Imagine the perfect financial regulatory agency. Such an agency could only continue to be perfect if nothing ever changed or if it could always anticipate every possible move by people wishing to exploit the deficiencies in the regulatory system instantaneously and it would allocate capital where it was needed without friction and instantaneously. Now read David Dayen’s remarks on “rationalizing” financial regulation:
The truth is that, regardless of what you think of the Dodd-Frank reform law, the financial regulatory system we have is incredibly unintelligently designed. Overlapping responsibilities, an alphabet soup of agencies zealously guarding their jurisdictions and a lack of a clear hierarchy has created such a morass that major problems can easily fall through the gaps. Think of the worst organizational chart you can imagine — like the one for Initech, the fictional company from Office Space, where Peter Gibbons has eight different bosses — and make it a little worse, and that’s what our financial regulatory apparatus looks like. Nobody would start from scratch and design oversight this way.
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This process of rationalization has some key features:
• The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) would get new independence as a super-regulator with broad oversight authority of the entire system. The Office of Financial Research would similarly get shifted out of the Treasury Department and have its own data collection mandate.
• A new Prudential Supervisory Agency (PSA) would be responsible for the supervisory authority now stretched across five different federal agencies, examining banks, systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), investment dealers, money market funds and more.
• The Federal Reserve would do rulemaking, but the PSA could propose regulations for them to approve. It would also have some oversight authority in concert with the FSOC.
• The Federal Deposit Insurance Commission would focus on deposit insurance and orderly liquidation of failed firms and get out of the primary supervision business.
• The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which currently regulates nationally chartered banks, would be eliminated.
• The SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission would be combined into one regulator with responsibility for investor protection and capital market conduct.
Some random observations about Mr. Dayen’s preferred “rationalization”. It would be most effective the first day it opened its door and would deteriorate over time. How do I know that? We’ve been studying bureaucracies for the last 150 years and one of the things we know about them is that over time they stray from their notional mandate and devote increasingly more time, attention, and resources to organizational purposes. Note, too, that in the world Mr. Dayen envisions regulators are never coopted by the institutions they’re supposed to be regulating (“regulatory capture”) but always devote themselves unswervingly to their mandates. Regulatory capture of financial regulatory agencies is so obvious as to hardly require additional proof.
I’ve quoted the testimony around here before on the sources of the financial crisis. It wasn’t that no one had the authority to rein in the excesses or that the structure of regulation was too complicated. It was that the agencies with the mandates and authority didn’t bother to do their jobs.
In actuality there is a perfect financial regulatory agency along the lines I described in the opening paragraph of this post. It’s called “the market”. Like Christianity or communism the market is not a case of having been tried and found wanting but of having been found difficult and not tried. We do not presently have a market system and have not for at least the last century. We have a hybrid system and it’s not working very well.
What will inevitably happen with any regulatory agency, agencies, or structure is that their every move will be matched by the cleverest people in the world who have every incentive to do so to wring a buck out of the nooks and crannies of the system. More complicated even more adaptive structures can’t hope to match that. The only possible opposing force to an emerging phenomenon is another emerging phenomenon.