Restrainers vs. Primacists

Another post that caught my eye this morning was this one by Andrew Latham at RealClearDefense:

Although I am not an across-the-board supporter of Trump—I have strong reservations about much of his domestic agenda and political style—I am a passionate advocate for a grand strategy of restraint. Not because Trump champions it, but because restraint is the only approach consistent with the post-unipolar, multipolar world we now inhabit.

Restraint should never be mistaken for isolationism. The critics’ lazy conflation of the two is a disservice to strategic debate. Restraint does not mean withdrawing from the world or abandoning allies. Rather, it requires strategic discipline – prioritizing vital interests, especially in the Western Hemisphere and key regions of Eurasia, while avoiding costly, unnecessary interventions. The Western Hemisphere, in particular, deserves renewed focus as the bedrock of U.S. security. Strengthening regional ties, stabilizing fragile states, and preventing external interference in the Americas would ensure a secure backyard from which the U.S. can project power when essential. Yet, this hemispheric emphasis does not mean ignoring revisionist powers in other regions. Balancing and blunting threats elsewhere remains crucial when regional hegemony would jeopardize core U.S. interests. As multipolarity replaces the fleeting moment of unipolarity, the reality is clear: the United States cannot – and should not – attempt to sustain a unipolar moment that has long since passed.

and

Some critics point to Trump’s so-called softness on Russia as proof of dangerous isolationism. This, too, misses the mark. As The Wall Street Journal recently noted, Trump’s approach to Russia is hardly unprecedented. Previous administrations, including Obama’s, sought pragmatic engagement with Moscow when U.S. interests aligned. Restraint here does not mean appeasement; it means realism. Recognizing that antagonizing Russia on its doorstep risks unnecessary confrontation is strategic wisdom, not weakness. Europe is economically and technologically equipped to handle its own security. Overcommitting U.S. resources in Europe, especially when strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific and hemispheric challenges loom large, is shortsighted.

As should be apparent I am a “restrainer” rather than a “primacist”. One quibble I have with Dr. Latham’s thesis is in this passage:

…it requires strategic discipline – prioritizing vital interests, especially in the Western Hemisphere and key regions of Eurasia, while avoiding costly, unnecessary interventions.

because it unnecessarily elides the distinct between restraint and primacy. What are our “vital interests”? How do you determine what is “unnecessary”? IMO that is the essential distinction between restraint and seeking primacy. For primacists retaining primacy is a vital interest and anything that furthers it is necessary.

My view to the contrary is that which preserves American peace, freedom, and prosperity in the near term is vital and necessary. Such a view is bound to alarm optimistic internationalists.