The article on the spate of naval collisions lately at Military Times should warm the cockles of your heart:
The problem is years in the making. Now, the current generation of officers rising into command-level billets lacks the skills, training, education and experience needed to operate effectively and safely at sea, according to current and former officers interviewed by Navy Times.
“There is a systemic cultural wasteland in the SWO community right now, especially at the department head level,†said retired Navy Capt. Rick Hoffman, who commanded the cruiser Hue City and the frigate DeWert and who, after retirement, taught SWOs ship handling in Mayport.
“We do not put a premium on being good mariners,†Hoffman said. “We put a premium on being good inspection takers and admin weenies.â€
I doubt that we have by far the largest and most expensive military in the world to produce more “admin weenies”. But that would be consistent with the rest of our government at all levels. We don’t need to spend more money. We need to get more for the money that we spend. For that there will need to be a change in incentives and culture and that will take time, sustained attention, and energy. Translation: it won’t happen.
Update
This article at Defense News on the other hand points the finger directly at something I’ve mentioned in the past as a possible culprit—operational tempo:
In 2015, the Government Accountability Office reported that the high pace of operations was taking a heavy toll on ships forward-deployed to Japan.
Among the findings was that the break-neck pace of operations was robbing those ships of needed training and maintenance. Ships stationed in Japan spent on average 42 more days out to sea than their stateside counterparts, the GAO found.
“GAO … found that the high pace of operations the Navy uses for overseas-homeported ships limits dedicated training and maintenance periods, which has resulted in difficulty keeping crews fully trained and ships maintained,†the report read.
And that wear-and-tear has taken a significant toll on the condition of the ships that come back to the states from Japan after a rotation forward.
It could be both. We need to right-size our military for what we’re willing to spend, get more for the money that we do spend, and constrain what we ask our military to do. All at the same time.
Considering that the interest payments on our debt are rising rapidly, and soon will equal the defense budget, “right-size” can only mean a substantial reduction in the size of our forces and the elimination of many commitments. Leaving NATO and removing our forces from Europe may not be an option but a requirement. Similarly, ending our wars and shutting down our bases all across Africa and the Middle East is another possibility.
That and getting some ship-handling training to our deck officers would be nice. Does anyone think the Chinese and Russian navies are as concerned about PC and biofuels nonsense like we are.
The three navies are so different it’s darned hard to compare them fairly. In terms of blue water navies our navy is enormously larger than the Chinese and Russian navies combined. Theirs are in essence littoral fleets.
Additionally, neither we nor the Chinese have any way of evaluating actual Chinese readiness or military doctrine. The Chinese military is still much pointed inwards.
I think it’s both but mostly the former. Over my 23 years in the service, the ratio of queep to mission essential tasks became less and less favorable. There’s also been a big push to rate leadership based on quantifiable criteria. Combined with the ubiquitous “stop light” spreadsheets that track various “performance” and “readiness” measures and the result is a leadership system that focuses on turning yellow and red blocks into green blocks.
There’s also this which doesn’t just apply to the Army.
Boy, do I understand this. I’ve been balled out for reporting impediments. That turns the entire reporting process on its head. An impediment is something that impedes your activity and which you cannot resolve. Complaining about reporting genuine impediments makes people less likely to report them. Identifying problems in the process is not a moral failing.
Both. Andy’s article is good, but I think there have been similar ones over the last 10 years, at least. I was an enlisted guy when the military hit its nadir in the early 70s, so it was much worse back then. I think the underlying “can do” culture in the military makes it hard for people to ever admit that they cannot do. Officers will lie and skimp in order to avoid saying they couldn’t accomplish a mission or task with training and materials provided.
As a part of the first explanation, I would also add in money as a factor. The military cuts spending in funny places. Cutting training costs so that they can buy a few more toys seems pretty common to me. (Nephew’s sig other does logistics for the Navy and we talk about this frequently.)
Steve
“I’ve been balled out for reporting impediments.”
Wow. I feel sorry for you and Andy. Maybe I’m well placed, because I wouldn’t do well under such circumstances. Whether by personality, fiduciary concerns or naked financial self interest when the decision making group encounters an impediment as you defined it it gets communicated in all its “aw shit” glory in hours to a day or two. Impediments don’t age well, or go away by wishing or denial.
BTW. People don’t seem to handle it well, but Trumps style is to come at issues like a freight train. It has downsides, but from where I sit it’s better than our do nothing politicians.