This morning Andrew Sullivan linked to a subscription-required article from Stratfor and quotes a snippet from it. Mr. Sullivan’s observations on the Stratfor article and the tantalizing smidgeon he quotes leave me with a lot more questions than answers. From Sullivan:
Like many other smart analysts, the pro-war Stratfor military experts have concluded that the war to control the Iraq insurgency or to erect democratic institutions in Iraq has been lost (subscription required). I think it’s time to start truly absorbing this possibility. Why lost? Because we blew the opportunity to control the terrain with insufficient troops and terrible intelligence; because all the institutions required to build democracy in Iraq have already been infiltrated by insurgents; because at key moments – they mention the fall of 2003 or spring of 2004 – we simply failed to crush the insurgency when we might have had a chance of success.
What has changed since spring of 2004? Since fall of 2003? Would the use of the level of force recently used in Fallujah back in the spring have saved the situation? Why? Greater force? Was that politically possible?
From Stratfor, quoted by Sullivan:
The issue facing the Bush administration is simple. It can continue to fight the war as it has, hoping that a miracle will bring successes in 2005 that didn’t happen in 2004. Alternatively, it can accept the reality that the guerrilla force is now self-sustaining and sufficiently large not to flicker out and face the fact that a U.S. conventional force of less than 150,000 is not likely to suppress the guerrillas.
Aren’t there other alternatives? Isn’t it possible (even likely), for example, that the Iraqi government put in place after the January 30 election will authorize the use of/use substantially more force than the U. S. has seen fit to use to date in providing security i.e. rooting out the insurgents?
More to the point, it can recognize these facts: 1. The United States cannot re-engineer Iraq because the guerrillas will infiltrate every institution it creates.
Has this changed since spring of 2004? Fall of 2003? Or has this been true since the very beginning?
2. That the United States by itself lacks the intelligence capabilities to fight an effective counterinsurgency
Do the combined nations of the world have sufficient intelligence capabilities to fight an effective counterinsurgency in Iraq?
3. That exposing U.S. forces to security responsibilities in this environment generates casualties without bringing the United States closer to the goal.
Under its obligations under the Geneva Conventions the United States was required as the occupying power to undertake security responsibilities until sovereignty was restored. Until the Iraqis are ready to undertake this themselves it’s still a pragmatic necessity. What are the authors suggesting?
4. That the strain on the U.S. force is undermining its ability to react to opportunities and threats in the rest of the region. And that, therefore, this phase of the Iraq campaign must be halted as soon as possible.
I don’t think that anyone disagrees with this. The question, of course, is how.
Sullivan concludes:
They recommend withdrawing U.S. forces to the periphery of Iraq and letting the inevitable civil war take place in the center.
How is such a civil war in the strategic interests of the United States?
Although it may read like it I didn’t intend the foregoing as a fisking—I’m really interested in the answers to these questions. I was not in favor of invading Iraq largely on prudential grounds since I envisioned something not unlike what has actually happened unless the United States forces took an approach to security substantially more aggressive than would have been supported by anything resembling a consensus of Americans. But now we’re there. Aren’t the strategic and political implications of letting Iraq fend for itself substantially more disadvantageous to America’s grand strategy than never having invaded at all? Are they really proposing that we exit Iraq with a strategic defeat?
Sullivan and (presumably) Stratfor favored the war. At least initially. Why did they support a war that they now appear to believe has always been politically impossible to win? If they were wrong, why should we believe them now.
I’m further concerned by the larger implications of all of this. Do they suggest that we shouldn’t ever engage in military action in the area regardless of the provocation since we can’t guarantee that a rump native government will remain in place, we don’t have the military intelligence to fight a successful counterinsurgency, and we can’t prevent any institutions we put into place from being infiltrated by the opposition? What are their alternatives? Should we disengage from the area completely? Do they suggest that we abrogate the Geneva Conventions? Fight wars of extermination?
Perhaps someone with access to the entire article can help me with this. But as it is I’m just left with too many questions.
UPDATE: There have been some responses to Sullivan’s post and to mine from Zenpundit, Ali of Free Iraqi, and Amba of Ambivablog.
