At UnHerd Aris Roussinos muses over whether Ukraine should consider compromising:
The Biden administration’s approach to the war has always been fundamentally sound: that Ukraine should be supported to negotiate, but only from a position of relative strength. Yet it is no good to belatedly observe, as US officials are now anonymously wont to do, that perhaps America’s top general Mark Milley was right in claiming that Ukraine’s greatest period of relative strength was last winter, following the unexpected success of the Kherson and Kharkiv offensives, when an overstretched Russia was on the ropes and seemingly willing to negotiate. True, back then, Ukraine’s star was ascendent and the planned offensive, then slated for the spring, seemed fraught with terrible potential for Russia’s leadership. Yet even then, Russia insisted on Kyiv recognising Moscow’s possession of the Ukrainian territories it had just abandoned, an impossible starting condition for talks.
and
Instead of public expressions of eternal support followed by private disavowals, Washington should not now promise Kyiv more than it can realistically expect to deliver, factoring in the possibility of a White House transition. Equally, Ukraine now needs to cut its ambitions to America’s cloth: it should abandon fantasies of carving a humbled Russia into ethnic republics, or bundling Putin into a dock in the Hague, and focus on what can be realistically be achieved over the course of the next year. Both America and Ukraine will need to compromise: Washington by delivering more aid over a longer timeframe than Biden is politically comfortable with, and Kyiv by lowering its goals to match its objective capabilities.
I don’t believe that Ukraine can compromise; continuing to demand a return to their pre-2014 borders is an existential issue for them. Equally existential for the Russians is continued control of Crimea and independence at the very least for the two Donbas provinces. That’s not a new development; Russia has maintained that view all along. Like it or not it’s not up to us to dictate the Russian interest.
It may well be that Ukraine will join NATO, just not in the way advocates had wanted but by federating with Poland. That may be the most viable alternative for the rump eastern Ukraine. Declaring that such judgments are up to the Ukrainians is meaningless noise. U. S. support is critical to Ukraine’s ability to continue at its present level although it could continue a guerrilla war essentially forever.
Ukraine is going to be cut up and shared out to its neighbors. There will be NO Ukraine to join NATO.
What now needs to be determined is what a defeat in Ukraine means to the future os US/NATO.
The instigation of a war with China is next on the neocon agenda. That will result in the expulsion of the US military from Asian. Welcome to 1897.
Russia existed just fine without the Donbas regions. There is no rational reason for them to declare it existential except to justify they want the area. Once we again we have to accept Russian fantasy as being equivalent to Ukraine losing territory which is factual.
Steve
For nearly 200 years Russia has proclaimed itself the defender of ethnic Russians. Donbas has 40% ethnic Russians—at this point they may constitute a majority, who knows?
That you do not consider that a legitimate interest does not mean that the Russians don’t.
Being the defender of ethnic Russians doesnt make not owning the Donbas area an existential crisis. Russia itself was never threatened. Its and excuse to take over that land or any land where there are a lot of Russians. It should also be noted that one of the reasons there are so many Russians in places like the Donbas and the Baltics is that Russia deported and killed a lot of the native peoples and then gave the land to ethnic Russians.
So from the POV of Ukraine, Russia killed and deported a bunch of people and installed a bunch of their own and now they want to claim the land. From the Russian POV this is a great way to expand the empire, but we will call it existential since most people dont know what that means and they dont know the history.
Steve
That’s a pretty good description of what happened in the Baltics which were not historically part of Russia but it’s not what happened in Ukraine which has been a part of Russia since the time of Catherine the Great. Before that it was part of Poland during which time the Poles ejected Russians and Tatars from their land.
I think the reality is that both sides will have to compromise on their goals because their current goals are not achievable. But another reality is that it can take a long time for that reality to sink in. And a Ukrainian willingness to settle and compromise doesn’t mean that Russia is or will be similarly willing.
Plus, there are strong incentives for each side, in any negotiation, to not compromise on long-term goals. The combatants may settle for a temporary white peace or cease-fire, but neither will give up fundamental claims.
Dave- When you include the pre and post WW2 deportations and killings of Ukrainians by Russians the number is well over 1 million. Add in the famine caused by Russians and you are up in the 4-6 million range. They killed a heck of a lot of people. They did bring ethnic Russians to resettle. I dont know how well documented there is a number for Russians brought in to take over the land lost. Note that when the turmoil settled after 1921 Ukraine was a republic as part of the USSR with Ukraine as its official language.
Steve