More on the Shape of Compromise

William Galston, in his most recent Wall Street Journal column, also expresses support for compromise on the COVID-19 relief bill:

The Covid-19 relief bill is the first test for the Biden administration. It’s no surprise there’s disagreement on how to proceed. One controversy is strategic: How vigorously should the administration pursue bipartisan support for its legislation, and what price should it be willing to pay to achieve it? Some Democrats—myself among them—believe that the president’s calls for unity will be hollow unless he does all he can to reach a bipartisan agreement that satisfies his core objectives. Monday’s meeting with 10 Republican senators to discuss their $618 billion offer was a good first step, and conversations will continue.

Let’s pause here. To some extent that’s begging the question. What are President Biden’s “core objectives”? If a $15/hour minimum wage, bailing out profligate cities and states, and sending handouts to the top 3% (or, as has been pointed out, to the top 20% of income earners) are among them, there’s no room for compromise at all.

Continuing

The Senate Republican plan meets the administration’s funding request for vaccinations and other health-related measures, but offers less for extended unemployment payments, aid to schools, and checks to individuals. It doesn’t increase the child tax credit and provides no direct aid to states and localities. But even this may be too much for House Republicans.

Step back from the details, and it’s clear the administration proposals serve four distinct policy objectives: relief, stimulus, investment and structural change. The details matter, but measures to mitigate immediate hardship enjoy the broadest support. Measures to promote economic and social change—such as increasing the federal minimum wage to $15 an hour—are the least popular. Proposed investments for the future, such as rebuilding and restocking the National Strategic Stockpile, are also widely supported, in part because of their relatively modest cost.

He goes on to observe that the analogy with the Obama Administration’s approach to the situation in 2009 which the Biden Administration seems to be following is weak. Due to steps already taken consumer spending as well as household saving are actually pretty good. The primary impediments to recovery in some sectors are government actions not money.

He concludes:

Unemployed workers need help, as do the low-income households in which most of them live. To the extent that state and local revenue losses are forcing these jurisdictions to cut jobs, the federal government should help plug the hole. But sending checks to upper-income households that don’t need the money and won’t spend it makes neither economic nor moral sense.