David Ignatius’s most recent Washington Post column on ending the war in Ukraine is such a mish-mosh of contradictions, things with which I agree, and fantasies with which I disagree, I’m not sure what to make of it:
Chess players sometimes fall into a situation they call “zugzwang,” in which any move worsens their position. The impasse in the Ukraine peace talks feels like that. But unlike chess players, statesmen aren’t bound by rules. They can escape disaster.
Here’s the deadlock: Ukraine and its European supporters want a peace deal, perhaps freezing the current front line, so long as Kyiv gets “security guarantees” for the future. But Russia demands that the West first address “root causes” of the war, which amounts to its own version of a security guarantee.
He divides “security guarantees” into “offensive guarantees” and “defensive guarantees”. Here’s an example of an “offensive guarantee”:
One tough Western approach would be reciprocity. If Putin continues to attack cities and civilian infrastructure across Ukraine, then Kyiv’s allies would give it the means to respond in kind. The weapons are ready: Anglo-French Storm Shadow cruise missiles with a range of 155 miles; German Taurus cruise missiles with a 300-mile range; U.S. ATACMS and Precision Strike ballistic missiles with ranges of 250 miles.
and here are some “defensive” ones:
I can imagine an array of military options — from a no-fly zone over Ukraine, to a rotating training and advisory force inside Ukraine, to new retaliatory capabilities if Russia keeps attacking civilians or energy infrastructure. These would be security guarantees — not for the future but immediately.
Once upon a time Mr. Ignatius was the voice of the diplomatic establishment. Is that still the case? If so, the diplomatic establishment has fallen on hard times and not merely because it’s being pressed by Donald Trump.
Our most recent experience with Anglo-French offensive capability was in 2011 during the Libyan civil war. Within a couple of days the British and French had reached the end of their ability to fly missions. Has it improved since then? I doubt it.
Who would maintain a “no fly zone” in Ukraine? Clearly, not the British and French. It would be up to us. How would we accomplish it?
Similarly, with the cruise missiles and ATACMS he mentions. We could supply the Ukrainians for a few days, perhaps a month. Then what?
Mr. Ignatius mentions an unfortunate truth:
When they approached the brink in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union negotiated mutual security guarantees: Russia pulled its nuclear missiles from Cuba in exchange for America’s pledge not to invade the island (and to secretly remove nuclear missiles from Turkey).
Said another way the crisis was ended through reciprocity. The Soviets agreed to withdraw its nuclear missiles from Cuba and we agreed to withdraw ours from Turkey. That’s an account that differs somewhat from the popular account but it is reciprocity. We don’t put nuclear weapons on your border and you don’t put them on ours. What would the equivalent version of reciprocity be in the context of Ukraine and how does that differ from the appeasement we are being warned about by opponents of ending the war who never seem to propose a resolution to the conflict that we can actually accomplish and that doesn’t involve pushing Russia’s back to the wall, risking global thermonuclear war?
Mr. Ignatius concludes with this advice:
The strategist Fred Iklé wrote a brilliant little book called “Every War Must End” during the agonizing final years of the Vietnam conflict. Two comments seem especially appropriate now. “Inflicting ‘punishment’ on the enemy is … an ineffective strategy for ending a war,” Iklé cautioned. To end conflicts, he said, “nations on both sides tend to see a peace settlement that will bring greater and more lasting security than existed before the fighting broke out.”
If Russia chooses unwisely to fight on, then Europe and the United States should begin providing security guarantees for Ukraine now, not later. This isn’t chess. When a game is heading toward defeat, step away from the board.






