The editors of the Wall Street Journal are grimly amused by the dialogue between Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry:
Foreign Minister Wang Yi made this leverage explicit in a Wednesday lecture to U.S. climate envoy John Kerry, who is back in China pleading with its leaders to reduce the country’s carbon consumption. “The U.S. side wants the climate change cooperation to be an ‘oasis’ of China-U.S. relations,†Mr. Yi said, according to a Foreign Ministry readout of the meeting. But he insisted that “China-U.S. cooperation on climate change cannot be divorced from the overall situation of China-U.S. relations.â€
In other words, Beijing wants to extract concessions from Washington before it further indulges Mr. Kerry’s climate show. Mr. Yi told Mr. Kerry, according to the document, that “the United States has made a major strategic miscalculation about China.†America should “attach importance to and actively respond to the ‘two lists’ and ‘three bottom lines’ put forward by China,†he instructed.
The “List of U.S. Wrongdoings that Must Stop†includes sanctions on Communist Party figures (the State Department has restricted travel to the U.S. by some officials, including those connected to China’s violation of its treaty obligations on Hong Kong). The list also complains of American efforts to shut down potential Chinese espionage operations in the U.S.
The most significant of the “three bottom lines,†meanwhile, is that the U.S. back off its defense of Taiwan—the island democracy that Beijing wants to absorb, potentially by force. If the U.S. backs away from its Pacific alliances, the pitch seems to go, perhaps China will sign up for more putative cuts to CO2 emissions in the future.
For the Communist Party, climate change is secondary to China’s immediate strategic interests. Yet it hopes the U.S. is woolly-headed enough to trade away its security priorities for unenforceable climate promises.
That mirrors the way China has been treating American businesses for 40 years, holding out promises of access to the enormous Chinese market and getting them to, very nearly literally, trade the store. My contention has long been that their leaders are smarter and tougher than ours and that our political leadership has practically no notion of how to negotiate with the Chinese leadership. Their assumptions, based in a career in American politics, are invariably wrong.






