At the European Center for Foreign Relations Célia Belin, Majda Ruge, Jeremy Shapiro present “six scary policy scenarios” if Donald Trump is re-elected in November. They posit three strains of foreign policy opinion among Republicans:
- Donald Trump remains erratic and inconsistent when it comes to foreign policy. But the broader Republican foreign policy ecosystem forming around his administration is increasingly clear and organised.
- This ecosystem comprises three main “tribes” – restrainers who want US foreign policy to focus on America; prioritisers who want it to focus on Asia; and primacists who want it to continue to focus globally.
and the scenarios they present include a return to the Minsk Accords and a foreign policy crisis in the Indo-Pacific. I found the piece thought-provoking.
I have found Donald Trump’s thought processes puzzling since well prior to 2017. However, I think the authors overestimate how much can be determined about what a hypothetical second Trump term would bring based on prevailing strains of Republican foreign policy thought. Might they consider the first Trump term as a sign of what a second would bring? Maybe that, in fact, is what they’re considering and Trump’s previous European policies are what worry them.
My own observation is that Mr. Trump’s approach to foreign policy is completely transactional—he assesses what’s the best “deal” he can get from any particular situation, “deal” measured variably. I can well see how that would be disconcerting to European leaders.
While I cannot tell you what a second Trump term would do in any given situation, I can give you my impressions of European leadership. I think that the Europeans, particularly the Germans, are very accustomed to pursuing their own national interests, having America pick up the tab, and any change in that is very concerning to them. I also think they’re putting far too much weight on the “2% of GDP” NATO guideline for defense spending when they should be focusing more on readiness. When you’ve spent far less than you needed to for any reasonable level of readiness for over a generation, how much do you need to spend to achieve a satisfactory level of readiness? It could be 2%, 10%, or more? It could be 1%. I’m no expert on European militaries but even the French military, probably that at the highest level of readiness at this point, could probably use some sprucing up, protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.
Furthermore, what do the recent EU elections portend for future European defense spending? My take on the EU elections was that the Europeans were voting their pocketbooks and they’re tired of leadership policies that raise prices and taxes which would include increased defense spending.
I would just amend Trump’s transactional nature to note that it is the best deal that he will benefit from, secondarily parts of the nation that provide him support may also benefit. I would say more concerning are the reports that the intent is to place sycophants in all positions of power so that there wont be anyone with the balls to disagree with him and no one with the experience and knowledge to know when they should tell him no. Lots of Ben Carsons, no Jim Mattis.
Europe bought into the neoliberal idea that if they developed economic interdependence that there would not be war. Wasn’t the claim that no two nations that had a MacDonalds would fight against each other? To be fair to them the US also bought into the idea that with the USSR officially gone Russia was not so much of a threat not realizing that Russia was really the threatening and controlling part of the USSR and it effectively retained control of some of the nations not officially in the republic anymore. Even more they failed to realize that Russia intended to re-establish that empire.
Steve
I don’t necessarily disagree with what you said in that comment, steve. It would be helpful to your argument if you cited how Trump benefited (other than politically) from his foreign policy choices during his presidency. If you are arguing, for example, that his son-in-law benefited financially from negotiating the Abraham Accords, I agree that would be corrupt. Corrupt in Trump, corrupt in Biden.
However, Poland doesn’t seem that worried about Russia and Germany and France certainly aren’t.
During World War II the U. S. spent 40% of its GDP on its military. Poland has budgeted 4% for 2024. That’s not exactly a wartime footing. Nearly every EU country has exponentially increased its trade with Kyrgyzstan since 2022, suggesting that they continue to trade with Russia “through the backdoor”.
Trump’s foreign policy was highly influenced by whomever was in the room, which often was his son-in-law. A second administration has far more potential influencers courting Trump with more predictive frameworks, but it’s not clear which specific influencers would be in that room. This type of maneuvering didn’t happen before the first administration because nobody, perhaps even Trump, thought he would win. So this could be different.
PD has it correct, for Trump personnel is policy; which is one of the mysteries of a potential second Trump administration. Currently, it doesn’t seem most major characters from the first administration will be back; not Jared (in charge of Middle East policy) or Ivanka, not Matt Pottinger (who spearheaded policy on China); not Pompeo, definitely not Mattis or Esper, not Pence, not Barr, not Mnuchin. The plausible ones I’ve heard are Lighthizer and O’Brian.
It is also notable that the chaos of Trump campaign 2016 and 2020 has been replaced with a steadier campaign in 2024. I’ve barely noticed any personnel changes in the past year.
Another factor for Europeans is the European context is far different than 2016 or 2020.
Macron (who Obama endorsed as an antidote to Trump) looks like he committed political seppuku by calling snap elections where the far-left and far-right will decimate his party (it is amusing to watch Le Pen live the saying, “Paris is worth a mass”). In Germany, the long serving Merkel is gone, replaced by an unpopular Scholz and where the “far right” AFD is on course to win a plurality in East German state elections in the fall (a first), also the German model has been wrecked due to competition from China in autos and losing access to cheap Russian gas. The Italians have Meloni, who is supposedly “far right” as well. The UK is moving left in the upcoming election, but the Tories were “Trump skeptical”.
And whoever takes office in 2025 still has the headache of the Ukraine war. The ugly truth is Ukraine is losing, and the current course is either Ukraine loses or a lot of NATO troops will be fighting and dying in Ukraine against Russian troops. Indeed, if someone could negotiate for a return to Minsk (Russia only control Crimea in return for Ukrainian neutrality, recognition of the Russian language, some “Federalization”), neutral observers would consider that a Ukrainian victory.
Incentives point Trump and the Europeans towards doing things differently in 2025 vs 2016 if Trump is President, but we will see.