Islamists in the Arab World

If one were to try and pick the best blog in the blogosphere it would be hard to know where to start. I suspect that any choice would necessarily reflect one’s own political position and affiliations, aesthetic judgment and prejudices. There are almost no end of candidates for nearly every possible taste. But if one were to select the best commenter on blogs I think there is almost no contest: the ubiquitous praktike.

I find comments that praktike has dropped on blogs all over the political spectrum. I don’t always agree with the comments. I’d say I agree with praktike’s position maybe 50% of the time. But I invariably respect the argument he’s making. It’s nearly always well-expressed, well-reasoned, and well-informed. So I’m always flattered when praktike comments on The Glittering Eye. By the way, praktike’s now-defunct blog was American Footprint. He has a new billet at chez Nadezhda.

In a comment to my recent post Who are the moderate Muslims?, praktike referred me to a very interesting paper, Islamists in the Arab World by Graham E. Fuller from The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It’s a worthwhile contribution to the discussion.

I don’t entirely agree with Mr. Fuller’s assumptions or his point-of-view. For example:

First we need to define terms. What is an Islamist? I define the term broadly—in keeping with the reality of the phenomenon: An Islamist is anyone who believes that the Koran and the Hadith (traditions of the Prophet’s life, actions, and words) contain important principles about Muslim governance and society, and who tries to implement these principles in some way.

Either there are Muslims who don’t believe that “the Koran and the Hadith (traditions of the Prophet’s life, actions, and words) contain important principles about Muslim governance and society, and who tries to implement these principles in some way” or there are Muslims who believe it and don’t “try to implement these principles” or this is a distinction without a difference. Mr. Fuller gives no examples or references for this. I think that it remains to be seen.

In his discussion of Islam and democracy he seems to conflate Islam and Islam in the Arab world, uniting them when it suits his argument and separating them when it doesn’t.

This definition embraces a broad spectrum that includes both radical and moderate, violent and peaceful, traditional and modern, democratic and antidemocratic. At one extreme it includes Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda; on the other, the ruling moderate Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey, which seeks membership in the European Union and cooperates with Washington on key aspects of regional politics.

Since, as Mr. Fuller obviously knows, the Turks are not Arabs this is either off-topic (Islamists and the Arab world) or conflation.

In his discussion of the weakness of democracy in the Arab world, Mr. Fuller lists seven causes:

• Oil
• Income levels
• Nature of the Arab state
• Arab—Israeli tensions
• Geography
• Long-time Western Support for “Friendly Tyrants” in the Middle East
• Islamism

Perhaps he includes this under the category Nature of the Arab state, but I was amazed and disappointed that he didn’t list what I believe to be the single largest cause of the democracy deficit in the Arab world: the tension between Arab tribalism on the one hand and the Muslim ‘Ummah on the other. I’d say many of the items on his list are consequences of other items on his list rather than causes e.g. income levels, nature of the Arab state, Western support for tyrants. Sure, it’s a positive feedback system. But that’s a misunderstanding or misrepresentation of causation.

Mr. Fuller goes on to provide an excellent discussion of the context and consequences of Islamism in the Arab world. Some of his insights are excellent:

The problem was compounded when jurisprudential authority during the chaos and destruction of the Mongol invasions propounded the concept that even unjust rule was preferable to chaos and anarchy. This legal opinion has comfortably served autocrats well ever since, because it provides virtual de facto sanction for tyranny.

But he continues to conflate Islam with Islam in the Arab world.

Mr. Fuller proceeds to give reasons for both optimism and pessimism. Unfortunately, I’m in pretty close agreement with his prognosis:

The prognosis for political Islam under these conditions—indeed for almost any form of moderate politics—is not good. Moderate voices, Islamist or non-Islamist, dare not speak up in the mood of rising radicalism. Indeed, we might speculate that at least two things must occur before we can hope to see any longer-term trend of moderation within Arab Islamist politics. Only after existing regimes fall, or throw open the political process, will there be a chance for genuinely open and democratic orders to emerge. But this in itself is not enough, for the mood of the new, more populist regimes will initially be anti-American. The external sources of radicalization must also be curtailed. This means an end to the radical right-wing policies of the Likud in Israel and a just settlement of the Palestinian problem, a departure of American troops from the region, and an end to the more intimidating and broad-brush anti-Muslim discrimination that has unfortunately come to mark the new global alert against Muslim terrorism.

Note that he’s still confusing causes with consequences.

I would have preferred it if Mr. Fuller had concentrated more closely to his putative topic and given us a little more insight into why Islamism in the Arab world is different (if it is). I strongly recommend this paper to anyone who wants to learn more about the context of the situation we now find ourselves in. It’s a valuable contribution.

UPDATE: Submitted to Beltway Traffic Jam.