Not Interested in Ryan’s Budget

Just for the record I don’t have the least interest in Paul Ryan’s budget. I don’t care about his intentions. From what I’ve read from both sides of the aisle he makes assumptions that are just too dubious. I don’t think it has any more chance of passing anything other than, possibly, the House (although even that is doubtful) than the president’s budgets have for the last several years.

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Moore’s Law and Batteries

A lot of people are familiar with “Moore’s Law”, the idea that performance in integrated circuits doubles about every two years. It’s named for Gene Moore, co-founder of Intel, who published a paper nearly a half century ago that noted the phenomenon and predicted it would continue for at least ten years.

It’s continued far longer than that, right up to the present day. It’s been generalized by the public into the erroneous belief that technological development on all fronts proceeds very, very rapidly.

There is no Moore’s Law for batteries. Improvements in battery development are almost entirely based on higher energy density and that’s limited by physics.

The first alkaline battery (the sort used in flashlights, for example) was invented in 1899 in Sweden. It took roughly fifty years for that technology to become commercially viable in the United States. Lithium batteries, the ancestor of the sort that are now used in a wide range of devices from hearing aids to cameras to the Chevy Volt, were invented around 1912. It was the 1970s before they became commercially available in the United States.

The last new battery development to become commercially available was the lithium ion polymer battery in 1996, nearly twenty years ago. There are lots of new designs being worked on but they may never be commercially viable. Some of the most promising involve nanotechnology. Some may become commercially viable. We just don’t know whether or when. It could be five years from now. It could be a century from now. We may have reached the end of the road. We just don’t know.

The point of this post is this: don’t plan on revolutionary new battery designs coming along every couple of years. Broadcast power is more likely than that.

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The Council Has Spoken!

The Watcher’s Council has announced its winners for last week.

Council Winners

Non-Council Winners

The complete post on the Watcher’s site is here.

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Why Hybrids and EVs Are No Solution

Yesterday there was some discussion over the value of hybrids and electrics (EVs) in solving whatever climatological problems are being caused by greenhouse gas production. Some of the remarks were pretty angry or sarcastic so I thought I’d try to put more light than heat into the discussion. I’m going to be a bad storyteller and jump to the conclusion first: the effect of hybrids and EVs is negligible and will be for the foreseeable future.

First, let’s look at where emissions are coming from:

As you can see vehicle emissions from all vehicles account for a little over 25% of all greenhouse gas emissions.

Now, let’s look at what sort of vehicles are on the road:

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Passenger cars account for a little over a third of all vehicles. Both of those charts come from the Department of Transportation.

The U. S. “fleet”, all of the passenger cars in the country, takes more than 20 years to turn over. That length of time is actually increasing as vehicles become more reliable. There are about 250 million cars in the United States, hybrids and EVs account for less than 2% of them, and 2012 sales of hybrids and EVs accounted for less than 3% of all passenger car sales.

Let’s start crunching numbers. First, at that rate how long will it take before all passenger cars are hybrids or EVs? Answer: at the present rate of replacement hybrids and EVs will never be more than 3% of all passenger cars in the fleet. Well, at the present rate of increase in sales how long will it take? Answer: sales of hybrids and EVs in the U. S. peaked in 2009 and have declined since then. Even if the decline in sales as a percentage of the total stops, sales of hybrids and EVs will never exceed 3%.

Okay, okay. Let’s assume that a) the lifetime savings in emissions of an EV or hybrid is 24% (the number in the article), b) the percentage of hybrids and EVs rises to 10% of all passenger vehicles (which, barring some dramatic change in purchasing behavior will never happen), and c) the size of the fleet remains the same. How much will that result in decline in greenhouse gas emissions?

That would be

24% (the savings over conventional vehicles) X 28% (the percentage of emissions due to vehicles) X 34% (the proportion of the total represented by passenger vehicles) X 10% (the assumed proportion of hybrids and EVs)

or .22%, 22 parts per ten thousand. Or, said another way, a very, very small amount. Probably too small to measure with any real confidence. That doesn’t accomplish what would need to be accomplished to reduce (or reverse) whatever global warming is occurring as a result of greenhouse gases. It isn’t even a start.

I could go on by demonstrating that the amount by which China is increasing its production of greenhouse gases exceeds that tiny amount of savings but I think I’ve made my point.

I repeat the hypothesis I stated in my previous post on this subject: emphasis on hybrids and EVs is no practical solution. It’s more credibly explained as a symbolic action with the intent of moving the Overton window.

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Illinois Charged With Securities Fraud

There are times when I don’t know whether to laugh or to cry. The Securities and Exchange Commission has charged the state of Illinois with securities fraud:

Washington, D.C., March 11, 2013 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged the State of Illinois with securities fraud for misleading municipal bond investors about the state’s approach to funding its pension obligations.

An SEC investigation revealed that Illinois failed to inform investors about the impact of problems with its pension funding schedule as the state offered and sold more than $2.2 billion worth of municipal bonds from 2005 to early 2009. Illinois failed to disclose that its statutory plan significantly underfunded the state’s pension obligations and increased the risk to its overall financial condition. The state also misled investors about the effect of changes to its statutory plan.

Illinois, which implemented a number of remedial actions and issued corrective disclosures beginning in 2009, agreed to settle the SEC’s charges.

“Municipal investors are no less entitled to truthful risk disclosures than other investors,” said George S. Canellos, Acting Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. “Time after time, Illinois failed to inform its bond investors about the risk to its financial condition posed by the structural underfunding of its pension system.”

Elaine Greenberg, Chief of the SEC’s Municipal Securities and Public Pensions Unit, added, “Regardless of the funding methodology they choose, municipal issuers must provide accurate and complete pension disclosures including the effects of material changes to their pension plans. Public pension disclosure by municipal issuers continues to be a top priority of the unit.”

According to the SEC’s order instituting settled administrative proceedings against Illinois, the state established a 50-year pension contribution schedule in the Illinois Pension Funding Act that was enacted in 1994. The schedule proved insufficient to cover both the cost of benefits accrued in a current year and a payment to amortize the plans’ unfunded actuarial liability. The statutory plan structurally underfunded the state’s pension obligations and backloaded the majority of pension contributions far into the future. This structure imposed significant stress on the pension systems and the state’s ability to meet its competing obligations – a condition that worsened over time.

I don’t much care whether the officials involved were elected, appointed, or hired. The people of the state of Illinois have a right to expect their civil servants to comply with the law. That’s the minimum standard of performance not the maximum standard. By their malfeasance the state has not only become subject to SEC fines but to who knows how much in legal costs, vulnerability to civil suits, and judgments.

We’ve reached the point where everybody in the entire hierarchy that’s involved here should be deemed unfit and ineligible for office.

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Local or Global?

Global warming dissident Bjorn Lomborg needles the fans of electric vehicles and hybrids:

A 2012 comprehensive life-cycle analysis in Journal of Industrial Ecology shows that almost half the lifetime carbon-dioxide emissions from an electric car come from the energy used to produce the car, especially the battery. The mining of lithium, for instance, is a less than green activity. By contrast, the manufacture of a gas-powered car accounts for 17% of its lifetime carbon-dioxide emissions. When an electric car rolls off the production line, it has already been responsible for 30,000 pounds of carbon-dioxide emission. The amount for making a conventional car: 14,000 pounds.

He goes on to suggest that the lifetime production of greenhouse gases may actually be higher for supposedly “green” vehicles than it is for those using conventional internal combustion engines. It would, perhaps, be indelicate of me to point out that if you reduce the amount you drive to, say, a couple of thousand miles a year it doesn’t matter much whether it’s in a fully electric all-weather golf cart or an SUV. Either way you reduce your production of greenhouse gases. Our problems are zoning, other forms of subsidy, and the lifestyles those make possible, not how our vehicles are powered.

However, I have a question. I recognize there’s a hot dispute about whether anthropogenic global warming is actually occurring but there’s somewhat less dispute over whether production of greenhouse gases influences local climate change. Here’s my question. If that’s the case, doesn’t centralizing greenhouse gas production, as Dr. Lomborg notes takes place in the production of hybrids and electrical vehicles, indisputably contribute to local climate change? Does it matter where that localized climate change is? I’ve always suspected that industrialization of the tropics was a very bad idea.

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Breaking Up the Big Banks

Richard Fisher and Harvey Rosenblum, president and research director respectively of the Dallas Fed, offer their prescription for mitigating the risk of banks that are “too big to fail”:

First, we would roll back the federal safety net—deposit insurance and the Federal Reserve’s discount window—to apply only to traditional commercial banks, and not to the nonbank affiliates of bank holding companies or the parent companies themselves, where the safety net was never intended to be.

Second, customers, creditors and counterparties of all nonbank affiliates and the parent holding companies would sign a simple, legally binding, unambiguous disclosure acknowledging and accepting that there is no government guarantee—ever—backstopping their investment. A similar disclaimer would apply to bank deposits outside the FDIC insurance limit and other unsecured debts.

Third, we recommend that the largest financial holding companies be restructured so that every one of their corporate entities is subject to a speedy bankruptcy process, and in the case of banking entities themselves, that they be of a size that is “too small to save.” Addressing institutional size is vital to maintaining a credible threat of failure, thereby providing a convincing case that policy has truly changed. This step gets both bank incentives and structure right, neither of which is accomplished by Dodd–Frank.

I think the first two prescriptions are boilerplate. The root of the problem is that whatever the laws the institutions are seen as too big to allow to fail. “Don’t do that” isn’t enough of a prescription.

The third, unfortunately, is just wishful thinking. It can be stated more succinctly as “Just do it!”. It presupposes that breaking up the elephantine big banks into chewable pieces is a shared goal. Quite to the contrary, if the big banks are broken up and rendered small enough to be allowed to fail where will politicians and apparatchiks go to rake in the big bucks after (or between) their period of what we laughingly refer to as “public service”?

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A Rebuttal of “Medicare for All”

In a Washington Post op-ed David Goldhill produces an interesting retort to those who advocate a national policy along the lines of “Medicare for all”:

In the mainstream of our health-care debate, this growth in seniors’ demand is considered organic — a need to be fulfilled. But this extraordinary growth in volume is better understood as a provider reaction to the perverse incentives of low prices. Faced with buyers focused on volumes — such as private insurers — the health-care industry prices high; when dealing with buyers focused on prices — such as Medicare and Medicaid — the focus shifts to raising volumes, especially of more-costly procedures. Both strategies demonstrate the industry’s enormous market power.

One of the things that concerns me about the present trajectory of federal healthcare policy is that it seems to me to be moving in the direction of “Medicaid for all”, which seems to me the worst of all possible outcomes.

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Cargo Cult Science

You know, it occurs to me that if you think that, because scientists express things mathematically, if you express things mathematically, too, then you’re being scientific is a sort of “cargo cult science”.

That’s not science, it’s not empirical, and it’s not realistic.

Update

Apparently, I’m not by any means the first person to make this observation. The eminently quotable Richard Feynman first did nearly 40 years ago. Plus ça change…

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Point/Counter-Point

Mark Thoma of Economist’s View has an interesting back-and-forth between Jeffrey Sachs and Paul Krugman excerpted from their op-ed and column, respectively, on Dr. Krugmans’s Keynesian prescriptions for solving our economic woes. It’s relatively brief and I can’t excerpt from it without recapitulating it so I recommend reading it in full. I honestly don’t know what to make of it. A few random observations.

First, what Dr. Sachs refers to as “crude Keynesianism” which he attributes to Dr. Krugman is what I’ve been calling “folk Keynesianism”.

Second:

empirical ace; ace;adjective

1 : originating in or based on observation or experience
2 : relying on experience or observation alone often without due regard for system and theory
3 : capable of being verified or disproved by observation or experiment

Models are not empirical evidence. They may be derived from data, “observation or experience”, but they are not data. Models prove consistency, i.e. that your conclusions follow from your premises, rather than truth, that your premises are actually correct (and your conclusions follow from them).

As I understand it Dr. Krugman’s explanation of events depends on our being in a liquidity trap, i.e. that people are hoarding cash. Is there really dispositive evidence of this? Can we be in a liquidity trap and have the savings rate go down, as has been the case for the last several years? Is a liquidity trap consistent with very rapid price increases and, consequently, much more money being spent on them, on goods and services consumed by the highest income earners?

I think my own folk Keynesianism, i.e. “spend during recessions, pay down debt during recoveries”, is actually somewhat closer to what Lord Keynes wrote about than what both Drs. Krugman and Thoma are advocating which I would bowdlerize as “spend during recoveries, spend faster during recessions”. That may not be indifferent to the public debt but it sure looks like the next best thing. I would also note that the recovery, such as it is, began in June 2009.

Since there doesn’t seem to be an empirical method of determining whether you’re in a liquidity trap, why is Dr. Krugman’s changing prescriptions between Republican administrations and Democratic administrations not “tax during Republican administrations, spend during Democratic administrations”?

Aren’t there simpler explanations for what’s been happening? For example, unforeseen effects (or foreseen, as some are contending) of policy that have resulted in increasing income inequality? A flight to quality?

Finally, if the problem is that people are hoarding cash because they’re uncertain about the future, isn’t the solution building up their certainty? Go back and look at the last six years. It doesn’t look anybody’s bucking people’s confidence up much to me.

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