It is very nearly a truism that the United States is not a democracy but a republic. Indeed, the Founding Fathers had what amounted to a horror of democracy, as Madison wrote in Federalist 10:
AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a wellconstructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.
The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.
He goes on to defend the system of checks and balances established by the new Constitution in what is probably the most famous passage from Federalist.
The protections against “faction” under our system are numerous and they include not only the system of checks and balances but representative government itself, the division of the legislature into two houses, the appointment of the members of the Senate by the state governments, and the electoral college.
I don’t think most people understand what a “republic” is. It is a form of government in which the will of majority is not the most important thing. The rules have primacy. Legitimacy is not conveyed by popularity with 50%+1 of the voters but by agreeing on the rules and following them.
There is at least an argument to be made for majority rule. In the absence of a system of rules there is none at all to be made for minority rule unless that is according to the rules in which case it’s all that is important.
For the last two years Democrats have been arguing that
- The rules aren’t fair and
- Trump cheated.
Over two years no evidence has emerged of the latter which leaves them with the former. However, under our system, if you are unable to change the rules because of the rules themselves, there are two honorable, decent courses of action.
The first is to leave—to flee. The second is to take up arms against what is to you an intolerable and unjust order. Not only is calling the legitimacy of the system itself neither honorable nor decent it is shortsighted. It is worse than a crime—it is a mistake, sawing off the limb of the tree you’re sitting on.
Wait, there is another option. When the electoral districts in the UK overwhelming favored Tories, (see rotten boroughs), Whigs were able to get the voting districts reformed in exchange for creating uniform voting qualifications, creating a voter registration system, and extended the franchise to large tenants. Achieving political objectives beyond your reach requires compromise.
When Hamilton couldn’t get approval of federal assumption of state debts through Madison’s House of Representatives, he asked for Jefferson’s help, and Jefferson invited the men to dinner where they hammered out the compromise that delivered the new national capitol to the South, plus a little extra debt assumption for Virginia. If the process had required Madison to support debt assumption on its own merits, it would never have happened.
We used to elect politicians to be statesmen. Now, we see the electoral process as simply a means to request commodities, and we are confused why we don’t get what we ordered.
That is right on the money. Possibly the best comment I have read all week.
It also dovetails with something I’ve been working on. An enormous amount of what I’m seeing right now that passes for politics is targeted at enabling additional consumption or, more precisely, timeshifting consumption from the future into the present.
Is there any actual evidence that our great national problem is insufficient personal consumption? That’s the impression you’d receive from the political discourse. The U. S. economy is beginning to enter a level of dependence on personal consumption more characteristic of an economy teetering on the brink of collapse than a major economy.
Of course, the franchise was held a few white men of property in the days of Hamilton and Jefferson. That is the main difference.
I would add the Bill of Rights and the Supreme Court to the anti-democratic elements in the Constitution. There is no going back. the next stage is dictatorship.
Dave – nice post. Send it to Dr Taylor
PD – I echo Dave’s observation.
Dave (in comments) – it’s called pandering. And politicians discovered it works. There is a large market for free beer.
I inadvertently hit submit too soon.
so the consumption society is a long discussion. Politicians are to blame, but so are, well, consumers. Instant gratification is in, saving is out. People who have no business taking lavish vacations or outsized homes or 6 TVs in the House or restaraunt dinners (none of which I was familiar with when I couldn’t afford it) think they are owed it. They are not.
You could have a whole series of posts on this.
“Not only is calling the legitimacy of the system itself neither honorable nor decent it is shortsighted. It is worse than a crime—it is a mistake, sawing off the limb of the tree you’re sitting on.”
I had several debates with Dr. Taylor over at OTB regarding this point. He sees no harm in discussing the problems with our system but doesn’t have a path to make it better. And the thing is, I agree with him about a lot of the issues with our system, but to me delegitimizing our institutions when there is no real plan or chance for reform is just as you said – sawing off the limb you’re (we all are) sitting on.
Madison: “But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. ”
The surest way to encourage factions is to build a treasure room like you find in the final monster’s lair of a video game – mountains of gold and jewels and dancing girls. Everybody and their brother in law saddles up and form groups to get the goodies.
The Constitution enshrined Federalism to prevent precisely this from happening. The national treasure would be distributed throughout the system – Federal, State, County, City, improvement districts, home owners associations… Alexis de Tocqueville wrote of this in “Democracy in America”.
The principle is called subsidiarity: “Subsidiarity is a principle of social organization that holds that social and political issues should be dealt with at the most immediate level that is consistent with their resolution.”
Over the past 80 years or so the Federal Government has aggregated power to the point where Federalism is toothless. Washington should not be building roads or providing school lunches amongst other things.
@Roy: I disagree that “Washington should not be building roads.” The Interstate highway system is vital to the economy and would not and could not be built by the states. It’s bad enough that we’ve allowed some states to put up toll booths on them.
I would have agreed not that long ago that the Feds shouldn’t be “providing school lunches amongst other things” but really see no way around it. We’re a rich nation in aggregate but have quite a bit of poverty, unequally distributed. The poorest states not only couldn’t afford to provide the lunches but culturally would be the least likely to do so. Federal subsidies create something of a moral hazard but they’re better than the alternative of unfed children.
It’s a complicated subject. While I agree with your observations about the utility of the interstate system, I think it has also suffered from a serious case of mission creep. A lot of what passes for interstate highways are actually commuter roads that don’t actually have a lot to do with interstate transit. As just one indicator of the mission creep, Hawaii has an interstate highway.
As of today every city in the United States with a population of 100,000 or more is connected to the others by an interstate highway. Extending that to every city of over 50,000 or 25,000 would not bring a great deal of additional utility. Basically, the interstate highway project is over.
Another complicated subject. Today 95% of Americans have cellphones and 77% have smartphones. 79% of households have cable TV. To whatever extent there are unfed children except in rare cases it’s due to parental neglect and the refusal of federal, state, and local authorities to take action against neglectful parents.