Question

Since Donald Trump’s election I’ve seen a lot of thrashing back and forth and handwringing about the Affordable Care Act. “Repeal and replace” seems to be a foregone conclusion.

My question is whether the problem is the ACA or the very idea of insurance as applied to healthcare? The cost of healthcare insurance is proportional to the cost of healthcare. There’s no way to control the cost of healthcare insurance without controlling the cost of healthcare and the cost of healthcare is presently rising at a multiple of all other costs.

Even if healthcare costs could be brought under control, to make insurance applicable to healthcare you’d need to limit what was covered to insurable risks. That’s politically impossible.

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Hate Crimes, 2015

The following table was derived from the FBI’s report on hate crimes for the most recent year available, 2015:

Nature Number
Bias against Jews 695
Bias against Muslims 301
Bias against Christians 175
Total bias against religion 1,434

What can or cannot reasonably be surmised from that? Hate crimes against other religious sects or denominations were in single digits.

FWIW by far the greatest number of hate crimes are those perpetrated against blacks. They account for a quarter of all hate crimes, more than the total of all hate crimes perpetrated on the basis of religion.

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The Role of Internal Migration

In his Wall Street Journal column James Taranto remarks on Judis’s and Texeira’s predictions I mentioned yesterday:

In all, we’d say Judis and Teixeira were about half right. They correctly predicted that nonwhite voters would improve Democratic prospects in states like Colorado, Nevada, North Carolina and Virginia—but they failed to anticipate the scope of Republican gains in other states.

The latter trend probably can’t take the GOP much further; Maine, Minnesota and New Hampshire are the only obvious opportunities Trump didn’t realize this year. It’s certainly possible that the former trend will continue, as Teixeira now predicts, and the emerging Democratic majority will finally emerge.

Or it could recede again. Trump improved slightly over Mitt Romney’s performance among blacks, Hispanics and Asian-Americans—and there’s still plenty more room for improvement.

I think there are several problems with the hypothesis. First, although black voters clearly vote as a reliable bloc, Hispanic voters don’t. They don’t even vote as two blocs (Cuban and other). Might Republicans have permanently alienated Hispanic voters? Sure. But the evidence doesn’t prove it.

And I think that Mssrs. Taranto, Judis, and Texeira all neglect the effects of internal migration. Black voters moving from Illinois to Georgia will make Illinois less blue and Georgia less red. Will Hispanic voters moving from California to Texas turn Texas blue? Or will they become less blue themselves?

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Compare and Contrast

In the last four presidential elections 2004-2016, whites have voted for the Republican candidate in the following percentages: 58, 55, 59, 58. During the same period black voters have voted for the Democratic candidate in the following percentages: 88, 95, 93, 88. Hispanics voted for the Democratic candidate in the following percentages: 56, 68, 71, 65.

What conclusions can you reasonably draw from that? What conclusions cannot be reasonably drawn from that?

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Triangulation

The surprising election of Donald Trump has caused all sorts of people to discover that the United States has three branches of government, as though setting foot on a foreign shore for the first time. One of these is Norm Ornstein, who in his Washington Post op-ed calls for Senators to curb the worst excesses of a Trump presidency:

Senate Republicans should also make sure that destructive policies, whether to increase the debt with unpaid-for tax cuts, blow up agencies, make mindless cuts in regulations, pursue trade wars, accept torture, move us closer to an all-out war with Islam or curtail civil liberties, do not get jammed through Congress. They cannot succumb to the pressure sure to come from the radical right to blow up the filibuster not just for nominations but also for legislative actions. Not every Senate Republican will heed this call. But from a group including Graham, Jeff Flake (Ariz.), Susan Collins (Maine), Lisa Murkowski (Alaska), Shelley Moore Capito (W.Va.), Lamar Alexander (Tenn.), Bob Corker (Tenn.), John McCain (Ariz.), Johnny Isakson (Ga.), Ben Sasse (Neb.), among others, there should be sufficient numbers to provide a check and balance against authoritarian and divisive rule.

and

What about Senate Democrats? They will be tempted to adopt the 2009 Republican playbook, when Democrats controlled Washington: Vote in unison against everything, filibuster everything, even those things you like, to obstruct action and make it look ugly, allow damage to the country in the short term to reap political rewards in the next election. That would be a mistake.

Democrats have a chance to use their filibuster power not just to obstruct but also to improve. The first opportunity to do that will likely be on an infrastructure bill. Financing a good portion of the package through repatriated corporate profits invested in long-term, low-interest infrastructure bonds is one key. Making sure that a significant share of the program goes to green energy, broadband, cybersecurity and the electrical grid should be strong demands. So should a guarantee that any corporate tax reform that is a part of the deal not be simply another giant tax cut and giveaway.

I don’t think he needs to worry. Each sitting senator has won his or her own elections and few of them are aligned with Trump. Those who are will likely be drawn into the incoming administration.

Senators tend to see themselves as presidents-in-waiting, are jealous of their prerogatives, and some of them, like Orrin Hatch or Patrick Leahy, have been in the Senate since before Donald Trump had been married the first time. They can’t be told what to do.

I anticipate a new-found regard for the power of the Congress and why we are a nation of laws rather than of men.

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Realignment

At Foreign Policy Emile Simpson sees a major political realignment taking place throughout the developed world:

Brexit and Trump were not anomalies, accidents of political history that can be explained away to maintain the integrity of the inherited notion that “normal” politics involves competition between a center-left party and a center-right party. Rather, in my view, they are symptomatic of a paradigm shift in the configuration of Western political life, one which has only just started.

Consider the familiar political category of left and right, which since 1945 has provided the basic organizing category of political differentiation in Western democracies across the vast majority of issues. Although the language of left and right dates to the French Revolution, the category started to take substantial political meaning in the late 19th century, and was forged over the following decades on the anvil of intense political fights over industrialization in the West, and all the changes in economic, social, and political relations that came in its wake.

The crucial point is that left and right are symbiotic, because they represent both sides of the argument over the problem of industrialization, over which there are good arguments to be made on either side. It is the interaction of these arguments set up by the mediation of the left-right categorization that produced sensible compromises across a whole range of issues.

I’m not entirely sure that’s what’s going on. I think what we’re seeing has more to do with the nature of greed.

Greed has no limits but the rate of economic growth does. When there’s lots of economic activity the desires of the powerful go barely noticed. It’s not that they’re not greedy. It’s that the greed is hardly noticed.

But when economic activity slows the underlying avarice that was there all along stands out more starkly. The entire developed world has experienced more than 50 years of great economic activity. There have been ups and downs but the trend was up.

But now that’s slowed down. Maybe the brakes are only on temporarily. Maybe it’s permanent. The guys at the top still demand their cut. A hundred million here and a hundred million there and pretty soon you’re talking about real money.

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Watchdog of the Public Good

NBC News complains about access to President-Elect Trump:

In a highly unusual move, President-elect Donald Trump on Tuesday night left his Manhattan residence without notifying the reporters covering him or giving any indication of where he was going.

The maneuver seemed to deliberately limit access to the media.

The only way the press eventually ascertained his whereabouts was after a Bloomberg reporter, who happened to be dining at the 21 Club, tweeted a photo of Trump and some of his transition team in the Midtown steakhouse.

Trump spokeswoman Hope Hicks later told NBC News. “He is having dinner with his family.”

Wife Melania, daughter Ivanka Trump, her husband Jared Kushner, sons Donald Jr. and Eric Trump were all at the restaurant.

I welcome this sort of scrutiny. I look forward to much, much more.

I hope the scrutiny and commentary are fair and unbiased but IMO unfair and biased scrutiny and commentary are better than none at all.

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No Permanent Majorities

In the light of Mr. Judis’s and Mr. Texeira’s op-eds, I strongly recommend that you read Sean Trende’s assessment of the track record of the “emerging Democratic majority” hypothesis at RealClearPolitics:

If you take a long view of American politics, they are exceedingly stable; a party may jump out to a lead if the other party presides over three years of economic decline (as Herbert Hoover did from 1930 to 1932) or runs for re-election amid 9 percent growth (as FDR did in 1936), but we tend toward a 50-50 nation. Even the supposed New Deal coalition was bedeviled by contingency; in 1938, Republicans nearly won the popular vote for the House; in 1940, FDR trailed in the polls until Hitler invaded Poland; in 1942 Republicans won the popular vote for the House by four points; from 1946 to 1958 they were roughly at parity with the Democrats. Our tendency as humans to attempt to find order in chaos leads us to overlook these contrary data points, and to find continuity in the high points for Democrats. But this leads us to miss the forest for the trees.

Analysts should have been skeptical of the Emerging Democratic Majority thesis because the party dominance that proponents of the theory – especially of the “hard” version of the theory – were suggesting was essentially unprecedented in American history. That doesn’t mean that something like that couldn’t happen, or that it can’t happen in the future. It just means that we shouldn’t be surprised when it doesn’t.

To believe in the “hard” version of the hypothesis you’ve got to believe in governing philosophies that have not materialized, numbers that aren’t there, the irrelevance of contingency in American politics, the primacy of identity, and that Hispanics, Asians, and Muslims will provide the same sort of reliable voting blocs that black voters have over the period of the last three-quarters of a century.

Intolerance, overreach, and outright racism among a white voter interest group could cause other interest groups to make common cause. That’s what I mean by a worst case scenario. But even that is unlikely to be permanent. Whiteness is malleable. Once upon a time the Irish, Italians, Catholics, and Jews were not thought of as white. Some people still don’t think they are but nowadays most Americans would think you were nuts if you said that the Irish weren’t white.

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Counter-Point

Judis’s co-author, Ruy Texeira, still believes:

Here’s one way to think about the 2016 election. We are witnessing a great race in this country between demographic and economic change that’s driving a new America, and reaction to those changes. On November 8, with a tremendous burst of speed, reaction to change caught up with change and surpassed it.

But is that advantage sustainable over the long haul, as change continues and reaction has to run ever faster simply to keep pace? Probably not. Those old legs will give out eventually, though we do not know exactly when. In the end, the race will be won by change — as it always is.

Looking back from 2032, we are far more likely to view the 2016 election as the last stand of America’s white working class, dreaming of a past that no longer exists, than as a fundamental transformation of the political system.

Soon after Mssrs. Judis and Texeira wrote The Emerging Democratic Majority, Democrats took control of the House and the Senate in a surge that reached its apogee with the election of Barack Obama to the presidency. Since then they’ve lost the House, Senate, and presidency and now hold majorities in only a third of state legislatures.

Mr. Texeira should hope that the sort of interest group power politics he advocated doesn’t come to pass. If it does the numbers don’t support his dreamed-of permanent Democratic majority.

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The Limits of Growth

The editors of the Wall Street Journal point out Europe’s problems:

The eurozone economy expanded 0.3% last quarter, according to data released Tuesday. Um, hurray?

We don’t begrudge Europe news that, by recent growth standards, qualifies as good. France notched quarterly growth of 0.2% while Italy clocked in at 0.3%, which is better than the zero and negative numbers from earlier this year. The growth in Europe’s third- and fourth-largest economies helped offset Germany’s worse-than-expected 0.2%.

Still, it’s worth noting that these figures are the best that Europe’s major economies seem capable of achieving even as European Central Bank chief Mario Draghi has provided the sort of stimulus that our Keynesian friends have long demanded: Negative interest rates, a devalued euro (down by around 24% from a 2014 high of $1.40), and purchases of corporate and government bonds to the tune of €80 billion per month.

Nor is that all. The eurozone has enjoyed dramatic energy-price declines, mercifully not entirely muted by that euro devaluation. This helps explain how German consumers have been able to keep their economy chugging, as lower global prices offset the ruinous expenses of Berlin’s green-energy boondoggles.

and go on to ask where’s the growth? I’ll provide two answers. First, part of “Europe’s” growth was an illusion. It was German growth propelled by the Chinese purchasing Germany’s “factories in a box” to build factories to satisfy Western consumption and by borrowing-driven consumption in the eurozone periphery, e.g. Greece. There isn’t enough Chinese consumption to fuel European economic growth and there won’t be unless the Chinese authorities have a dramatic change of heart. Think that’s going to happen? Me, neither.

Second, deadweight loss. The inefficiencies of their system are growing faster than the underlying economies. It’s fun while it lasts but the party’s over now.

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