Here’s the meat of Ryan Hass’s advice to the Biden Administration for managing our relations with China in his piece at Brookings:
Rather than reacting to Chinese efforts to negotiate principles for guiding the relationship, the Biden administration would be wise to present its concrete objectives for the year ahead. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s trip to China in the first quarter of 2023 provides an opportunity for the United States to set the agenda. By laying out concrete goals and signposts for advancing them, Blinken could orient the relationship toward America’s top priorities and concerns. China’s focus on positive optics for Xi’s visit to the United States in November will offer an opportunity to leverage form for substance.
On the security front, both sides could take practical steps to lower risk. These include reaching agreement on limits around uses of new and emerging technologies in areas where both sides are vulnerable and no rules presently exist. For example, both sides would benefit by establishing limits on uses of artificial intelligence-enabled autonomous weapons systems. As a first step, both sides could agree that humans must be responsible for all nuclear launch decisions and that such decisions must never be delegated to artificial intelligence-enabled systems. Similarly, both sides have demonstrated destructive anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons systems. They could agree to limit future testing of ASAT weapons to prevent the creation of orbital debris.
Both countries also are vulnerable to future pandemics. They have mutual self-interest in the creation of a global disease surveillance network to detect future virus outbreaks before they spread. A similar logic applies to climate change. Methane plays a major role in rising temperatures. Both sides would benefit from pooling capabilities to advance research into methane emission reduction challenges and solutions.
The opioid epidemic in America also demands attention. Chinese officials argue that the problem is one of demand, not supply. Nevertheless, U.S. and Chinese officials must think more creatively about practical steps to reduce the flow of fentanyl with Chinese-origin precursor chemicals into the United States.
This list of priority issues is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.
My own view is that we should worry a lot less about China and managing our relations with China and a lot more about the United States and how we operate in the world.
We can no more be dependent on China for rare earths and other strategic materials and goods than we were dependent on Germany or Japan for oil or steel in 1941. If that means we must pay more or manage environmental controls better, so be it. That’s just the cost of doing business.
We need to produce more of what we consume and stop treating increases in the prices of services as economic growth. We need to interfere less in the internal affairs of other countries than we do at present and, again, that’s the cost of doing business. We need to return to what was said a century ago: the business of America is business.
If we do those things, U. S.-Chinese relations will manage themselves. If we don’t in two years we’ll be back stewing about managing U. S.-Chinese relations, just with less security, lower economic growth, and a more assertive China than at present.
