There’s an article in Nature by Max Kozlov that quantifies something I have been saying here for some time. The pace of scientific breakthroughs has declined sharply:

The number of science and technology research papers published has skyrocketed over the past few decades — but the ‘disruptiveness’ of those papers has dropped, according to an analysis of how radically papers depart from the previous literature1.

Data from millions of manuscripts show that, compared with the mid-twentieth century, research done in the 2000s was much more likely to incrementally push science forward than to veer off in a new direction and render previous work obsolete. Analysis of patents from 1976 to 2010 showed the same trend.

“The data suggest something is changing,” says Russell Funk, a sociologist at the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis and a co-author of the analysis, which was published on 4 January in Nature. “You don’t have quite the same intensity of breakthrough discoveries you once had.”

The author is basically at a loss to explain what has happened. Here are some possible causes:

• We’ve picked the low-hanging fruit
• Research organizations are larger and more bureaucratic than they used to be
• The cost of producing new breakthroughs increases exponentially and we aren’t willing to spend as much as is necessary to produce them faster

Whatever the reason it’s a reality. Don’t expect technological progress to save your pet plan. Elaborations will come but don’t expect breakthroughs.

Notice the chart at the top of this page. Breakthroughs in the physical and life sciences are on the floor and in technology and the social sciences not far behind.

In a sense that’s encouraging. If you’re adhering faithfully to the scientific method, it’s exactly what you’d expect.

Here’s the meat of Ryan Hass’s advice to the Biden Administration for managing our relations with China in his piece at Brookings:

Rather than reacting to Chinese efforts to negotiate principles for guiding the relationship, the Biden administration would be wise to present its concrete objectives for the year ahead. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s trip to China in the first quarter of 2023 provides an opportunity for the United States to set the agenda. By laying out concrete goals and signposts for advancing them, Blinken could orient the relationship toward America’s top priorities and concerns. China’s focus on positive optics for Xi’s visit to the United States in November will offer an opportunity to leverage form for substance.

On the security front, both sides could take practical steps to lower risk. These include reaching agreement on limits around uses of new and emerging technologies in areas where both sides are vulnerable and no rules presently exist. For example, both sides would benefit by establishing limits on uses of artificial intelligence-enabled autonomous weapons systems. As a first step, both sides could agree that humans must be responsible for all nuclear launch decisions and that such decisions must never be delegated to artificial intelligence-enabled systems. Similarly, both sides have demonstrated destructive anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons systems. They could agree to limit future testing of ASAT weapons to prevent the creation of orbital debris.

Both countries also are vulnerable to future pandemics. They have mutual self-interest in the creation of a global disease surveillance network to detect future virus outbreaks before they spread. A similar logic applies to climate change. Methane plays a major role in rising temperatures. Both sides would benefit from pooling capabilities to advance research into methane emission reduction challenges and solutions.

The opioid epidemic in America also demands attention. Chinese officials argue that the problem is one of demand, not supply. Nevertheless, U.S. and Chinese officials must think more creatively about practical steps to reduce the flow of fentanyl with Chinese-origin precursor chemicals into the United States.

This list of priority issues is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.

My own view is that we should worry a lot less about China and managing our relations with China and a lot more about the United States and how we operate in the world.

We can no more be dependent on China for rare earths and other strategic materials and goods than we were dependent on Germany or Japan for oil or steel in 1941. If that means we must pay more or manage environmental controls better, so be it. That’s just the cost of doing business.

We need to produce more of what we consume and stop treating increases in the prices of services as economic growth. We need to interfere less in the internal affairs of other countries than we do at present and, again, that’s the cost of doing business. We need to return to what was said a century ago: the business of America is business.

If we do those things, U. S.-Chinese relations will manage themselves. If we don’t in two years we’ll be back stewing about managing U. S.-Chinese relations, just with less security, lower economic growth, and a more assertive China than at present.

As I reflected on the kerfuffle over picking a new Speaker of the House, I thought that Republicans ought to think long and hard about precisely why they wanted a House majority in the first place. As it turned out the editors of the Wall Street Journal had similar thoughts:

The problem any GOP leader faces today is that too many Republicans don’t really want to hold and keep political power. They’re much more comfortable in opposition in the minority, which is easier because no hard decisions or compromises are necessary. You can rage against “the swamp” without having to do anything to change it. This is the fundamental and sorry truth behind the Speaker spectacle and the performative GOP politics of recent years.

It’s sorrier still because the country desperately needs an effective check on the excesses of the progressive left that dominates today’s Democratic Party. That’s what voters said when they gave Republicans the House majority, which they seem intent on squandering.

Also of interest is their characterization of the last two Republican House Speakers:

It’s true the Speaker is third in line to be President, you get your name in the history books and your portrait hung in the Capitol, and you can sit and applaud uncomfortably behind President Biden during his next two State of the Union addresses. Other than that, there’s not much to recommend the job.

That was true for John Boehner, who became Speaker in 2011 but was ousted in 2015 by a rump GOP faction after he failed to show enough enthusiasm for futile political gestures. Paul Ryan took over and was able to push through the 2017 tax reform, among other things, but he left after 2018 rather than have to deal with the growing Crank Caucus.

I believe that Republicans and Americans more generally should reflect on just what would happen if Republicans’ “crank caucus” were to gain as outsized a role in policymaking as the Democrats’ equal and opposite “crank caucus” has had for the last two years. I see no evidence that it would result in greater fiscal prudence or effective and limited government. Why should we want that?

It has long been my suspicion that the ownership of purebred dogs is at least in part aspirational. Ross Pomeroy’s report on a study of canine intelligence at RealClearScience makes one wonder about that:

Researchers at the University of Helsinki in Finland put over 1,000 dogs from 13 distinct breeds through a battery of cognitive tests in perhaps the largest laboratory study of canine intelligence ever conducted. Their findings were recently published in the journal Scientific Reports.

Between March 2016 and February 2022, the authors invited dog owners to bring their one- to eight-year-old pups into a large indoor field to undergo the smartDOG test battery, which was developed by study author Katriina Tiira.

AS will surprise no one Border Collies are the smartest. Labrador Retrievers on the other hand were the dumbest. They’re also the most popular breed in the United States.

I wonder if Danny Ervin will actually get any traction with his plea in this piece at RealClearEnergy to resume mining and processing of rare earths here in the United States:

We should stop pretending that domestic mining is unessential. The best way to keep the competition for minerals from erupting into a conflict with China is for the U.S. to do what has served it so well for over a century: to offer a viable alternative to imports based on increased domestic mining. Congress should approve without delay a bill that would streamline the permitting process.

I suspect not but hope springs eternal.

It would be prudent for us not to lose track of the reality, lamented by Ryan Morgan at American Military News that the Russia-Ukraine War is a very dirty one with both sides perpetrating atrocities and committing war crimes:

The head of a U.S. private military contractor training and assisting Ukrainian forces said, in a recent podcast interview, that Ukrainian forces have violated conventions on the rules of warfare and he repeatedly alluded to Ukrainian forces abusing and killing surrendering Russian troops.

Andrew Milburn, a retired U.S. Marine colonel who now leads a private military contractor called the Mozart Group, appeared on an episode of the Team House Podcast. Max Blumenthal, an editor at The GrayZone, shared an edited clip of several of Milburn’s comments on the podcast, where he shared his concerns about potential Ukrainian war crimes.

The Russians and Ukrainians are more like one another than either are like the Americans. We’re on the side of the Ukrainians but neither side is really aligned with our interests and we disregard that to our own detriment.

I found Andrew Latham’s post at The Hill considering the U. S.’s next grand strategy pretty interesting:

The five competitors he discuses are:

• liberal internationalism
• deep engagement
• strategic competition
• restraint
• “progressive” grand strategy

That last candidate emphasizes “environmental justice, countering authoritarianism and in general addressing the world’s social ills”,

Unlike in most of the rest of the world U. S. grand strategy is not a coherent policy as such but an emergent phenomenon composed of the competing interests of different factions of Americans. Consequently, try as they might I doubt that any interested party will succeed in making their own preferences dominate. It is likely to be some not particularly coherent combination of those grand strategies, I suspect some combination of liberal internationalism and strategic competition with lip service paid to the interests of progressive grand strategy. My own preference would be restraint which I doubt will gain much traction.

Jamie Dimon is the chairman and CEO of JP Morgan Chase & Co. As such he is one of the most powerful people in the United States and the world. Today Mr. Dimon has an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal>, ostensibly a call for American leadership in “the Western world”. Here’s the opening:

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine punctured many assumptions about the future of the world and thus was a pivotal moment in history. America and the West can no longer maintain a false sense of security based on the illusion that dictatorships and oppressive nations won’t use their economic and military powers to advance their aims—particularly against what they perceive as weak, incompetent and disorganized Western democracies. In a troubled world, we are reminded that national security is and always will be paramount, even if it seems to recede in tranquil times.

It should also lay to rest the idea that America can stand alone. U.S. leaders must always put America first, but global peace and order is a vital American interest. Only America has the full capability to lead and coalesce the Western world, though we must do so respectfully and in partnership with our allies. Without cohesiveness and unity with our allies, autocratic forces will divide and conquer the bickering West. America needs to lead with its strengths—not only military but also economic, diplomatic and moral.

and here are his objectives:

• Rededicate ourselves to the qualities and principles that made America great
• Develop a Marshall Plan for global energy and food security
• Increase military spending, along with our allies, as much as necessary to protect the world
• Recover our economic dynamism
• Deal with China thoughtfully and without fear

I could be glib and remark that Mr. Dimon is probably the biggest single obstacle to achieving any of those objectives but I’ll be a bit more practical. See my previous post:

U. S. power overseas is a consequence of our military strength and our military strength is downstream from the productive U. S. economy—our production of stuff. Not finance or services.

To that end we need to undo the financialization of the U. S. economy that has taken place over the last half century. We’ve got to consume less, save more, make more of what we consume, and borrow less.

A couple of final points. I think that Mr. Dimon is dreaming if he thinks that “the Western world” is languishing from a dearth of U. S. leadership. If anything there’s too much U. S. leadership and an almost complete vacuum of followership on the part of our putative allies. Their attention is focused unswervingly on their own parochial interests as it has been for decades.

Second, they’ll follow if it’s in their interest to do so. They, too, are interested in a more vibrant U. S. economy.

Finally, why is Mr. Dimon publishing this op-ed at this time? Is he interested in throwing his hat into the ring? Why should he take such a demotion not to mention pay cut?

After reading the editors’ of the Washington Post’s editorial advocating a revival of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), it’s still not clear to me what “a better China trade strategy”, their stated objective, would be. Here’s the gist of it:

In the closing weeks of the year, Japan announced a surge of defense spending, Taiwan extended its period of mandatory military service, and the Biden administration, which is keeping Trump-era tariffs in place on thousands of Chinese products, tightened export controls blocking Beijing’s access to strategic computer-chip technology.

Missing from this defensive formula is a positive strategy for competing with China on trade. China is consolidating its position at the center of Asia’s trading system. Its trade in Southeast Asia grew 71 percent in the past four years, according to a recent Wall Street Journal analysis. Beijing is on a trajectory to dominate the economic landscape of the world’s most productive region, increasing its leverage over the United States and its allies.

concluding:

It isn’t enough to promote industrial policy and tighten export controls on computer chips and maintain tariffs on Chinese goods; the United States needs a positive economic strategy to engage with Asian states to expand export markets and counterbalance China’s pull. The time might not be right in this Congress, but Washington would be wise to turn its attention to Pacific trade while it can still do so on its terms.

It isn’t easy to summarize the joint and national interests of countries which in aggregate contain 30% of the world’s population succinctly but let’s give it a try. China is politically controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, irredentist, nationalist, and racist. China has border disputes with every neighboring country. That isn’t particularly extraordinary—so do we. The difference is that a number of China’s border disputes are “hot”, i.e. there’s fighting going on. We have border disputes with Canada and Mexico but if we’re actually fighting with either one of them it’s news to me.

China has been engaged in a program of occupying, annexing, and Siniticizing areas adjacent to it since 1950. Every single one of its neighbors is aware that there is no future for them in a close relationship with China (see above). Why are they cozying up to China?

Three reasons: they want China’s trade, they know that a close relationship is the price for that trade, and they don’t trust us. Why should they? If we had set out to deliberately engage in a program of causing people to mistrust us we could hardly do worse than what we’ve been doing over the period of the last 60 years.

What should we do? You’re going to get tired of my repeating this. U. S. power overseas is a consequence of our military strength and our military strength is downstream from the productive U. S. economy—our production of stuff. Not finance or services. Consequently, we need to do four things all at once:

• Ensure that we are, if not self-sufficient, at least near-shoring production of strategic goods.
• Bolster our productive economy
• Refurbish our military
• Take a less interventionist stance

and to accomplish those we’ll need to stifle two powerful domestic constituencies: free traders and international interventionists. Those are tall orders. As the Magic 8-Ball might tell us, don’t count on it.