As an acquaintance of mine once put it, don’t tell me your priorities—tell me your relative priorities. In the coming hours and days we will see what various countries’ including the United States’s relative priorities are. At present Germany depends on Russia for natural gas and unless things change that will increasingly be the case since the country is phasing out both nuclear and coal-fired power generation. It continues to block the shipment of arms to Ukraine. Germany is Russia’s fourth most important trading
Shockingly, the U. S. imports more gasoline from Russia than any other country and the ending or suspension of gas and oil imports from Russia are not yet included in the sanctions the U. S. has imposed Russia.
China has imposed no sanctions on Russia and is Russia’s most important trading partner both for imports, on which Russia is far less dependent than the United States, and exports on which it is more dependent than the U. S.
The U.S. is a net exporter of gas and does not import significant gasoline from Russia. I’m not sure what would be complicated about stopping imports; but Russia would sell the gas elsewhere on the market and the U.S. could buy it elsewhere on the market, including domestically. Without broader sanctions, would be a meaningless gesture, but perhaps the gesture should be made.
I think that broader sanctions should be imposed but I also think we should not ask others to make sacrifices we aren’t willing to make ourselves.
A little OT or tangential but I heard Peter Zeihan talking about what he believes is likely Russia’s grand strategy. The gist as I understood it was that Ukraine is step one and doesn’t trigger NATO involvement, but is likely to exploit tensions between NATO members. The idea then is the eventual implosion of NATO which allows Russia to move ahead into eastern Poland and the Baltics without resistance from the West. Zeihan of course believes that Putin’s strategic defense goals necessitate control of 9 key areas and if Ukraine falls they will hold 7 and will then try to make a sweep of the remaining 2.
On the other hand he foresees failure in that long term military adventure, largely because of Russia’s collapsing demographics.
But if his main thesis is correct then we ought to be focused on getting NATO members’ priorities aligned as much as possible. I haven’t read or listened to Zeihan enough to be sure but I think he would say that’s pointless- that the collapse of NATO, Russia, China, and basically the rest of the world is inevitable and the US can accept that and be the last man standing. I find that too hard to swallow and think we need to at least try to preserve or reconstruct some kind of world order.
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The U. S. has accepted lower-than-promised military expenditures by NATO members for so long they think it’s a law of nature.
Of all NATO members at this point other than than the U. S. only the French military is at the highest level of readiness although the Brits could get there pretty quickly.
“The gist as I understood it was that Ukraine is step one and doesn’t trigger NATO involvement, but is likely to exploit tensions between NATO members.”
Or, it could have the opposite effect. Opening up the energy spigots would go a long way towards that. But its Biden.
The graphic is what Trump was upset about. The hand wringers blathered on about how he had alienated NATO members. Looks like they needed even a tougher talking to. There is a clip making the rounds of Trump addressing the UN, noting that Germany was on its way towards Russian energy dependency. The German delegation was laughing. But here we are.
Just a reminder.
If the current conflict signals that the 1989 peace dividend is over, the military was 6% of GDP in the 1980’s.
That’s a 70% increase from current levels or $550 billion dollars a year.
And in the 1980’s, that was in an economy with an industrial base that produced enough goods so trade was roughly balanced. The current industrial base produced a trade deficit of 800 billion dollars last year.
I suspect the Treasury Secretary and House Budget Committee chairman are going to have a fainting spell after the next NATO summit when presented with the bill.
On that topic I read an article the other day, quoting the Secretary of the Navy, that said that in order to meet current commitments the Navy needed 500 ships. I have no basis on which to contradict that. I just don’t know.
I have frequently said that my preference over increasing spending was to reduce commitments but that has serious implications for the U. S.’s ability to project power. I’m also skeptical about the carrier-heavy configuration we presently have. It reminds me of Bill Mauldin’s cartoon about tanks: “A movin’ foxhole attracks the eye”. Are carriers just too vulnerable? Wargames of action in the Persian Gulf have shown just that. And don’t even think about carrier warfare in the Black Sea. How about the South China Sea?
Thanks for pointing that out, CO. One would hope that there is a scale effect in defense spending. But your point stands.
To link spending and the navy back to “grand strategy”.
If one is focused on a land war in Europe; one would invest their money in the army and the air force. But if one is focused on a conflict over literal islands in the Pacific, one would put their money in the navy, marines, and certain types of missiles.
I would posit the US is entering an era where there is credible challenger in Europe and and the Pacific for the first time in WWII.
As a data point, after seeing Ukraine occur, former Japanese PM Abe said Japan should discuss hosting nuclear weapons in Japan, and thinks the US should abandon strategic ambiguity on Taiwan while retaining the “one China policy”. Remarkable considering Japan’s history and how officials like to communicate.
If the US must deal with both challenges, military spending could easily go to 9-10% of GDP. Is that sustainable?
And even the alignment in Europe looks more expensive to defend than in 1989. The iron curtain which needed defending by NATO (directly opposite Warsaw Pact members) —
Norway / USSR (200 km),
West Germany / East Germany (1400 km),
Germany / Czech Republic (200 km),
(Greece/Turkey)/Bulgaria (1000 km),
Turkey / USSR (400 km).
Total 3200 km.
Now, assuming Ukraine joins. Warsaw pact is replaced by CSTO.
Norway / Russia (200 km)
(Estonia/Latvia/Lithuania) / Russia (775 km)
Lithuania / Belarus (680 km)
Poland / Belarus (400 km)
Poland / Russia (200 km)
Ukraine / Belarus (1000 km)
Ukraine / Russia (2000 km)
Turkey / Armenia (300 km)
Total 5500 km.
Its kind of crazy; but at some point the length of borders the US is asked to defend by treaty will matter in policy making.