I was saddened this morning to read a post from James regarding the death of Blake Hounshell who, apparently, took his own life yesterday. A quick check of my older posts revealed that my earliest reference to him was in 2004 almost 20 years ago.

It highlighted to me that the artificial intimacy created by this online medium obscures a lot of invisible demons. You just don’t know what things people are struggling with.

In my own case I’ve been pretty open about it. Blogging keeps me focused and engaged. Without it I think my brain would turn to mush.

But you just can’t know what much more deadly invisible demons others may be struggling with.

I don’t read opinion pieces at Fox very frequently and I can’t remember the last one I linked to one. Too predictable. This morning I took the bait based on the caption regarding solving our biggest problem. The “biggest problem” to which the writer was referring was the debt.

I suppose one could debate whether the debt is our greatest problem. It’s certainly growing rapidly. Not quite out of control but too rapidly:

Find more statistics at Statista
Please note in the graph above that the increase in the public debt from 2017 to 2020 exceeds that since 2020 or, in other words, it’s a bipartisan problem—the parties are equal opportunity offenders.

But I think we have bigger problems. For example, the “Doomsday Clock” of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists is the closest it has been to midnight ever including at the height of the Cold War.

Another example of a major problem: diminishing returns to scale. That’s an umbrella factor presently affecting a broad range of issues from scientific research to building infrastructure to just about everything related to government at all levels. We don’t get enough bang for the buck.

So, here’s my question. What’s our biggest problem?

In a piece at Foreign Affairs Ivo H. Daalder and James Goldgeier present their plan for a “long war” between Russia and Ukraine. Here’s the meat of it:

There is a limit to what Washington and its allies can and will provide in terms of weapons and military assistance. Part of that limit is the reality that even the United States is running out of excess capabilities to provide to Ukraine. Take artillery shells. In the past year, Ukraine fired as many of them in a week as the United States can produce in a month. Similar shortfalls exist for more advanced weapons. Germany sent its modern IRIS-T air defense system to Ukraine in October, but it has struggled to supply the quantity of surface-to-air missiles necessary for Ukraine to maintain an effective defense. Given the extensive military aid it has already provided and dwindling available supplies, the West is likely to ship a significantly smaller amount of weaponry to Ukraine over the next six months than it did over the last six months.

In addition to supply constraints, Washington and its allies have also been held back in furnishing some sophisticated weapons to Ukraine because of the extensive training that would be required and the risk that such weapons could fall into Russian hands if used in the war theater. Combat aircraft, from F-16s to newer-generation models, fall into the first category. In the second are sophisticated drones such as the Gray Eagle, which, if they were captured by Russian forces, would give Russia crucial insights into U.S. military capabilities and technology.

Then there is the danger of escalation. Moscow has repeatedly warned Washington not to send long-range missiles to Ukraine, including the MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, which has a range of 300 kilometers (186 miles) and could strike deep into Russian territory. U.S. President Joe Biden has consistently rejected calls to send these highly capable missiles to Ukraine, arguing that doing so would divide NATO and risk setting off a direct military confrontation with Russia, even a third world war. It is easy to dismiss these fears, as many seasoned observers do. But it is crucially important that the United States take the risks of escalation seriously and continually weigh the risks of not doing enough to help Ukraine against the consequences of doing too much, including the possibility that Russia might use tactical nuclear weapons. The undeniable reality is that there is an inherent limit to how much Ukrainian and American interests overlap in responding to Russia’s aggression.

with this their conclusion:

To develop an effective approach to dealing with a prolonged war, the West must also keep providing sufficient support to Ukraine to defend the territory it now controls—and to liberate more wherever possible. As Ukraine over time pursues its economic future in the European Union, the United States and NATO countries need to offer a security commitment to ensure that Ukraine has the weaponry it needs to defend itself against Russia over the long term, just as the United States has done for Israel for decades. Washington should also explore with its allies the possibility of augmenting Ukraine’s promised EU membership with eventual membership in NATO itself.

Meanwhile, Western leaders need to get back to the business of containing the Russian threat. That will require maintaining all the financial, trade, and economic sanctions they have put in place since Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014. It also means continuing their efforts to end dependence on Russian energy exports. And it entails doing everything possible to prevent Russian access to technologies necessary to sustain its economy, including in the defense sector.

An effective long-term containment policy will require the continued political isolation of Russia. Moscow’s exclusion from sporting and cultural events helps to ensure that isolation, as do votes in the UN General Assembly that demonstrate the lack of support for its illegal war against Ukraine. But a more concerted Western effort is necessary to demonstrate to the countries in the global South that alignment with Moscow—or nonalignment itself—ultimately erodes the foundations of peace and security on which the international order is based. That does not mean that all countries need to adopt the economic strategy of the West; it does mean convincing them that Russia is at fault and that its behavior is the fundamental cause of their economic plight. As part of that effort, Washington and its Western partners can do much more to address the food, energy, and economic crises that have emerged in the wake of Russia’s unprovoked actions—starting by relieving debts and providing food aid to countries most in need.

Finally, containment of Russia will require the West to maintain a strong deterrence posture against not just military threats but threats to its own institutions and societies as well. This means that Europe will have to increase its defense spending more than it already has in response to Russian aggression since 2014. The United States will need to stay engaged in Europe even as it devotes more and more effort to the China challenge in the Indo-Pacific. In addition, NATO and EU countries need to bolster their individual and joint efforts to thwart Russian interference in their elections and respond forcefully to economic intimidation, political interference, and other forms of hybrid warfare. Although parts of Russia’s military have been decimated, Moscow remains a significant threat to the West.

with the addition of a “communications channel”, something for which I see no prospect.

What the authors don’t seem to realize are:

1. Economically, the Ukrainians are already on their backs. It’s more building from scratch than rebuilding.
2. Germany undoubtedly understands that any money thrown at Ukraine for economic development will be wasted. Uncle Sugar will bear the costs while the Germans (not to mention the Egyptians) reap the benefits.
3. If this were a war between equals it might progress as they suggest. But it isn’t and the greatest likelihood is that the “long war” they plan will end with a collapse in organized resistance from Ukraine. They will continue to resist the Russians but it will be small scale and not organized. Furthermore in all likelihood the Ukrainians will hate us just as much as they do the Russians. After all when the Ukrainians lose it will be our fault, won’t it?

In answer to my question in the title, there won’t be many winners in a “long war”. Some arms dealers in the U. S., a few highly placed U. S. government officials, and that’s pretty much it.

Here’s the kernel of Alex Tabarrok’s explanation at Marginal Revolution for why there are so few semiconductor manufacturing companies:

In the entire US workforce there are approximately 3.7 million workers (2.3%) with an IQ greater than two standard deviations above the mean. (Mean 100, sd, 15, Normal dist.) Two standard deviations above the mean is pretty good but we are talking professor, physician, attorney level. At the very top of semiconductor manufacturing you are going to need workers with IQs at or higher than 1 in a 1000 people and there are only 164 thousand of these workers in the United States.

164 thousand very high-IQ workers are enough to run the entire semiconductor industry but you also want some of these workers doing fundamental research in mathematics, physics and computer science, running businesses, guiding the military and so forth. Moreover, we aren’t running a command economy. Many high-IQ workers won’t be interested in any of these fields but will want to study philosophy, music or English literature. Some of them will also be lazy! I’ve also assumed that we can identify all 164 thousand of these high-IQ workers but discrimination, poverty, poor health, bad luck and other factors will mean that many of these workers end up in jobs far below their potential–the US might be able to place only say 100,000 high-IQ workers in high-IQ professions, if we are lucky.

It’s very difficult to run a high-IQ civilization of 330 million on just 100,000 high-IQ workers–the pyramid of ability extends only so far. To some extent, we can economize on high-IQ workers by giving lower-IQ workers smarter tools and drawing on non-human intelligence. But we also need to draw on high-IQ workers throughout the world–which explains why some of the linchpins of our civilization end up in places like Eindhoven or Taiwan–or we need many more Americans.

From that first sentence in the last paragraph above, I gather that he sees the flaw in his reasoning. That sentence is a succinct summary of what has happened over the last 300-400 years. Areas of fabrication that were once the exclusive province of extremely skilled artisans have been democratized through automation. Rather than a master smith, weaver, or potter being needed to make an eating utensil, garment, or dinner plate, all of those are now highly automated.

Paradoxically, that doesn’t mean that we don’t need smiths, weavers, or potters but it does place a premium on the technicians who are able to master the new skills necessary for the new methods of fabrication. You can see that happening even now in many areas.

Today’s guilds are much more successful in preventing their artisanal ways of doing things from being democratized through mass production than the guilds of 400 years ago were but I don’t believe that will go on forever. It isn’t burger flippers whose livelihoods are most at risk due to automation today but doctors, lawyers, computer programmers, and college professors. That doesn’t mean we will no longer need doctors, lawyers, computer programmers, college professors, or, indeed, semiconductor designers but it does mean we will need better, smarter ones and there will never be enough of those to satisfy our needs.

One more word of caution about the last clause of Alex’s piece quoted above. We should heed Joschka Fischer’s advice: “We wanted workers; we got people”. Unless we are willing to be coldheartedly selective, to import a single prospective American with an IQ three standard deviations or more above normal we will need to import a thousand total prospective Americans, half of whom will never be able to support themselves. Shorter: it isn’t 1883 any more.

In Newsweek Dan Caldwell and Sumantra Maitra make a plea to the incoming House majority to use the power of the purse to rectify U. S. policy with respect to the war in Ukraine:

The House members should use the appropriations and oversight powers delegated to them by the Constitution to force a course correction for America’s Ukraine policy. They should enact a more realistic policy that recognizes the limited American interests at stake in Ukraine and prioritizes more urgent needs at home and abroad. America’s future should not be gambled away on a potential nuclear exchange over who controls the Donbas and Crimea—two regions that have repeatedly changed hands from one nation to another.

The status quo is unsustainable. The war is currently an attritional conflict where neither side appears to have a path to decisive victory. Russia and Ukraine are estimated to have suffered 100,000 casualties each. While Russia is clearly unable to conquer the entirety of Ukraine, it is also unlikely that Ukraine will be able to completely expel Russian troops from the Donbas or Crimea without increased Western support that carries the risk of nuclear escalation.

Okay, I’ll bite. What’s the U. S. interest?

I do not believe that Ukraine can accomplish its goals by any measure short of dismembering Russia into a dozen or more little statelets, none large enough to pose a threat. Furthermore, I don’t believe that is in the U. S. interest. Is it possible for us to pursue Ukrainian interests and American ones concurrently?

IMO that’s what we’re trying to do and its consequences are the “attritional conflict” mentioned by the authors.

For those of you who don’t follow Chicago news, last week Mayor Lightfoot made a distressed plea to Colorado Gov. Jared Polis to stop sending migrants from Colorado to Chicago. How does that differ from previous dispatches of migrants to “sanctuary cities”? Jared Polis is a Democrat. In a piece at the Washington Post Jim Geraghty takes note:

For what it’s worth, before his capitulation on Saturday, Polis insisted that what he was doing was completely different from what Republicans were doing. He said Colorado’s state government wasn’t forcing anyone to leave and extended invitations to everyone to stay, and that “the state is working with culturally competent navigators to ensure that each individual is voluntarily making their decision.”

Polis emphasized that about 70 percent of the migrants arriving in Denver didn’t see Colorado as their final destination, and the aim was to match them with family members, friends and services when they reached Chicago and New York.

But the Democratic mayors of those cities didn’t see a difference. Chicago Mayor Lori Lightfoot denounced Polis’s move, declaring in a statement to Politico, “It is simply inhumane for any governor, whether Republican or Democrat, to address this challenge by giving these poor, traumatized migrants a one-way ticket out of town and washing their hands of the matter at our literal and figurative expense. For shame.”

New York Mayor Eric Adams concurred. “Her remarks, do I agree with them? You’re damn right. You’re damn right I do. For the governor of Colorado to say that I’m going to push the problem to the city and didn’t even notify us. Everyone knows what we’re going through.” He added, “At one time we had to deal with Republican governors sending migrants to New York. Now we’re dealing with Democratic governors sending migrants to New York.”

Not anymore. After a “very productive conversation” with both mayors — meaning he got an earful — Polis said he’d stop the busing program.

This isn’t a partisan issue; it’s a problem for Congress (see my previous post).

Whether they’re economic migrants or asylum-seekers, the reality is that their very large number is causing a drain on resources in many places. It is well within Congress’s authority to deal with the situation.

One solution would be for Congress to appropriate a stipend for each migrant which would go to the jurisdictions hosting them. I suspect that would change the nature of the discussion considerably. Where the money would come from is important but it’s a different question. Congress has been reluctant to raise taxes to pay for what they want to spend; borrowing more money is at cross-purposes with the Fed’s attempt to curb inflation.

Another solution would be to appropriate enough money to enforce our laws at the border distinguishing between genuine asylum seekers and economic migrants right then and there. I suspect it would take more than money—you might need to draft judges and/or lawyers to do the preliminary adjudication on an emergency basis.

What is blithely referred to as “comprehensive immigration reform” is presently at an impasse and looks like to remain so. What Democrats find acceptable Republicans reject out of hand as amnesty. What Republicans find acceptable Democrats reject as heartless and racist. At this point calling for comprehensive immigration reform is sophistry. Congress needs to choose another alternative.

I think the correct alternative is to enforce the law. If you don’t like the law, change it don’t ignore it.

The best thing about the incoming Republican House majority is that the news media, e.g. NYT, WaPo, ABC, CBS will be complaining bitterly that all of our problems are due to the Congress much of which is correct.

The worst thing will be the glowing reports we will get about outlaw executive orders by the president and the statesmanlike Senate.

Maybe it’s just the Chicago yards within a couple of miles of where I live but right now in the Chicago mayoral campaign Willie Wilson is winning the yard sign poll. As far as I’m concerned they’re about three years behind the curve. Lori Lightfoot was elected due to her support on the Northwest Side of Chicago which is where I live. If the Northwest Side of Chicago is deserting her, I don’t see how she gets re-elected. The South and West sides didn’t vote for her in the mayoral primaries three years ago.

I devoted the 40 minutes necessary to listen to the conversation embedded above between Washington Post columnist Henry Olsen and Heritage CEO Kevin Roberts today and for the life of me I can’t recognize today’s Republican Party or, indeed, the United States more generally in the GOP and America they describe in their conversation. Consider it through the prism of the spectacle of picking a new Speaker that we have been held hostage to for the last five days. What did that tell us? I think it told us that there is a very small number of Republicans who will do pretty much anything to get their way and, fortunately or unfortunately, they don’t have a clear idea of what “their way” is.

I also don’t see “MAGA Republicans” or “MAGA adjacent” in quite the way they do, either. I think that there was a faction of the population, many of them generally negative about politics who liked Trump because he was petty and combative. Basically, they’re mad as hell and they’re not going to take it any more. Am I wrong about that?