A regular commenter’s response to my post yesterday on technological unemployment was terse:
1) We produce more…
2) With fewer human workers.
3) How?
My answer is equally terse. The same way it has been for tens of thousands of years.
Technological advances have created surpluses. The surpluses have made new jobs possible or even necessary. Some are in primary production. A century ago practically no gallium or germanium was produced commercially. Now they’re essential to our civilization and new jobs mining and refining them have sprung into being. Thousands of tons of the stuff are produced.
At its height there were hundreds of thousands more jobs in the auto sector than there ever had been in the carriage manufacturing sector. That’s an example of increased production not resulting in technological unemployment but in the creation of many more, better paying jobs.
But by far the most jobs will be in secondary production. What will those jobs be? We have no idea but the Department of Labor says that 65% of today’s schoolkids will work for businesses that haven’t been created yet.
Here’s another example of technology making jobs possible that hadn’t been possible before. Writing. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics more than a hundred thousand people earn their livings as authors or writers in the United States alone. Four hundred years ago practically nobody did anywhere. What happened? Advances in technology.
People have been complaining that their jobs were becoming obsolete due to machines for 200 years. While there has been some short term technological unemployment, every instance of that is a tragedy for those involved and I don’t want to minimize that, there has been no massive unemployment due to technology. That was true in 1820. It was true in 1920. It was true in 1990.
Is it possible that today really is different? Sure. But there are very real costs associated with guessing wrong about something like that. The costs not only take the form of the direct costs of dealing with massive technological unemployment that never happens but in the opportunity costs of doing that and the deadweight loss that results.
Additionally, there are other explanations for what’s happening right now and those explanations are demonstrable. Among these explanations are foreign competition, immigration, and deadweight loss (deadweight loss alone is estimated to cost millions of jobs). Taxi drivers and coal miners aren’t just victims of technological obsolescence. Policy preference also pays a role. Treating policy preference and technological obsolescence as though they were the same thing is an overreaction as well as making it more difficult to devise solutions.
The historically slow rate of new business formation is one of the factors in slow job growth, too. New businesses produce new jobs. Old, established businesses cut costs by, among other things, cutting jobs. Over the period of the last thirty years most net job creation has been by new businesses. We don’t know why the rate of new business formation has slowed but policy preference seems to be a likely explanation.
Just to head off a possible complaint about some of my observations above, the alternative to the adverse effects of taxation and regulation isn’t no taxation or regulation. it’s better, more targeted taxation and regulation.
Under the circumstances those who are concerned about technological unemployment need to produce much stronger evidence for their theories than they have to date. It’s not enough just to ask how.