Why does every analysis of the battle to re-take Mosul assume victory? This post at Hurriyet Daily News by Tolga Taniş is no exception:
ISIL may also play the Turkey card and try to draw Ankara into the clashes by staging attacks at risky and critical locations in the region.
They will lose Mosul sooner or later, but they will not finish; because then, they will turn to their “classic terror acts†of assassinations, bombings and suicide attacks. They will continue with their idea of territorial control in Syria. However, even though in Iraq all anti-government armed forces have been consolidated, in Syria there are several different radical groups, whom some of them are fighting ISIL. This too will constitute another difficulty for ISIL.
Losing Mosul will strike a major blow to ISIL in terms of financing. They made $500 million in 2015 from oil sales. They sold their oil to the people living in the region they were in control of. They also made $360 million from tax revenues. When they lose the largest city they are controlling, these figures will decline; thus lessening their operational power.
I’m not even sure what victory in the conflict would be. If you remove DAESH’s control over Mosul but destroy the city in the process, would that be a victory? Or if a substantial chunk of the city’s population flees? Or if most of DAESH’s operational strength remains undegraded?
It might be a better idea to figure out what the objective is before declaring victory. And many hazards remain. If DAESH harasses the Kurds enough they might withdraw to defend their own territory. There’s no guarantee that the Iraqi military will retain force cohesion. The Turks might just decide to occupy the territory between their borders and Mosul. There are all sorts of things that could go wrong.