I wanted to call attention to Andreas Umland’s piece at The National Interest on the nature of security guarantees for Ukraine. Mr. Umland opens:
Since spring 2025, the term “security guarantee” has become a buzzword in international debates about future Western support for Ukraine. Following the conclusion of a ceasefire, ensuring Ukraine’s security is to be a central component of international engagement with the embattled country. However, the term is currently often used in a way that leaves important political and strategic challenges to the implementation of these guarantees unaddressed.
In general, the term “security guarantees” can be misleading: a complete security guarantee is an unattainable illusion, not only for Ukraine but also for every other nation. Expert discussions distinguish between guarantees and (weaker) security commitments, as well as between positive and negative guarantees. As a rule, a positive security guarantee—the type of promise Ukraine is seeking—implies strong commitments on the part of the guarantor to protect the beneficiary.
The different definitions and interpretations of security guarantees, as well as the ambiguities and contradictions implicit in their planning and implementation, pose a problem. Open questions must be clearly identified at the outset. Transparency can help move from purely discursive progress on Kyiv’s future defense needs to a real improvement in Ukraine’s security situation.
In the body of the piece Mr. Umland, successfully in my opinion, argues against stationing a European “reassurance force” in Ukraine but in support of something he calls “the SkyShield plan”:
A limited engagement of their air forces over and in western and central Ukraine appears less problematic than the deployment of ground troops and warships. Such support with Western interceptors—also known as “SkyShield”—would already be possible and sensible now, before a ceasefire is concluded.
The establishment of joint air defense zones over entire regions of Ukraine, or at least over important cities such as Uzhhorod, Lviv, and Kyiv, or critical infrastructure, carries less risk of escalation, as the deployment of Western interceptors can be limited in two ways.
I have no objection in principle to either version of security guarantee that he describes with the following caveats:
- in either case other European countries should be providing the funding and manpower for it
- U. S. security guarantees to Ukraine should primarily be in the form of negative reciprocity
The devil, as usual, is in the details. One glaring omission is where would the forces for the “SkyShield plan” be stationed? And, if stationed in Ukraine, how would that differ from the “reassurance force” plan he discards?
I am skeptical the Russians will acquisence to what amounts to a “no fly zone” over Ukraine by NATO member countries; while the wars course favors them.
A more realistic alternative is a UN sponsored “peacekeeping” force composing of the “non-aligned bloc” (i.e. Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Egypt, South Africa, Brazil, Argentia, etc) that would patrol Ukraine held areas east of the Dneiper; they would be serve a buffer between Russian and Ukrainian armed forces. I think this gives Ukraine + Europe + Russia + US incentives to not restart hostilities or raise tensions by incorporating Ukraine into NATO overtly or by stealth.
Its weird all the commentary on the negotations seems disconnected from a deep analysis of the situation on the battlefield. The summary is its not going well for Ukraine. The war analogies I use (US civil war, and WW1), they losing side conceded at 49 months and 51 months, this war is now 45 months. There are very real risks the Ukrainian army suffers a catastrophic breakdown with all the consequences that would entail if the war goes into 2027.