Alice Banchini of Alice in Texas has an excellent post on lying. Whenever I want to get the straight skinny on moral conduct I always turn to Aquinas first:
Accordingly if these three things concur, namely, falsehood of what is said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally the intention to deceive, then there is falsehood—materially, since what is said is false, formally, on account of the will to tell an untruth, and effectively, on account of the will to impart a falsehood.
If you tell the truth thinking it is a lie with the intent to deceive, it is deceit but not a lie. If you tell a falsehood thinking it is the truth, it’s neither deceitful nor a lie.
The Jesuits added some new wrinkles to this kind of thinking that had to do with the consequences of the lie and the person to whom the lie was told. If the consequences of the truth would be to injure someone else, the Jebbies were inclined to excuse the lie. Or if the person asking the question had no right to the truth, the Jebbies also considered a lie excuseable. That’s where the term “equivocating Jesuit” came from. Have I mentioned that I’m Jesuit-educated?
Many times I have told people what I sincerely believe to be the truth, while knowing that they are biased against me, that they will consider it a lie, and thus that they will consider me, falsely, to be a liar. Thus I will have (essentially) deceived them. This has happened often enough in my life, that I can anticipate these situations and even take a perverse enjoyment. What would Aquinas or the Jesuits think of this?
That’s easy, Tresho. Without falsehood there is no lie. Without the intent to deceive, there is no deceit.
A person with no right to the truth should receive a null answer unless there is additional justification for falsehood.