One thing I didn’t touch on in my posts about risk yesterday was that public pension funds have been taking bigger risks with the funds entrusted to them. At City Journal Steven Malanga explains:
Since 2001, the study found, most government pension funds have boosted their share of investments in riskier financial vehicles, from volatile stocks to real estate. During this period, pension funds achieved median annualized returns of just 6.4 percent, well below the goal of 7.5 percent to 8 percent returns. Only one pension system has met its investing goals since 2001. No wonder, then, that the indebtedness of state systems increased from $33 billion to a staggering $1.5 trillion.
The problem stems from politicians squandering the strong investment returns of the 1990s. Rather than banking pension systems’ rising surpluses in those flush years, elected leaders in California, Illinois, New Jersey, South Carolina, and elsewhere expanded worker benefits—promising that financial markets could underwrite the new costs. But economic downturns inevitably ensued, with market crashes in 2001 and 2008. The declines drained the systems of valuable assets, and when the Federal Reserve lowered interest rates, returns languished in safer investments, such as government bonds. The so-called risk-free rate of return—that is, the return that an investor earns from putting money into such instruments—fell from 5 percent in 2001 to just 2 percent today.
Forced to seek bigger gains elsewhere, pension funds have gambled more. Since 2001, the portion of state pension-fund portfolios invested in stocks and alternate financial vehicles rose by 10 points, to 77 percent. Portfolio managers chased these investments even as the pension systems matured, with a growing percentage of members nearing retirement. This approach departed from that of just about every other type of pension fund. As a 2014 study by the Society of Actuaries noted, “Public sector plans in the U.S. are unique in that they have taken additional risk as the plans have become more mature, compared to private sector plans in the U.S. and private and public sector plans in Canada, UK and the Netherlands, which have taken less risk as plans have matured.â€
The stock market isn’t like an annuity. The history of equities tells us that returns come in fits and starts. There can be many years of few if any returns followed by a few spikes of great returns. But that’s not what the assumptions of public pension funds need to meet their goals. They must realize 7.5% – 8% returns every year. All but a very few public pension funds have come anywhere near that so, consequently, they’re chasing greater returns by taking more serious risks.
That’s what will inevitably happen when assumptions are unrealistic and neither those putting the pension plans into effect, the beneficiaries of the pensions, or the managers of the pensions assume any risk. Worst comes to worst they can always fall back on the taxpayer.
Or can they? Illinois’s population is declining in absolute terms and on average those leaving have higher incomes and wealth than those remaining.
What I think should happen is that the pay and pensions of legislators should be contingent on the assumptions they’ve built into the plans they’re created being met. They are, after all, the people who are able to change those assumptions and plans. They need more skin in the game. Maybe even clawbacks. Maybe even clawbacks that exceed the state pay they’ve received—many derive much more income from peddling their contacts and influence than they do at their jobs as state legislators, cf. House Speaker Mike Madigan.
But all of that is a pipedream.







