I have found the news coverage and commentary lately so dispiriting I have had difficulty in rising to post anything at all. I thought I’d make some remarks about the arrest of Columbia University Mahmoud Khalil, presumably prior to his deportation. I thought the legal aspects of this case were discussed pretty well by Andrew R. Arthur in this post at the Center for Immigration Studies. Many are focusing on the First Amendment issues but, as the linked post makes clear, there are issues to consider other than freedom of speech. Here’s his conclusion:
As you can see, I’ve relied on a lot of suppositions and guesswork to get to the conclusion that Khalil was arrested by ICE because the secretary of State has concluded that his presence in this country “would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States”.
If I’m right, expect to see the Trump administration rely more heavily on the foreign policy removal charge in section 237(a)(4)(C)(i) of the INA in response to pro-Hamas activity in the United States — and also expect a raft of legal challenges to follow.
I suggest you read the enter post. It’s not terribly long and quite informative.
Going beyond the legal and human rights issues at stake in this case, one of the things that struck me was how well this particular case supported my views of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It’s a “wicked problem“. As I see it there are only three possible resolutions of the conflict: the Israelis can kill all of the Palestinians or expel them from their homes, the Palestinians and kill all the Israelis or expel them from their homes, or their can be a negotiated between Israelis and Palestinians.
Clearly, Hamas is a major impediment to the third alternative (negotiation). Its explicit raison d’être is the second resolution. Does the full-throated, unconditional, uncritical support of the U. S. government for Israel make the third alternative more likely? I don’t think so. I think it’s a barrier to the Israelis negotiating. I suspect that the sad reality is that our interests in the conflict are more domestic political ones than they are any particular commitment to either the Israelis or the Palestinians but they are domestic political interests held both by Republicans and Democrats.
There is, of course, another way of looking at this case. Do we really want to import professional activists from other countries into the United States? I don’t think so. The number of hypothetical comparisons is practically endless. How do you think the United States would have acted if a Nazi activist were granted a student visa and spent his time agitating against our support for Britain in 1940?
That in turn raises another question. Is it possible for a Palestinian to be pro-Gazan without being pro-Hamas? Given that Hamas is in fact the elected government of Gaza I think the answer is “no”.