In an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal Robert C. O’Brien and Alexander B. Gray present what they call a “Hardheaded Guide to Deterring Russia and China”. Their proposals are:
First, key European partners like Poland, Romania and the Baltic states have requested significant military hardware that remains unapproved or stuck in the U.S. bureaucracy. We have been calling for approval of the Abrams Main Battle Tank sale to Poland for more than a year and commend Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Secretary of State Antony Blinken for approving the deal last week. The administration should expedite all similar requests.
Second, Finland and Sweden are highly concerned about Russian adventurism. Both maintain capable militaries and defense industrial bases, along with impressive intelligence services. Washington should support the growing sentiment in Helsinki and Stockholm to seek NATO membership. They would strengthen the alliance’s northern flank, including in the critical Arctic area.
Third, the U.S. should reassess legacy basing in Germany. Berlin has shown itself unwilling to undertake a leadership role throughout the Ukraine crisis. This development shouldn’t come as a surprise given the German industrial elite’s dependence on Russian gas and the Chinese export market. With NATO having moved east, Germany is no longer a frontline state. U.S. forces there, other than those manning hospital facilities and airbases, should be repositioned to outposts in Poland and the Baltics and bases in the Indo-Pacific.
Fourth, the Biden administration energy policy requires urgent re-examination. Oil at $100 a barrel not only hurts U.S. consumers, it puts billions into Mr. Putin’s war machine and Iran’s nuclear program. Appeasing Russia and Germany by reversing the Trump administration’s policy on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline clearly failed. It is time to stop Nord Stream 2 once and for all. Further, the U.S. must restore its energy leadership. Finishing the Keystone XL pipeline would send Russia and the world a potent message that America is committed to energy independence.
Fifth, NATO must show its adversaries unwavering resolve. Allies that fail to increase defense spending to the required 2% of gross domestic product within three years shouldn’t play a leading role in NATO. During Donald Trump’s presidency, the alliance’s defense spending commitment grew by nearly $400 billion through 2029, but American taxpayers still carry a disproportionate burden for defending Europe. Under such circumstances it makes sense for only countries that pay 2% of their GDP for defense to enjoy full voting privileges in the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s main decision-making body.
Finally, Russia needs to face real consequences for deterrence to work. The West threatened sanctions but exacted no real penalties when Moscow annexed Crimea and set up a proxy government in Donbas. The Biden administration’s sanctions in response to the assertion that parts of Ukraine are “independent†were welcomed but proved insufficient to dissuade Mr. Putin from further action. The free world must make clear to Mr. Putin that Russia’s economy will be fully cut off if he doesn’t de-escalate forthwith. That means, at a minimum, removing Russia’s banks from the Swift system and seizing all oligarch assets world-wide.
Further, Russia should be made to understand that Ukraine’s current government would be recognized in exile by the U.S., NATO and most of the world. All diplomatic property and seats at the United Nations and multilateral organizations would be controlled by the legitimate government of Ukraine, not a Putin-installed puppet regime.
I see several major problems with their proposals. First, I do not believe that these measures if put in place severally or entirely, would change anything respecting Ukraine.
Second, can anyone thing of any example anywhere in the world in which economic sanctions have actually induced any major power to do things they saw as being contrary to their national interest? I can’t. Indeed, one of the few examples I can think of in which sanctions were effective was South Africa and I believe that was widely misunderstood. In particular how successful can sanctions be if the target’s major trading partner didn’t participate?
Third, would additional given or sold to Poland make Poland more secure or just put it in greater risk? I don’t honestly know.
While I think that some of their proposals have merit, I think they’re confusing what works with minor countries with what would be effective with major powers. Sadly, there’s no ready alternative to absolute military and economic superiority which would require a major course change by the United States.