Onwards to Fareed Zakaria’s critique of China’s new, more assertive style of diplomacy in the Washington Post. He thinks it’s working against China’s interests. After citing a number of recent examples he remarks:

China’s current foreign policy is far removed from its patient, long-term and moderate approach during the Deng Xiaoping era and after. Back then, the central objective was to ensure that the country’s meteoric economic rise did not trigger resentment and counterbalancing from other nations. President Hu Jintao’s adviser Zheng Bijian coined the term “peaceful rise” to describe China’s aspirations and strategy. Now Chinese diplomats embrace conflict and hurl insults in what is known as “wolf warrior” diplomacy.

What is striking about China’s strategy is that it has produced a series of “own goals” — leading countries to adopt the very policies Beijing has long tried to stop. There have also been serious consequences for its global image, greatly diminishing its soft power. Negative views toward China among Americans soared from 47 percent in 2017 to a staggering 73 percent in 2020. If you think that’s a U.S. phenomenon, here are the numbers for some other countries: 40 percent to 73 percent in Canada, 37 percent to 74 percent in the United Kingdom, 32 percent to 81 percent in Australia, 61 percent to 75 percent in South Korea and 49 percent to 85 percent in Sweden. If there is a single theme in international life these days, it is rising public hostility toward China.

President Xi Jinping has transformed China’s approach, domestically and abroad. He has consolidated power for the party and himself. He has reasserted party control over economic policy, in recent months putting curbs on the most innovative parts of the Chinese economy (the technology sector) while lavishing benefits on its most unproductive one (the old state-owned enterprises). And he has pursued a combative, unpredictable and often emotional foreign policy.

In doing all this, he is dismantling China’s hard-earned reputation as a smart, stable and productive player on the world stage. It all brings to mind another period of centralized politics and aggressive foreign policy — the Mao era. That did not end so well for China.

I think he’s got it almost completely backwards. They’re playing to the house. They don’t care about the European Union, Australia, or the United States. The care about how they’re perceived in China. When a Chinese diplomat shouts down American diplomats who’ve been droning on about human rights, carbon emissions, or whatever interests the present U. S. administration, it’s received well by the Chinese people. It is seen as strength and an appearance of strength can bolster actual strength.

I’m not actually afraid of China. I’m afraid of the United States, its incompetent political leadership, and its uneducated, timorous elite who are assiduously pursuing what they perceive as their own interests at the expense of those of the rest of us.

Most of the articles I read to today made me wonder about in what world the authors were living? Let’s start with this New York Times op-ed from former Israeli Prime Minister Tzvi Livni on the possibility of an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians:

The argument over historical narratives hasn’t changed. It won’t. Those on both sides that insist on forcing their narrative on the other side, or turning the conflict into a religious war, cannot make the compromises needed for peace. This is true also for those from the international community supporting one side and denying the rights of the other. This is destructive and only strengthens extremists.

Peace based on the vision of two states for two peoples gives an answer to the national aspirations of both the Jewish people and the Palestinians and requires compromises by both.

which is fair enough. But this is more aspirational than actual:

National conflicts cannot be resolved by wars and violence, but only by a political resolution, leadership and compromise. A religious conflict is not a conflict over rights, but a fight against the right of others to live by their faith. For religious ideologists, there is no compromise.

History is filled with counter-examples, a notable case being the saving of the remnants of European Jewry by wars and violence about 80 years ago. And I think his conclusion is a free flight of fancy:

An agreement will be possible when pragmatic leaders on both sides understand that the price of not having an agreement for their people is far higher than the price of compromise.

It is pragmatism not to mention survival instinct on the part of the political leadership both among Israelis and Palestinians that has driven those parties farther apart over the last 30 years. The most extreme elements in both societies have veto power over any agreement which shoves those agreements into insignificance. As long as that’s the case which is to say the foreseeable future, agreements are meaningless.

To update Ev Dirksen a trillion here and a trillion there and pretty soon you’re talking about real money. I would hope that this observation by Brad Polumbo at the Foundation for Economic Education would have some resonance:

Americans largely agree that climate change and pollution are real problems. But a new poll reveals that they aren’t interested in shelling out massive amounts from their wallets in pursuit of progressive, big-government “solutions” like the so-called “Green New Deal.”

After all, the Green New Deal would cost taxpayers up to $93 trillion, a truly astounding sum that comes out to nearly $600,000 per US household. Yet most Americans aren’t even willing to sacrifice $50 a month to mitigate climate change. At least, that’s the finding of newly-released polling from the fiscally-conservative Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI).

CEI surveyed a representative sample of 1,200 registered voters on environmental issues, and their findings have a margin of error of 2.83 percent.

A strong majority of respondents said they were somewhat or very concerned about the issue of climate change. However, one of the most interesting follow-up questions was this: “How much of your own money would you be willing to personally spend each month to reduce the impact of climate change?”

The vast majority of voters were only willing to make very minimal financial sacrifices.

About 35 percent said they wouldn’t be willing to spend anything, with another 15 percent saying they’d only sacrifice $1-$10. Another 6 percent were willing to give up $11-$20, while 5 percent said they’d sacrifice $21-$30. In all, a whopping 75 percent of respondents were not willing to pay more than $50 a month.

What worries me about that isn’t just the enormous size of the bill or the cognitive dissonance involved or even that I don’t believe you can reduce carbon emissions by producing more carbon emissions and building those increasing emissions into the system. It’s my concern that the Democratic leadership are embracing Modern Monetary Theory. It certainly aligns with their predispositions.

All I can say is that positive feedback loops can’t go on forever.

BTW that disconnect between cost and willingness to pay is the reason I think that obtaining more energy from small modular nukes and carbon capture are better strategies than the ones that are being proposed by most proponents of the GND.

Why do the editors of the Wall Street Journal write so many editorials critical of Illinois’s state government? I mean other than it being the best example of a bad example, an object lesson. In their most recent complaint about the Land of Lincoln they call attention to the latest stupidity from the state legislature:

A famous Supreme Court quip is that the U.S. Constitution isn’t a suicide pact, but what about the Illinois constitution? After years of fiscal recklessness, the state’s credit ratings are a notch above junk. Yet the politicians in Springfield now want to add collective bargaining to the Illinois bill of rights, putting union power on the same footing as due process and religious freedom.

The House passed the idea Wednesday after the Senate approved it last week. The proposed constitutional amendment would guarantee a “fundamental right to organize and to bargain collectively,” including for better wages, hours, working conditions and a vague catchall of “economic welfare.” The amendment says that no law would be allowed to block labor agreements from “requiring membership in an organization as a condition of employment.”

It’s obvious why they’re doing it—unions and particularly public employees’ unions are their most important supporters and foot soldiers.

It’s not entirely clear that the people of Illinois will go along with them. I would think that the points made by the editors:

Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin and Kentucky all have banned coerced unionization during the past decade. It’s a bad idea to lock Illinois into an uncompetitive policy for private workers. What’s worse is that the amendment could make it impossible for the state to tweak the public labor rules that are driving its unsustainable finances.

would be persuasive. They certainly are to me.

I really liked Isaac Stone Fish’s Washington Post op-ed, underscoring as it does a point I have made from time to time. Russia and China are not as cozy as many Americans assume:

To begin with, Moscow has more to fear from Beijing than Washington. Like the Philippines, India and Bhutan, Russia is vulnerable to Chinese territorial encroachment. China has supplanted Russia as the most influential nation in Central Asia — Moscow’s traditional geopolitical backyard — and has uncomfortably large influence over Russia’s economy. Despite the countless irritants in the U.S.-Russia relationship, all this means that there is now space to enlist Moscow as a silent but meaningful partner in the global campaign to curb the pernicious aspects of the Chinese Communist Party’s international influence.

The biggest reason for Moscow’s fear is territorial. While there is no good polling in both countries on sensitive issues such as territorial integrity, some Russians fear the Chinese want to invade Siberia, while some Chinese feel that parts of eastern Russia actually belong to China. In 1858 and 1860, early in what the Chinese Communist Party calls the “century of humiliation,” the Chinese and the Russians signed treaties that ceded huge swaths of lands around Lake Baikal to the Russians. Some Chinese want that land back. “Hong Kong and Macau have returned,” to the motherland, the history blogger Yuan Zaiyu lamented in March 2020. “Why not Vladivostok?”

Russians in the country’s sparsely populated Far East fear and resent Chinese immigration and influence. The governor of Russia’s Jewish Autonomous Oblast, which borders the Chinese province of Heilongjiang, has improbably claimed that 80 percent of the land in his region is now “controlled by Chinese.” The Chinese presence in Siberia, said Svetlana Pavlova, the chief editor of a Siberian news website, is like “a red rag to a bull.” (As the pandemic spread in early 2020, Russia became the first country to shut its land border with China.)

Perceptions can create reality. Chinese frustrations with Russia — most Chinese alive today came of age in an era of frosty relations between the two nations, from the Sino-Soviet split in the mid-1950s to the 2001 Sino-Russian strategic and economic treaty — could easily push China’s foreign policy to be more aggressive toward its northern neighbor. Russian analysts watched the June 2020 border clash between India and China that killed at least 20 Indian soldiers closely — and not just because Russia is India’s most important weapons supplier.

As fate would have it there is a country with which Russia has a considerable amount in common and who is not a regional competitor as China is: the United States. Short version of what happened: we blew it.

Also don’t imagine that the Russians are naive about the prospectively tense situation between Russia and China. They’re fully aware of it and, like Americans, they tend to exaggerate threats. So, when President Putin calls President Xi his “best friend”, I generally think of this.

The editors of the Washington Post are coming at the search for the origin of SARS-CoV-2 from another direction—who was patient zero? Not to mention where:

IN THE hunt for the origins of the virus that has touched off a global pandemic, the very first cases are extremely important. They could reveal vital information about where the virus came from. China has stated that the outbreak began in Wuhan in December 2019, but this may not be the whole story: There have been suggestions by Chinese and Western scientists that some cases arose earlier. Who were the people who fell ill, and where did they encounter the virus? China should help solve this mystery, but it so far has thrown a cloak over it.

Beijing steadfastly denies there was an inadvertent leak from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, or WIV, one of two theories being pursued about the virus origin. The other is a zoonotic spillover from an animal. President Biden announced Wednesday that the U.S. intelligence community was divided over the competing theories and said he had urged further investigation.

Identification of the earliest cases could help resolve the issue. On Jan. 15, outgoing Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said the U.S. government “has reason to believe that several researchers inside” the Wuhan Institute of Virology “became sick in autumn 2019, before the first identified case of the outbreak, with symptoms consistent with both COVID-19 and common seasonal illnesses.” But he provided no further evidence for this vague claim, and when a joint World Health Organization-China mission went to the WIV on Feb. 3, the director, Yuan Zhiming, categorically denied Mr. Pompeo’s assertion. It would help if the administration declassified the U.S. intelligence.

Here’s what’s known so far about early cases: On Dec. 31, 2019, China notified the WHO of 44 cases of pneumonia of unknown cause. By the time China agreed to a joint study with the WHO in summer 2020, the number of these cases had grown to 124. The resulting joint report in March 2021 said Chinese records had established 174 confirmed cases in December 2019, and the first onset among these was Dec. 8.

Were there others before that? In preparation for the WHO-China joint mission, Chinese officials examined 76,253 cases of fever or respiratory illness in 233 health-care institutions from Oct. 1 to Dec. 10, 2019. Out of this mass of records, they identified 92 people who might have been infected with SARS-CoV-2 in the autumn. However, on further scrutiny, all 92 cases were rejected as covid.

I don’t think they’re looking at the question broadly enough. Could Patient Zero have been in Italy? Australia? The UK? The U. S.? Studies based on viral evolution models have proposed a date of sometime between the middle of September 2019 and the middle of December 2019 with some time in October 2019 looking pretty darned likely. Being open about the suspected cases from 2019 could actually vindicate China’s claims that the virus developed somewhere else.

I wanted to call attention to Farhad Manjoo’s New York Times column, complaining about what he calls the “Apple tax”:

Last week, though, Cook might have felt a bit like a spinning pinwheel under the polite yet relentless interrogation of a Federal District Court judge charged with deciding whether Apple is a ruthless monopolist. In the process, the judge, Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers in Oakland, Calif., highlighted a scourge affecting just about every Apple customer and the software developers who want to build apps for them.

Call this scourge what it plainly is, the Apple tax — the billions of dollars a year that Apple collects from large swaths of the technology industry for the privilege of offering paid apps and in-app purchases to iPhone and iPad users. Once, in the early days of the iPhone, Apple’s 30 percent fee on app purchases, and its restrictive rules, could be defended on the grounds of its great innovation in the mobile market. Apple, after all, was the first to market the modern touch-screen smartphone and the simple, one-tap way of adding apps to it, and it seemed reasonable for the company to collect tremendous winnings from its creation.

But for how many years should Apple get to milk billions of dollars of almost pure profit from an invention first released back when George W. Bush was president? What justification is there any longer for Apple’s severe restrictions on how users and software makers can do business with each other, other than that it has the market power to impose them? Isn’t it time we were all given a break from the Apple tax?

It’s called “abuse of monopoly power” and it illustrates neatly a point I have been making for some time: Apple should be broken up using the power of the Sherman Antitrust Act. And it’s not the only one.

This also ties in with my post on innovation yesterday. Very, very few mobile apps actually end up making a net profit. Increasing the price of apps which is the net effect of the “Apple tax” actually reduces the number of apps earning profits and stifles innovation.

George Will writes favorably about the Endless Frontier Act in his most recent Washington Post column:

To increase society’s supply of pickles, increase monetary demand for them. Increasing the supply of America’s most important product — innovation — is more complicated. It involves money that fertilizes a culture that nurtures talented individuals.

Solving the complexities of this is one purpose of the Endless Frontier Act (EFA), which aims to disburse $100 billion over five years for the purpose of finding and supporting those who will shape the future of science. This is, inevitably, a process of a few spectacular hits among many misses.

The EFA is a perhaps unintentional homage to one source of American dynamism, immigration, because it implicitly embraces an insight of an immigrant from Austria, the economist Joseph Schumpeter, who in 1932 came to Harvard. His theory was that the principal drivers of social dynamism are not workers (as Marx thought) or various impersonal economic forces (as many economists thought) but innovators — inventors of new things and companies. Thomas Edison, working in his Menlo Park, N.J., “invention factory” — he eventually held 1,093 patents — was one. Others include Henry Ford, Thomas Watson, Bill Gates and Steve Jobs.

and, based on this description, I think he can safely be added to the list of people who drawn the wrong lessons from the Manhattan Project:

The template for successful government-fueled innovation began in September 1942 when the government purchased 58,575 acres of eastern Tennessee wilderness and created the town of Oak Ridge with state-of-the-art physics facilities. Thirty-four months later, an atomic blast lit the New Mexico desert. The Manhattan Project had a narrow focus: the problem of releasing and weaponizing the atom’s explosive energy.

I would also challenge to some degree his list of innovators. Edison’s primary innovation was organizational rather technological. He invented the industrial laboratory. The reason his name is on so many patents is that he insisted on it—that list is actually the work of dozens of “muckers” as he called them. There’s a similar pattern for all of those he mentions with the possible exception of Steve Jobs. In Jobs’s case the innovations of the company he founded slowed to a crawl after his death. Which brings me to my next point.

Individuals innovate. Companies and in particular large companies elaborate. If you want innovation you’ve got to break up the big companies to leave room for the actual innovators.

Third, open-ended funding of R&D by the federal government does not have that great a track record at least not from a ROI standpoint. The projects that have had great ROI include the Manhattan Project and the Mercury-Apollo Project. These are what I’m referring to as “mass engineering projects”: projects with limited, well-defined objectives that we are confident can be achieved.

Fourth, greenfield developments are more likely to result in innovation.

Fifth, don’t compete with the private sector. Doing that will crowd out innovation rather than foster it.

Finally, to encourage individuals to become real innovators there must be real, long-term jobs and career paths for doing it. Letting the wages of engineers and scientists rise will produce a lot more innovation than importing engineers and scientists to push wages down.

In his latest New York Times column Tom Friedman expresses increasing concern over the situation, not solely because of the violence and loss of life but because of the risks it holds for Democrats and for American Jews:

Because without that horizon — without any viable hope of separating Israelis and Palestinians into two states for two peoples — the only outcome left will be one state in which the Israeli majority dominates and Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the West Bank will be systematically deprived of equal rights so that Israel can preserve its Jewish character.

If that happens, the charge that Israel has become an apartheid-like entity will resonate and gain traction far and wide. The Democratic Party will be fractured. A rising chorus of progressives — who increasingly portray the Israeli army’s treatment of Palestinians as equivalent to the Minneapolis Police Department’s treatment of Black people or to the treatment by colonial powers of Indigenous peoples — will insist on distancing the United States from Israel and, maybe, even lead to bans on arms sales.

Meanwhile, centrist Democrats will push back that these progressives are incredibly naïve, that they have no clue how many two-state peace plans the Palestinians have already rejected — which decimated the Israeli peace camp — and that none of their causes, from women’s rights to L.G.B.T.Q. rights to religious pluralism, would last a minute on the Hamas-run campus of the Islamic University of Gaza.

As the past two weeks demonstrated, every Jewish organization and synagogue in America will be heatedly divided over this question: Are you willing to defend a one-state Israel that is not even pretending to be a democracy anymore, a one-state Israel whose leaders prefer to rely on the uncritical support of evangelicals than the critical support of Jews?

Finally, Jewish and non-Jewish students on every college campus also will be forced to wrestle with this question or run as far away as possible from the debate. More and more will abandon Israel. You can already see it happening. And anti-Semitism will flourish under the guise of anti-Zionism.

It will get very ugly. All nuance will be lost. Twitter and Facebook will become battlefields between Israel’s critics and defenders, and Donald Trump and the Republicans will fan the flames, telling American Jews that they have no future in the Democratic Party and beckoning them to come over to the G.O.P. — which, with its evangelical base, does indeed unquestioningly support the Jewish state … for now.

He proposes the Biden Administration do the following:

• Act as though the Palestinian Authority on the West Bank is already a Palestinian state.
• Open a diplomatic mission to the Palestinians in Ramallah and invite a diplomatic representative of the PA to Washington.
• Propose negotiations using the plan produced by the Trump Administration as a starting point.
• Encourage the Arab states that have normalized relations with Israel to move their embassies to West Jerusalem.
• Encourage Arab states to “massively increase” their financial support for the PA.

I deeply miss John Burgess. He believed that the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians could be resolved, essentially, by paying the Palestinians off. IMO those days are gone. Contrary to the view being promoted by American progressives, continuing attacks on Israel from Gaza and the West Bank have eviscerated the peace movement in Israel and there are factions within Israel which will accept nothing less than a Greater Israel, absorbing all of the Palestinian territories and more. Meanwhile the corruption and impotence of the PA has rendered it non-viable as a negotiating partner and Hamas is actually gaining steam among Palestinians by its ongoing attacks against Israel. There are factions among the Palestinians which will accept nothing less than pushing the Israeli Jews into the sea.

The effect of more support for the PA will be to finance corruption and create the risk that the money will ultimately end up in the hands of Hamas.

Contrary to what Mr. Friedman seems to believe it’s a truly wicked problem. Not only is there no solution I can’t even envision a meaningful process.