More Questions About Ukraine’s Strategic Objectives

As it turns out it’s not just the WSJ bureau chief and I who are puzzled about Ukraine’s strategic objectives. At Foreign Policy John R. Deni does some speculation of his own:

Why send thousands of forces north when Ukrainian territory is being lost elsewhere? Why incentivize Moscow to reinforce a border region that has been relatively quiet, hence creating a longer-term security dilemma for Ukraine? Why not wait until Ukrainian units in the east and south were robust enough to leverage any siphoning of Russian forces resulting from an operation in the north?

Whatever Kyiv’s actual goals may be, the operation holds important insights regarding the long-term trajectory of the war. It’s possible, although not yet certain, that the Kursk offensive is not merely an opportunistic gambit but rather part of a broader military campaign that could stretch well into 2025, purposefully setting the stage for operations elsewhere.

Secondly, the offensive appears to provide evidence of Ukrainian ability to leverage Western training in a way unseen during the failed counteroffensive of 2023, namely by using combined arms maneuver warfare—the synchronization of various combat tools in a way that shocks, disorients, and ultimately defeats an adversary.

If these preliminary conclusions crystallize, the Kursk offensive could prove to be a major turning point.

He goes on:

Some observers have speculated that the operation is intended largely for political purposes. Certainly, at the strategic level—and at a time when many in the West are now considering what Ukrainian forces will need to initiate a broad counteroffensive in 2025—the Kursk operation may generate optimism among Ukraine’s supporters and bolster their willingness to continue funding and training. Evidence for this already exists in some of the reactions across the West.

However, it is difficult to believe that the principal aim of the Kursk offensive—10 days old as of Aug. 16—is purely political, intended to strengthen Kyiv’s bargaining position in (nonexistent) peace talks, guarantee additional Western assistance, undermine Russian President Vladimir Putin’s authority at home, or facilitate prisoner exchanges.

Of course, as all students of Prussian Gen. Carl von Clausewitz know, warfare is an extension of politics. But to conclude that Ukraine would send thousands of troops north on a risky operation into Russian territory while its forces to the south and east are slowly losing ground for purely political reasons seems dubious at best.

Alternatively, some Ukrainian officials have claimed that the Kursk operation is intended to complicate the flow of forces from elsewhere in Russia to Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region. This seems doubtful, given the relatively limited extent of the operation so far and the lack of evidence regarding the interdiction of major rail lines, roadways, or other transportation infrastructure or platforms related to the flow of personnel and equipment into Donetsk. Ukrainian forces would have to drive farther east into Russia, probably to the rail junction at Voronezh, roughly 200 miles to the east of the border town of Sudzha in Kursk Oblast, or roughly the same distance headed southeast toward Valuyki, to interdict the rail lines or roads that eventually make their way into Ukraine’s Donbas.

Ukrainian officials have also claimed that the Kursk offensive was intended to enable the destruction of Russian facilities and platforms engaged in glide bomb and other long-range operations against Ukrainian territory. On Aug. 13, a Ukrainian official argued that Kyiv’s forces lacked enough long-range weapons to hit these targets from across the border. However, that very night, Ukraine conducted its largest drone operation to date, reportedly sending scores of drones to hit facilities and platforms across a wide swath of Russian territory, including in Kursk, Belgorod, Voronezh, Volgograd, Bryansk, Orel, Rostov, and faraway Nizhny Novgorod—approximately 500 miles from the Ukrainian border.

Somewhat more likely than all these other rationales, and as some Ukrainian officials have indicated, the operation seems designed to relieve pressure on Ukrainian forces in the south and east. It may also force Moscow’s military planners to consider the longer-term defense of Russia’s border with northern Ukraine, tying down more troops there and introducing a new constraint on Russian commanders. So far, there have been some reports that Russian officials have diverted troops from the southern portion of the front as well as from Kaliningrad.

However, even if pressure is relieved, it is unlikely that Ukrainian troops in the east and south will have the wherewithal to conduct a counteroffensive of their own, at least in the short run.

That may explain why activists in Kaliningrad have been doing some saber-rattling lately. He continues to speculate that Ukrainians are putting their Western training in “combined arms warfare” to good use which I find pretty unlikely. I suspect this particular offensive is purely Ukrainian in its methods and purposes. Has any evidence to the contrary been produced?