It has been some time since I last wrote on this subject. The publication of the 2025 National Security Strategy and the agonistic response from European commentators prompts a fresh look.
The United States military evaluates the “readiness” of units based on what is referred to as the “C scale” taking personnel, equipment on hand, equipment condition (serviceability), and training into account.
C-1 is the highest level of readiness. A unit rated C-1 is ready for anything including sustained military operations. A unit rated C-2 can undertake most missions. A unit rated C-3 can undertake many but not all missions. A unit rated C-4 needs additional equipment, personnel, or training to undertake wartime missions. It can only undertake portions. A unit rated C-5 is not ready.
It should be noted that the U. S. rating system emphasizes independence in logistics. These are informed estimates based on publicly available data from NATO, national audits, think-tanks such as IISS, RUSI, RAND, and German Bundestag oversight reports.
If we were to apply this rating system to the militaries of our NATO allies, how would they rate? Other than the United States there is only one C-1 rated military in NATO: France. Here is how the militaries of some of our NATO allies would rate:
| Country | Rating | Comments |
| France | C-1/C-2 | France retains a modern, well-equipped force structure, relatively large manpower, and (for major formations) a reasonable ability to mobilize and sustain — especially compared to smaller nations. |
| Poland | C-2 | Poland’s sharp defense-spending increase, size of its armed forces, and its front-line posture give it relatively high potential. But sustainment, strategic lift, heavy-industrial depth, and reliance on allies for high-end enablers likely cap it below a universal C-1. |
| Germany | C-3 (or worse for heavy ground forces in major war) | According to recent assessment: German ground forces “are not ready for a real fight” under a substantial adversary attack. That suggests they would struggle to sustain full-spectrum operations at U.S.-C-1 standards. |
| Turkey | C-2 regionally; C-3 for reinforcing Central/Eastern Europe | Second-largest army in NATO: ~402k active, ~260k reserve, with multiple armored and mechanized divisions and ~3,000 tanks on paper. Combat-tested in Syria, Iraq, Caucasus, etc., and NATO notes it meets/exceeds 2% of GDP and fulfills capability targets. But much of its armor is old, and Fox explicitly questions whether Türkiye can move heavy formations into Eastern Europe quickly; it’s clearly able to dominate in the Caucasus but has mobility chokepoints across the Bosporus and Balkans. By U.S. standards: C-2 for regional fights near home, C-3 if you’re asking it to be a first-in heavy contributor in Poland/Baltics on short notice. |
| Italy | C-2 / C-3 (call it a strong C-3 today) | Italian Army is sophisticated, with three division-level commands and ten brigades (mix of light, mechanized, and tank), plus high-readiness airmobile forces. But heavy brigades still rely on legacy Ariete MBTs and Dardo IFVs; modernization to newer Leopards and IFVs is only just picking up. Italy likely can deploy a battalion quickly and a mechanised brigade within a month, similar to France/UK, but struggles to meet 2% of GDP and has limited depth. |
| Spain | C-3 | Spain is modernizing its land forces for 2035 but has been the lowest spender in NATO as a share of GDP (?1.28% in 2024). |
| Netherlands | C-2 at battalion level under NATO logistics; C-3 if judged as an independent heavy force | The Royal Netherlands Army has three brigades (airmobile, light, mechanized) and ~21k full-time personnel; highly professional and interoperable. |
| Norway | C-2 for home defense in the north; C-3 beyond that | Very small but well-equipped land force centered on Brigade Nord (now being reinforced and essentially growing into a heavier Arctic posture, plus a second brigade). For defending its own territory and key northern approaches, it’s a solid, self-supporting niche C-2. For large-scale deployments into the Baltic or farther south, it becomes a small C-3 contributor that needs allied lift and logistics. |
| Baltic countries | C-3 as conventional forces; very high readiness for resistance/insurgency | Estonia assumes it will be overrun quickly and structures its army for insurgency; Latvia has one mechanized brigade plus reservist light brigades; Lithuania has two mechanized brigades plus a reserve force. |
The UK’s military is not what it was. The UK sits somewhere between France and Italy: small active forces but high readiness at scale when funded and tasked.
These evaluations are necessarily somewhat speculative since NATO does not provide such measurements of readiness publicly. Not to mention that statements are frequently political rather than substantive. They are optimistic. I could support these assessments with information available publicly down to the unit level but this is a blog post not a dissertation or book.
The Bundeswehr reportedly had just 2 days of artillery ammunition on hand in 2023. Even with continued dependence on the U. S. it needs two weeks. Germany could, within roughly three years, bring its active components up to something like U.S. C-2 standards if and only if it puts ammunition, spare parts, depot-level maintenance, and field training ahead of prestige programs. Doing that while sustaining Ukraine likely requires defense spending closer to 3% of GDP. The real question is not technical feasibility but political will: whether Berlin is prepared to prioritize actual combat power over symbolism. Until that changes, the Bundeswehr will remain a C-3 force in a C-1 neighborhood. Do the Germans have the political will?
