It’s Not Our Salami

Following up on my brief brief post on China yesterday, here’s an item from Robert Haddick of War on the Rocks you might find interesting. In the post Mr. Haddick outlines China’s recent actions, described as “salami-slicing”:

John Mearsheimer recently argued that China is pursuing in Asia what the United States has in Latin America: regional hegemony. In pursuit of that goal, China keeps trying to take territory, bit by bit, in the East and South China Seas. And the United States doesn’t know what to do about it.

This practice, known as salami-slicing, involves the slow accumulation of small changes, none of which in isolation amounts to a casus belli, but which add up over time to a substantial change in the strategic picture. By using salami-slicing tactics in the East and South China Seas, China does not have to choose between trade with the rest of the world and the achievement of an expanded security perimeter in the Western Pacific at the expense of China’s neighbors. Given enough time, and continued confusion by the United States and its allies on how to respond, China is on course to eventually achieve both.

China’s salami-slicing has accelerated over the past few years. In 2012, China established “Sansha City” on Woody Island, an island in the Paracel chain that China seized by force from South Vietnam in 1974 (Vietnam refuses to recognize China’s seizure). China declared that Sansha City would be the administrative center of all of its claims in the South China Sea, including those in the Spratly Island group. Small Chinese military and paramilitary garrisons on Woody Island reinforce the image of sovereign legitimacy China is trying to establish—an image that neighbors such as Vietnam and the Philippines lack the resources to replicate. Just last month, China permanently based a 5,000-ton paramilitary patrol vessel at Woody Island.

That’s not just provocation as some have suggested. It’s military activity. Mr. Haddick sees these actions as posing a problem for the United States.

As I see it the problem is that, while irredentist Chinese nationalists may believe it’s their salami they’re slicing, it most emphatically is not our salami. It might be Japan’s salami or India’s salami or South Korea’s or Taiwan’s or the Philippines’s but it’s not ours and our interests are not synonymous with theirs.

Now I think the solution to the problem of these East Asian countries is pretty obvious and alluded to by Mr. Haddick:

U.S. officials may have another unspoken reason for their forbearance policy: what might be termed a “rope-a-dope” gambit. China’s assertions are clearly sparking a region-wide security backlash. Security cooperation is rapidly developing, from India through Southeast Asia and Australia, and up to Japan, aimed at balancing China’s military power. Non-Chinese military spending and procurement in the region is similarly expected to leap over the next five years. U.S. officials may conclude that the more such activity occurs, the lighter will be America’s security burden in the region.

There will be a temptation in the United States to infantilize our allies (and prospective allies) in East Asia as has been our policy with respect to Europe in the mistaken view that weak allies somehow make us stronger. The temptation should be resisted.

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Samoyeds Are Crazy

It’s 2°F here.

They’re snow-bathing.

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There Has Always Been Anarchy There

I think that Robert Kaplan gets a few things wrong but most things right in his recent musings on why there’s so much anarchy around the world. Let’s start with what I agree with.

The most important observation he makes is that institutions matter:

Here we come to the key element. The post-colonial Arab dictators ran moukhabarat states: states whose order depended on the secret police and the other, related security services. But beyond that, institutional and bureaucratic development was weak and unresponsive to the needs of the population — a population that, because it was increasingly urbanized, required social services and complex infrastructure. (Alas, urban societies are more demanding on central governments than agricultural ones, and the world is rapidly urbanizing.) It is institutions that fill the gap between the ruler at the top and the extended family or tribe at the bottom. Thus, with insufficient institutional development, the chances for either dictatorship or anarchy proliferate. Civil society occupies the middle ground between those extremes, but it cannot prosper without the requisite institutions and bureaucracies.

That isn’t limited to the Arab world. The Soviet Union as a matter of policy tried to pound down any institutions other than the Communist Party, the military, and the KGB. They were largely successful but two institutions eluded them: organized crime and the Orthodox Church. No wonder that when the Soviet Union collapsed largely taking the Communist Party with it the remaining institutions controlled the creation of the economy and the state that followed it. Even less is the wonder that Russia is now headed by former KGB.

China has much the same problem and when the Chinese Communist Party loses control of the country as will inevitably happen, the institutions that will remain—largely families, organized crime, and the military—will be in a position to control the outcome.

Consequently, I fully agree with this observation:

The real question marks are Russia and China. The possible weakening of authoritarian rule in those sprawling states may usher in less democracy than chronic instability and ethnic separatism that would dwarf in scale the current instability in the Middle East. Indeed, what follows Vladimir Putin could be worse, not better. The same holds true for a weakening of autocracy in China.

Now onwards to the observations of his with which I disagree.

First, I think most of the world has always had anarchy. It’s not a new development. In particular there’s a broad swathe of territory from the Bosporus to the Hindu Kush in which there have never been strong states other than for very short periods if at all.

My second criticism may sound like a quibble but it’s more than that. States don’t have identities:

With feeble institutions, such post-colonial states have feeble identities. If the state only means oppression, then its population consists of subjects, not citizens. Subjects of despotisms know only fear, not loyalty. If the state has only fear to offer, then, if the pillars of the dictatorship crumble or are brought low, it is non-state identities that fill the subsequent void. And in a state configured by long-standing legal borders, however artificially drawn they may have been, the triumph of non-state identities can mean anarchy.

People have identities. When people have identities, expressed through institutions like tribes and religion, that oppose the formation of strong states, they won’t have strong states.

And I disagree with his conclusion:

The future of world politics will be about which societies can develop responsive institutions to govern vast geographical space and which cannot. That is the question toward which the present season of anarchy leads.

Because identity and institutions matter the future of world politics will be about how the rest of the world deals with the large areas of ungoverned and ungovernable territory.

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The Big Red Line

Here’s some saber-rattling from John Bosco at the National Interest on the subjects on which I touched yesterday, China’s provocative actions on its periphery and our apparent inability to articulate clear objectives. Mr. Bosco recommends that the president take up one of the pens he’s mentioned recently:

The president should take that same pen and draw a red line across the Asia Pacific region in response to China’s threats of force in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea. The line would also transverse the Korean Peninsula at the 38th Parallel.

Then he needs to pick up that phone and enlist the cooperation of America’s regional allies—Japan, South Korea, Australia, Philippines—as well as friends and security partners like Taiwan, Vietnam, Singapore and Indonesia. He should assure them of Washington’s commitment to maritime and aviation security in the region and seek their material and diplomatic support for that common good.

China’s leaders, and some U.S. commentators, will charge provocation. But such a presidential declaration will ultimately avoid conflict by affirming freedom of navigation and flight as a unifying theme in the regional and international order that has existed for over six decades.

It would not be the first time a U.S. leader drew a line on the map of Asia. Secretary of State Dean Acheson and General Douglas MacArthur, supported by President Harry Truman, did it in early 1950 to declare U.S. strategic resistance to Communist expansion. Unfortunately, their defense perimeter did not include South Korea or Taiwan. Beijing and Pyongyang saw not a red line but a green light, and the Korean War erupted.

I don’t think that’s any more in our interest than carrying so much of the water for our putative European allies has been but I strongly suspect I’d be out-voted on that.

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IBGYBG in Chicago

The editors of the Chicago Tribune tell the bald and sad truth:

Emanuel didn’t excavate the deep debt chasm into which City Hall has descended. But his administration has tumbled into the same habits as his predecessor. Chicago pols and public officials have grown accustomed — addicted, really — to the easy borrowing that lets them survive the next election without telling taxpayers the truth: We are consuming more in services than we’re collecting in revenue, and that foolishness has got to stop.

Yes, stopping the deficit spending that Chicago’s rising debt obscures someday will require a radical downsizing of the city payroll, an unsettling end to some services and outsourcing of others, a stark rise in taxes, or all three. Those slashes will inflict inconvenience, and in some cases hardship, on Chicagoans.

As me auld mither used to say “grasp the nettle”. What are Chicago’s politicians doing instead?

Of course, for many years Detroit was not today’s broke and broken Detroit. Msall again: “Detroit politicians made choices based on short-term political benefits rather than the long-term welfare of their city.”

Think on that as Chicago aldermen decide whether to authorize another up-to-$900 million in bonds backed by property taxes — and to double, to $1 billion, the amount of short-term bank money that City Hall can borrow to raise cash.

It’s time to grasp the nettle.

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The Journalistic Confidence Scale

In decreasing order of confidence:

  • “X today presented evidence…”
  • “X today said he was in possession of evidence…”
  • “An unnamed person said she was in possession of evidence…”
  • “This newspaper has received evidence…”
  • “X today told this newspaper that evidence exists…”
  • “An unnamed person told this newspaper that evidence exists…”
  • “Evidence exists…”
  • “Evidence exists…” (followed by a disclaimer from the newspapers ombudsman)

For background see this column by James Taranto at the WSJ.

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Things You Don’t Say Even If They’re True

Remember those old cartoons they used to have in the newspapers? How many things can you find wrong with this picture? Maybe they still have them.

How many things can you find wrong with this statement:

On a conference call with reporters, a senior administration official said the change in worker behavior due to health care access reforms found in the Affordable Care Act was not a surprise.

“To put that in context, I have no doubt that if we eliminated Social Security and eliminated Medicare, there would be many 95-year-olds that would choose to work more hours than they’re working today just so they could survive, feed themselves and have health insurance,” the official said.

That statement was made in response to reporters’ questions about a CBO report which, probably to no one’s surprise, found that the PPACA would result in a lower labor force participation rate, slower growth, and a higher budget deficit than previous projections had suggested.

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Syria and the Lack of a Clear Idea

I’ve been seeing a lot of kvetching about U. S. policy with respect to Syria over the last couple of days. There are good examples of the genre here and here.

IMO our handling of the entire question suffers from a lack of clear objectives. In 25 words or less please state our objectives with respect to Syria.

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DC Sharpshooters

Megan McArdle considers the problems with the PPACA’s “demonstration programs”: the administration’s analysts don’t seem that interested in analyzing the results.

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The Dragon

I don’t have a great deal to say about this but I wanted to open this question up for discussion. China has, probably, more territorial disputes than any other country in East Asia, possibly in the world. It has territorial disputes with all of its neighbors, notably Japan, South Korea, India, Russia, and the Philippines. How do you think China’s neighbors would react to an aggressive and expansionary China?

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