Here’s something else I’ll believe when I see it. I just heard Sens. Lindsey Graham and Richard Blumenthal declaring their joint support for a piece of legislation that would grant President Trump the authority (without additional Congressional supervision) to impose additional 500% tariffs on goods from China, India, and Brazil on the grounds that those counties are financing Russia’s war against Ukraine by purchasing oil and reselling it.

There are so many “ifs” in that statement that sounds to me more like a campaign promise than a policy. If Congress passes the bill… If President Trump imposes the tariffs without suspending them… If sky-high tariffs are enough to deter China, India, and Brazil from purchasing Russian oil… If removing Chinese, Indian, and Brazilian purchases of Russian oil is sufficient to bring Russia to end its aggression on Ukraine…

And, of course, if that can be done without producing a serious recession in the United States.

Frankly, I’m skeptical.

At USA Today Secretary of State Marco Rubio lauds our NATO allies for their pledge to spend 5% of GDP on security:

Winston Churchill once stated, “There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.”

Although the United States has been united by treaty with its NATO allies for nearly 80 years, in the years before Donald Trump becoming president, the United States would have had to fight any major war in Europe effectively alone.

Since the end of the Cold War, Europe’s combined military capabilities had steadily degraded to the point of almost total impotence. Fortunately, President Trump’s decade-long calls for NATO allies to contribute more to shared security have recently been answered with a historic commitment among allies to spend a once-unthinkable 5% of gross domestic product on defense ? a number that reflects both fairness and strategic wisdom.

Not so fast, says Gabriel Elefteriu at Brussels Signal:

Last month’s NATO summit in The Hague gave off the disturbing impression of an alliance finally crossing the fine line between serious defence policy into the realm of make-believe. The main outcome was presented to the world as a “new 5 per cent defence spending pledge” by all allies. The previous target, dating from 2014, was 2 per cent. President Trump naturally claimed the new benchmark as a “big win”, with the White House calling it a “monumental victory” and a “dramatic” increase in defence contributions across the alliance. Yet hardly any of this is true.

Of the 5 per cent, 1.5 is to be counted as any spending intended to “protect critical infrastructure, defend networks, ensure civil preparedness and resilience, innovate, and strengthen the defence industrial base”. In other words, this part of the grand new defence commitment is really an exercise in accounting, as a variety of existing types of rolling domestic investments can simply be designated as “NATO spending”. Italy already plans to declare a €13.5 billion bridge to Sicily as a contribution towards defending Europe – which would be funny if it weren’t a logical outcome of what NATO defence policy has devolved to.

It’s the other 3.5 per cent that is supposed to provide the real (so-called “core”) defence uplift, though. But even this – leaving aside the separate 1.5 per cent nonsense just mentioned – is merely a target to be achieved by 2035, ten full years from now. Given that Russia is supposed to invade us much sooner than that – according to the usual hysterical European warnings – a 2035 target becomes superfluous as it is clearly disconnected from all official strategic calculations. Not to mention that the previous target from 2014 remains unmet 10 years on, with several NATO members not spending even 2 per cent on defence – among them, major countries like Italy (1.49 per cent), Spain (1.28) or Canada (1.37) – and most of the others hovering just above the threshold by intense cooking of the accounting books.

He goes on to document two reasons these countries won’t live up to these pledges. The first is that they lack the fiscal headroom to do it:

Of course, more money for defence could be raised, in principle – in the UK just as in any other European country – either by cutting spending on welfare, by increasing taxes, or by somehow growing the economy. The well-known problem is that neither Britain nor most of its European peers can afford any of these, let alone hope in some miraculous economic growth. They are too weighed down by regulation, taxes, Green costs, expensive energy, deindustrialisation, an aging population and a migrant onslaught to be able to splurge on rearmament at scale.

The second that they lack the political will to do it:

The third main issue standing in the way of getting even to the 3 per cent is that the the domestic situation across many European countries, especially the deeply sclerotic and mismanaged West European ones is becoming more, not less, socially and economically explosive as time goes by. This means more instability going forward, and therefore more need to divert resources and attention to domestic issues as opposed to worrying about Ukraine. Indeed, it is likely that in the coming years – if it takes that long – more politicians might come to see substantial benefits in extricating their country from the Ukraine imbroglio, as a way to save money, tap into new voting pools, and even obtain better energy prices for their debilitated industries.

He concludes:

For all these reasons, and more, it is almost clear that not only the “5 per cent” NATO target is a chimera, but also the 3.5 by 2035 and even the 3 per cent by 2030 (or later). Whether we believe our own fantasies is neither here nor there, except for the fact that it undermines the credibility of the defence capacity we do have. The problem is that the adversary likely doesn’t share in our beliefs – because, whether it is the Russians or the Chinese, they look at facts and realities as they are and make their strategic moves accordingly.

We, on the other hand, choose to live in a world of our own artificial making, increasingly disconnected from the realities and the real balance of power. What we have now is a make-believe European defence policy, in which the US pretends it still guarantees our security and we pretend to pay for it. Let’s hope we won’t be tested anytime soon.

That last witticism is from a Soviet-era wisecrack: “We pretend to work and they pretend to pay us”.

Will the Europeans reform their economies, reduce their spending on welfare, and increase their spending on defense? I’ll believe it when I see it. Here’s France’s military spending as a percent of GDP from MacroTrends:

Can someone explain to me why Jared Bernstein is referred to as an “economist’? My understanding is that his undergraduate degree is in music and his graduate degrees in social work. I’ve never looked at his transcripts but it’s quite possible he’s never taken a course in economics.

BTW that’s my main argument against technocracy. Just because you’re an expert on something does not mean you’re an expert on everything. Indeed, my experience is that it’s almost the opposite of that. The more focused you are on a single subject the less you tend to know about other subjects. There aren’t a lot of true generalists out there.

At the Wall Street Journal Patrick Thomas reports on the Trump Administration’s efforts to bar Chinese ownership of U. S. farmland:

The Trump administration has a message for China: Keep off the farm.

Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins said Tuesday the administration will work with state lawmakers to ban sales of U.S. farmland to buyers from China and other countries of concern, citing national-security interests.

Rollins, joined by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem, said the government is ratcheting up scrutiny on existing land owned by Chinese buyers and is looking at ways to potentially claw back past purchases.

“We’ll never let foreign adversaries control our land,” said Rollins.

State and federal lawmakers for years have warned that China and other countries could use U.S. farmland to facilitate spying or wield influence over the U.S. food-supply chain. Chinese-owned entities hold nearly 300,000 acres—roughly 0.02%—of U.S. farmland, according to Agriculture Department data, an area about the size of Los Angeles.

Republicans and Democrats alike have sought to curb foreign ownership of American farmland, at times seeking to increase government scrutiny of purchases and investments. Critics have raised fears that foreign owners could drive up land prices or sidestep environmental rules.

In general “fee simple” is the private ownership of real property in which the owner has the right to control, use, and transfer the property at will. It is the form of real estate ownership that is the norm in the United States but not worldwide. I have long believed in reciprocity with respect to land ownership, that is, foreign individuals and entities should only be allowed to own U. S. land if American individuals and entities are allowed to own land in those countries in fee simple ownership. You might be surprised at how many countries in which that is not the case.

I found this piece from the Wall Street Journal by Brian Schwartz and Nick Timiraos about prospective Federal Reserve chairs interesting:

WASHINGTON—Two Republicans named Kevin are vying to be the next chairman of the Federal Reserve. One is rising to the top of the list of potential candidates, while the other is facing skepticism from President Trump’s allies.

Kevin Hassett, one of Trump’s closest economic advisers, is emerging as a serious contender to be the next Fed chair, according to people familiar with the matter. Hassett’s rise threatens the other Kevin—former Fed governor Kevin Warsh—an early favorite for the job who has angled for the position ever since Trump passed him over for it eight years ago. Some people close to the president worry that Warsh, who isn’t in Trump’s inner circle, won’t be a champion of lower rates.

What is unfolding is quintessential Trump: two ambitious men competing for his approval in a high-stakes contest that echoes the boardroom drama he once promoted on “The Apprentice.”

Hassett met with Trump about the Fed job at least twice in June, according to people familiar with the matter. The discussions marked a shift for Hassett, who previously had told allies he wasn’t interested, but now says he would take the job if offered.

Warsh has discussed traveling to Washington this month to meet with Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent about the Fed position, according to people familiar with the matter.

Hassett and Warsh didn’t respond to requests for comment. “President Trump has been clear about the need for the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy to complement the Administration’s pro-growth agenda,” White House spokesman Kush Desai said. “He will continue to nominate the most qualified individuals who can best serve the American people.”

I only have two observations.

First, we should have more bankers and fewer economists as governors of the Federal Reserve, particularly as members of the FOMC. The difference between bankers and economists resembles that between chemical engineers and chemists. Historically, Federal Reserve governors have tended to have been bankers.

Second, here’s a graph, courtesy of MacroMicro of the Fed funds rate (short-term interest rate) implied by the Taylor Rule vs the effective Fed funds rate:

I think that’s a powerful argument for automating the operation of the FOMC, at least more than at present. Note, too, that it suggests President Trump’s assessment of the present EFFR is wrong.

I agree with the observation that Gerald Baker makes in his latest Wall Street Journal column—that the appeal of New York City mayoral candidate Zohran Mamdani resembles that of Donald Trump:

But while we may mock the radicalism of Mr. Mamdani and his fellow socialists seemingly on the rise in the Democratic Party, I see in the man’s appeal, his evident popularity among a certain type of young voter especially, more signs of the continuing crack-up of American politics. Many Republicans like to think that the extremism represented by the likes of Mr. Mamdani and Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez is a signal of the Democrats’ growing irrelevance and unelectability. But his ascent—provisional though it may still be—is more likely a reflection of the fissures that continue to stretch our national cohesion than some proof of the marginalized nature of Donald Trump’s opponents.

Confronted with the electoral success of a radical shift by their opponents, political parties have two choices. They can accommodate the new electoral reality, acknowledge that the other side has captured fresh truths that command popular majorities, and accept that the Overton window has shifted. In these circumstances the distinctive proposition they offer to the voters becomes a promise merely to moderate the more extreme elements of the new governing dispensation, softening its edges to appeal to those most skittish about it, without fundamentally challenging its supremacy. The so-called abundance Democrats seem inclined to this sort of accommodation.

Alternatively, they can reject the revolution, refuse to reconcile with the new order, and put their faith in the physics of Newton’s third law of motion to produce an equal and opposite reaction. The successful radicalism of the other side has demonstrated not a rightward (in this case) shift in the nation’s center of gravity, but a potent popular openness to radical solutions of all sorts.

The latter seems closer to the temper of our times. While Mr. Trump and the Republicans have enjoyed not only electoral superiority but remarkable governing success in the past six months, there is little evidence of a wider political paradigm shift. The president and his party have succeeded in executing radical new approaches to immigration, foreign policy, trade and international economics, and have just passed one of the largest and most consequential pieces of fiscal legislation in the past 20 years, but with very few exceptions, Democrats seem in no mood to endorse the change. Not a single Democrat in either house voted for the One Big Beautiful Bill Act; few have shown any sign of temporizing on any of the other MAGA Republican initiatives.

Instead the temptation for Mr. Trump’s opponents may be to double down on the resistance and take their chances on the easy appeal of radical ideas. They can take inspiration from the apparent success of a reality-challenging radicalism evidenced in key elements of the MAGA agenda.

but I disagree as to the nature of the resemblance. I don’t think that the resemblance is the radicalism of their policies but that both are populists and both have made effective use of social media.

At Liberal Patriot John Halpin asks whether Americans can “escape their overly emotional politics”?

Lost in the emotional propaganda of contemporary politics is any rational discussion of the pros and cons of various policy choices, neutral evaluations of legislative language and motives, and measured examination of actual outcomes and necessary adjustments to help improve complex legislation or executive actions. Partisan path dependency requires Democrats to uniformly hate and despise everything that Trump is doing and it also requires Republicans to uniformly love and praise his every action. Dissidents, meaning Democrats who might be okay with some of Trump’s policies or Republicans who might disagree with others, are not allowed in the arena and will be subjected to the partisan star chamber online and in the media.

Agonistic expression is characteristic our post-literate culture just as it was characteristic of pre-literate culture. Reason and temperate, logical modes of expression were typical of a very short period of our past, when many of us relied on the written word for information.

Now we’re relying on increasingly visual forms. Charts, graphs, videos. The post-literate period has just begun and it will get much, much worse.

I have been thinking quite a bit about Ukraine lately, spurred by the increasing severity of Russia’s bombardments and its slow advance into Ukrainian territory. The results of my researches and the references I’ve used are listed in the table at the bottom of this post.

One of the things I’ve noticed is that the prevailing wisdom seems to assume that the United States is able to provide as much support in terms of missiles and munitions as the Ukrainians need to fend off the Russians. A typical example of the prevailing wisdom is in this column by Lee Hockstader at the Washington Post:

PARIS — Soviet losses in World War II exceeded those of all other Allied forces combined and were roughly double those of Nazi Germany, whose capital, Berlin, ultimately fell to Red Army troops.

Keep that in mind when you hear that Moscow can’t possibly sustain the colossal military and economic costs it is suffering from the Ukrainian bloodbath Russian President Vladimir Putin initiated three years ago in pursuit of his neo-imperial fever dream. It can.

Ukraine has proved its own ferocious resilience in the course of fighting a war of survival. But as the war grinds on into its 41st month, it’s worth questioning the conventional wisdom that neither side can win on the battlefield.

Any failure to provide anything the Ukrainians might want is treated as foolhardy, faint-hearted, and politically motivated. That appears to be the prevailing wisdom but no one seems to produce evidence to support it. Is that the case?

My own view is that the United States of thirty years ago is not the United States of today. Today we are simply unable to increase our production of missiles and munitions faster than the Ukrainians can use them without sacrificing our own security.

That is not to say that we couldn’t. But it would take a fullscale wartime mobilization and that is politically impossible. The reaction of the New York Times and Washington Post to any attempt at a fullscale wartime mobilization by the Trump Administration can only be imagined.

References
Zelensky’s peace plan: ten essential points
Comparing Pathways to Peace in Ukraine—Davis Center
How to Win: a Seven Point Plan for Sustainable Peace in Ukraine—CEPA
The West Needs a New Strategy in Ukraine—Russia Matters
The argument for settling for talks and avoiding a “long war” in Ukraine—Washington Post
The Diplomatic Path to a Secure Ukraine—Quincy Institute
African leaders to propose ‘confidence building measures’ to Russia, Ukraine—Reuters
What happened the last time Russia and Ukraine held peace talks?—Reuters
China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukrainian Crisis—Wikipedia
Indonesia proposes demilitarised zone, UN referendum for Ukraine peace plan—Reuters
In Search of a Formula for Lasting Peace in Ukraine—USIP

Those who do not know history are doomed to say stupid things about it, I guess. At UnHerd Wolfgang Munchau writes:

The greatest diplomats of all time were a Frenchman and an Austrian. Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord was a master of political opportunism, rivalled only by his Habsburg counterpart, Klemens von Metternich. Talleyrand and Metternich were the chief diplomats of global powers. After Napoleon’s defeat, France was a much-diminished country with no military leverage. Talleyrand’s masterstroke consisted of carving out a niche for France by playing everyone off against each other — the British against the Prussians, and the Austrians against the Russians. He did not exactly invent the notion of a balance of power, but he exploited it with unrivalled genius.

Klemens von Metternich (1773-1859) was born into the petty nobility and elevated to prince for his services to the Austrian Empire. He hated liberalism, democracy, and nationalism and was committed to the advancement of empire in Europe. The corresponding figure, Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord (1754-1838) had a similar biography and views.

What would Metternich have done done about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? He would have gleefully engineered a division of Ukraine between Russia and Poland. As Mr. Munchau observes, he would have played China and the United States off against each other to the benefit of neither but fostering European imperialistic designs. He would have been delighted with a European Union, so long as it was ruled by an emperor and aristocrats. How he would have felt about the influx of Middle Easterners and Africans into Europe can only be imagined.

I suspect there are plenty of would-be Metternichs in Europe right now but they all belong to the Alternativ für Deutschland (AfD) or the corresponding party in France, Rassemblement national (National Rally formerly National Front) or the corresponding parties in the Netherlands, Italy, etc. That’s something that grimly amuses me. I think it’s foolish for any American to seek fellowship with right-wing European parties. European politics is just too different from ours.