The battle to retake Mosul from DAESH has begun. At RealClearWorld Anthony Cordesman remarks:
In fact, the most critical aspect of the battle may not be whether ISIS is defeated. It may be whether Iraq’s deeply divided factions can find some way to cooperate if they win. The alternative could be worse than ISIS: Sunni versus Shi’ite, Arab versus Kurd, and Turkey, Iran, outside Arab states, and Russia all competing to serve their own ends. “Winning†could all too easily divide Iraq on a lasting basis and/or turn into new forms of civil conflict. Here, it is useful to hear about the preparations for the fight. The problem is the lack of any credible public statements as to how the Iraqi and U.S. governments will react once ISIS is defeated.
Both the proper timing and actual success are critical. This battle cannot be safely politicized. Any major reversal in the fighting for Mosul will affect the future stability of every political element in Iraq, the future success of the U.S. effort to create effective Iraqi security forces, and global perceptions of the future of both ISIS and other violent Islamist movements. Here, a certain amount of trust in the U.S. military will be critical. If U.S. military briefings sometimes seem a bit vague, they should be. Focusing on play-by-play descriptions of progress and problems weakens Iraqi trust and U.S. influence, and provides far too much information to ISIS.
Right now there isn’t anything to analyze. Just a few self-serving reports from participants for which it is impossible to gauge the accuracy or authority. When there is something, I will.
Whether the “battle cannot be safely politicized” or it can, believe me, all of the participants will. We’re already seeing it.
For the most informative analysis on the likely aftermath of the battle see this article from Patrick Ryan and Patrick B. Johnston at War on the Rocks. DAESH will likely go underground (as I noted yesterday it may have already).
