I didn’t learn anything I didn’t already know from David Byler’s article in the Washington Post on how much California’s “population boom” has changed over the last few years. Here’s its opening passage:
For more than a century, California’s population has grown with astonishing speed: On average, the state added more than 300,000 people per year. But now the state’s growth has stalled.
The slowdown began before the pandemic. California gained about 230,000 people between July 1, 2016, and July 1, 2017, but between July 1, 2019, and July 1, 2020, the state’s population growth hit the brakes, adding only 21,000 new residents.
The slowdown has three primary causes: an exodus to other states, a larger-than-normal baby bust and an immigration halt. Each of these trends reveals deep problems within the state.
Changes in the type and dynamics of California’s population is nothing new. There was a point of inflection in the late 60s-early 70s when the aerospace sector collapsed. The engineers, scientists, and other skilled professionals that sector had employed needed to find other jobs quickly. Some moved within California; others left the state entirely. The people who replaced them, largely illegal migrants, earned a lot less money. That has been the pattern for decades. California has experienced substantial domestic outmigration since the 1990s. What kept California’s population growing were largely immigrants—both legal and illegal. That’s reflected in the demographic trends in the state since 1970. In 1970 85% of California’s population was white non-Hispanic; if the percentage of Hispanic population in the state is not 50% now it soon will be.
The article is full of interesting charts and graphs.
I hasten to point out that the factors Mr. Byler identifies:
- Outmigration
- Reduced immigration
- Lower birthrate
are not unrelated. The people leaving California tend to be younger than those who remain. As young people leave California, seeking lower taxes, affordable housing, and jobs, it tends to depress the birthrate.
All I have to add to Mr. Byler’s observations is that to a large degree the decline in immigration should not only have been expected but should be expected to continue. Consider Mexico’s population pyramid in 1970:
and compare it with its population pyramid now:
The decline in immigration from Mexico tracks with the decline in the growth in the number of people from age 15 to 35. It was to be expected. Similarly, we shouldn’t expect Guatemala, Honduras, and Salvador to make up the difference. They’re much smaller countries and they are experiencing the same demographic changes Mexico has—they’re just lagging behind Mexico by a couple of decades.
