Synopsis
Towards a new security consensus
The United Nations was created in 1945 above all else “to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war” – to ensure that the horrors of the World Wars were
never repeated. Sixty years later, we know all too well that the biggest security
threats we face now, and in the decades ahead, go far beyond States waging aggressive
war. They extend to poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation;
war and violence within States; the spread and possible use of nuclear, radiological,
chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime. The
threats are from non-State actors as well as States, and to human security as well as
State security.
The preoccupation of the United Nations founders was with State security. When
they spoke of creating a new system of collective security they meant it in the traditional
military sense: a system in which States join together and pledge that aggression
against one is aggression against all, and commit themselves in that event to react
collectively. But they also understood well, long before the idea of human security
gained currency, the indivisibility of security, economic development and human freedom.
In the opening words of the Charter, the United Nations was created “to reaffirm
faith in fundamental human rights” and “to promote social progress and better
standards of life in larger freedom”.
The central challenge for the twenty-first century is to fashion a new and broader
understanding, bringing together all these strands, of what collective security means
– and of all the responsibilities, commitments, strategies and institutions that come
with it if a collective security system is to be effective, efficient and equitable.
If there is to be a new security consensus, it must start with the understanding that
the front-line actors in dealing with all the threats we face, new and old, continue to be
individual sovereign States, whose role and responsibilities, and right to be respected,
are fully recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. But in the twenty-first century,
more than ever before, no State can stand wholly alone. Collective strategies, collective
institutions and a sense of collective responsibility are indispensable.
The case for collective security today rests on three basic pillars. Today’s threats
recognize no national boundaries, are connected, and must be addressed at the global
and regional as well as the national levels. No State, no matter how powerful, can by
its own efforts alone make itself invulnerable to today’s threats. And it cannot be
assumed that every State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibility to
protect its own peoples and not to harm its neighbours.
We must not underestimate the difficulty of reaching a new consensus about the
meaning and responsibilities of collective security. Many will regard one or more of
the threats we identify as not really being a threat to international peace and security.
Some believe that HIV/AIDS is a horrible disease, but not a security threat. Or that
terrorism is a threat to some States, but not all. Or that civil wars in Africa are a
humanitarian tragedy, but surely not a problem for international security. Or that
poverty is a problem of development, not security.
Differences of power, wealth and geography do determine what we perceive as the
gravest threats to our survival and well-being. Differences of focus lead us to dismiss
what others perceive as the gravest of all threats to their survival. Inequitable responses
to threats further fuel division. Many people believe that what passes for collective security
today is simply a system for protecting the rich and powerful. Such perceptions pose
a fundamental challenge to building collective security today. Stated baldly, without
mutual recognition of threats there can be no collective security. Self-help will rule, mistrust
will predominate and cooperation for long-term mutual gain will elude us.
What is needed today is nothing less than a new consensus between alliances
that are frayed, between wealthy nations and poor, and among peoples mired in mistrust
across an apparently widening cultural abyss. The essence of that consensus is
simple: we all share responsibility for each other’s security. And the test of that consensus
will be action.
Collective security and the challenge of prevention
Any event or process that leads to large-scale death or lessening of life chances and
undermines States as the basic unit of the international system is a threat to international
security. So defined, there are six clusters of threats with which the world must
be concerned now and in the decades ahead:
- Economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious disease and environmental
degradation
- Inter-State conflict
- Internal conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities
- Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons
- Terrorism
- Transnational organized crime
In its first 60 years, the United Nations has made crucial contributions to reducing
or mitigating these threats to international security. While there have been major
failures and shortcomings, the record of successes and contributions is underappreciated.
This gives hope that the Organization can adapt to successfully confront the new
challenges of the twenty-first century.
The primary challenge for the United Nations and its members is to ensure that,
of all the threats in the categories listed, those that are distant do not become immi-
nent and those that are imminent do not actually become destructive. This requires a
framework for preventive action which addresses all these threats in all the ways they
resonate most in different parts of the world. Most of all, it will require leadership at
the domestic and international levels to act early, decisively and collectively against all
these threats – from HIV/AIDS to nuclear terrorism – before they have their most devastating
effect.
In describing how to meet the challenge of prevention, we begin with development
because it is the indispensable foundation for a collective security system that
takes prevention seriously. It serves multiple functions. It helps combat the poverty,
infectious disease and environmental degradation that kill millions and threaten
human security. It is vital in helping States prevent or reverse the erosion of State
capacity, which is crucial for meeting almost every class of threat. And it is part of a
long-term strategy for preventing civil war and for addressing the environments in
which both terrorism and organized crime flourish.
Collective security and the use of force
What happens if peaceful prevention fails? If none of the preventive measures so far
described stop the descent into war and chaos? If distant threats do become imminent?
Or if imminent threats become actual? Or if a non-imminent threat nonetheless becomes
very real and measures short of the use of military force seem powerless to stop it?
We address here the circumstances in which effective collective security may
require the backing of military force, starting with the rules of international law that
must govern any decision to go to war if anarchy is not to prevail. It is necessary to
distinguish between situations in which a State claims to act in self-defence; situations
in which a State is posing a threat to others outside its borders; and situtations in
which the threat is primarily internal and the issue is the responsibility to protect a
State’s own people. In all cases, we believe that the Charter of the United Nations,
properly understood and applied, is equal to the task: Article 51 needs neither extension
nor restriction of its long-understood scope, and Chapter VII fully empowers the
Security Council to deal with every kind of threat that States may confront. The task
is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make
it work better than it has.
That force can legally be used does not always mean that, as a matter of good conscience
and good sense, it should be used. We identify a set of guidelines – five criteria
of legitimacy – which we believe that the Security Council (and anyone else
involved in these decisions) should always address in considering whether to authorize
or apply military force. The adoption of these guidelines (seriousness of threat,
proper purpose, last resort, proportional means and balance of consequences) will not
produce agreed conclusions with push-button predictability, but should significantly
improve the chances of reaching international consensus on what have been in recent
years deeply divisive issues.
We also address here the other major issues that arise during and after violent
conflict, including the needed capacities for peace enforcement, peacekeeping and
peacebuilding, and the protection of civilians. A central recurring theme is the necessity
for all members of the international community, developed and developing States
alike, to be much more forthcoming in providing and supporting deployable military
resources. Empty gestures are all too easy to make: an effective, efficient and equitable
collective security system demands real commitment.
A more effective United Nations for the twenty-first century
The United Nations was never intended to be a utopian exercise. It was meant to
be a collective security system that worked. The Charter of the United Nations
provided the most powerful States with permanent membership on the Security
Council and the veto. In exchange, they were expected to use their power for the
common good and promote and obey international law. As Harry Truman, then
President of the United States, noted in his speech to the final plenary session of
the founding conference of the United Nations Organization, “we all have to recognize
– no matter how great our strength – that we must deny ourselves the
licence to do always as we please”.
In approaching the issue of United Nations reform, it is as important today as it
was in 1945 to combine power with principle. Recommendations that ignore underlying
power realities will be doomed to failure or irrelevance, but recommendations
that simply reflect raw distributions of power and make no effort to bolster international
principles are unlikely to gain the widespread adherence required to shift international
behaviour.
Proposed changes should be driven by real-world need. Change for its own sake
is likely to run the well-worn course of the endless reform debates of the past decade.
The litmus test is this: does a proposed change help meet the challenge posed by a
virulent threat?
Throughout the work of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change, we have looked for institutional weaknesses in current responses to threats.
The following stand as the most urgently in need of remedy:
- The General Assembly has lost vitality and often fails to focus effectively on
the most compelling issues of the day.
- The Security Council will need to be more proactive in the future. For this to
happen, those who contribute most to the Organization financially, militarily
and diplomatically should participate more in Council decision-making, and
those who participate in Council decision-making should contribute more to
the Organization. The Security Council needs greater credibility, legitimacy
and representation to do all that we demand of it.
- There is a major institutional gap in addressing countries under stress and
countries emerging from conflict. Such countries often suffer from attention,
policy guidance and resource deficits.
- The Security Council has not made the most of the potential advantages of
working with regional and subregional organizations.
- There must be new institutional arrangements to address the economic and
social threats to international security.
- The Commission on Human Rights suffers from a legitimacy deficit that casts
doubts on the overall reputation of the United Nations.
- There is a need for a more professional and better organized Secretariat that is
much more capable of concerted action.
The reforms we propose will not by themselves make the United Nations more
effective. In the absence of Member States reaching agreement on the security consensus
contained in the present report, the United Nations will underachieve. Its institutions
will still only be as strong as the energy, resources and attention devoted to
them by Member States and their leaders.
Without undue modesty let me urge you to vote for The Glittering Eye for 
