David Ignatius’s most recent Washington Post column on ending the war in Ukraine is such a mish-mosh of contradictions, things with which I agree, and fantasies with which I disagree, I’m not sure what to make of it:
Chess players sometimes fall into a situation they call “zugzwang,” in which any move worsens their position. The impasse in the Ukraine peace talks feels like that. But unlike chess players, statesmen aren’t bound by rules. They can escape disaster.
Here’s the deadlock: Ukraine and its European supporters want a peace deal, perhaps freezing the current front line, so long as Kyiv gets “security guarantees” for the future. But Russia demands that the West first address “root causes” of the war, which amounts to its own version of a security guarantee.
He divides “security guarantees” into “offensive guarantees” and “defensive guarantees”. Here’s an example of an “offensive guarantee”:
One tough Western approach would be reciprocity. If Putin continues to attack cities and civilian infrastructure across Ukraine, then Kyiv’s allies would give it the means to respond in kind. The weapons are ready: Anglo-French Storm Shadow cruise missiles with a range of 155 miles; German Taurus cruise missiles with a 300-mile range; U.S. ATACMS and Precision Strike ballistic missiles with ranges of 250 miles.
and here are some “defensive” ones:
I can imagine an array of military options — from a no-fly zone over Ukraine, to a rotating training and advisory force inside Ukraine, to new retaliatory capabilities if Russia keeps attacking civilians or energy infrastructure. These would be security guarantees — not for the future but immediately.
Once upon a time Mr. Ignatius was the voice of the diplomatic establishment. Is that still the case? If so, the diplomatic establishment has fallen on hard times and not merely because it’s being pressed by Donald Trump.
Our most recent experience with Anglo-French offensive capability was in 2011 during the Libyan civil war. Within a couple of days the British and French had reached the end of their ability to fly missions. Has it improved since then? I doubt it.
Who would maintain a “no fly zone” in Ukraine? Clearly, not the British and French. It would be up to us. How would we accomplish it?
Similarly, with the cruise missiles and ATACMS he mentions. We could supply the Ukrainians for a few days, perhaps a month. Then what?
Mr. Ignatius mentions an unfortunate truth:
When they approached the brink in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union negotiated mutual security guarantees: Russia pulled its nuclear missiles from Cuba in exchange for America’s pledge not to invade the island (and to secretly remove nuclear missiles from Turkey).
Said another way the crisis was ended through reciprocity. The Soviets agreed to withdraw its nuclear missiles from Cuba and we agreed to withdraw ours from Turkey. That’s an account that differs somewhat from the popular account but it is reciprocity. We don’t put nuclear weapons on your border and you don’t put them on ours. What would the equivalent version of reciprocity be in the context of Ukraine and how does that differ from the appeasement we are being warned about by opponents of ending the war who never seem to propose a resolution to the conflict that we can actually accomplish and that doesn’t involve pushing Russia’s back to the wall, risking global thermonuclear war?
Mr. Ignatius concludes with this advice:
The strategist Fred Iklé wrote a brilliant little book called “Every War Must End” during the agonizing final years of the Vietnam conflict. Two comments seem especially appropriate now. “Inflicting ‘punishment’ on the enemy is … an ineffective strategy for ending a war,” Iklé cautioned. To end conflicts, he said, “nations on both sides tend to see a peace settlement that will bring greater and more lasting security than existed before the fighting broke out.”
If Russia chooses unwisely to fight on, then Europe and the United States should begin providing security guarantees for Ukraine now, not later. This isn’t chess. When a game is heading toward defeat, step away from the board.
In libya, the problem was ordinance. Assuming a no-fly zone is about airspace, it would require little or no ordinance. The only requirements would be fuel and spare parts.
spare parts???
In Libya, the problem was (and is) the moral depravity of the West’s leaders, all of them. Gaddafi completely submitted to the US; shut down his nuclear program; and turned over the plans and materials to the US. The US, in turn, organized a wantonly brutal attack on Libya, reducing it to the anarchic wasteland it is today, and murdering Gaddafi as an afterthought. The GWoT murdered over 1 million Muslim civilians, and many Christians who lived among them.
This act ranks with the rape of Nanking, the fire bombing of Dresden (and Tokyo, and … [TNTC]).
Right now, the US is actively supporting the genocide in Gaza, and is planning a renewed war against Iran. Over 200 of the 250 wars since 1945 were started by the US, and almost always against countries that were at peace with the US and its allies.
And Russia is the problem?
No, Ignatius and the other war criminals who infest our government are the problem.
Lets see. If you are in the crowd that believes Ukraine just wanting to join NATO, even though they couldn’t according to NATO rules, was enough to cause Russia to invade, how likely is it that Russia would accept foreign troops in Ukraine for a security guarantee? What are the chances they dont insist upon Ukraine giving up arms and not have an organized military?
Steve
@bob sykes
Yes, spare parts. It takes fuel and spare parts to keep aircraft flying for extended periods of time. If they are not bombing hard targets in Russia or troops in Ukraine, the only ordinance would be for air-to-air battles.
NOTE: Spare parts are required for routine maintenance. An elevated training schedule requires spare parts.
When it comes to security guarantees, an honest discussion must start with a take on Bismarck, “Is Ukraine worth the life of a single US GI or a British Tommy or a French Poilu, etc” — so far through 2.5 years of war, 2 Presidencies, 4 Prime Ministerships, and 2 German Chancellorships the answer is no (at least officially). Unless that changes, a lot of things discussed aren’t viable (no fly zone, training and advisory forces).
Its also pretty illuminating, if we are willing to put NATO lives on the line in the future, why aren’t we putting lives on the line now?
Finish that discussion, then the second thing to discuss is what if Putin’s goal is to wreck Ukraine if he can’t keep it out of NATO’s sphere of influence. I read comments on how Putin keeps insisting Ukraine reduce its military size and the post that currently Ukraine’s army is an asset to NATO; a war of attrition of enough severity would mean Ukraine wouldn’t have enough men to field an army; and then Ukraine becomes a liability for NATO. How would one negotiate if that is Putin’s goal?
Pragmatically, the negotiations will be driven by the battlefield. Its going to be hard for Ukraine to win a more favorable negotiated outcome unless they break out of this attrition dynamic that’s taken hold.
I look more at a sort of “second derivative” approach. Will Ukraine obtain a better settlement tomorrow than it would today? If not what would need to change for that to happen?
What I see is that Ukraine needs a ceasefire now rather than tomorrow.
That’s why Kaja Kallas, EU’s Estonian foreign minister, has been promoting a “steel hedgehog” strategy for Ukraine. I doubt that is credible without NATO “boots on the ground” or, at least, in the air.
Why are you so willing to tell Ukraine what they need to do? If you had relatives killed and the children of relatives stolen, as well as land, by the Russians isn’t it conceivable that you might feel differently about fighting the Russians?
Steve
My position has long been that we should supply munitions to the Ukrainians to the degree we are able but not furnish “boots on the ground”. If our NATO allies are willing to program long distance missiles for them, create a “no-fly zone”, do in-country training, etc., they should do so but we should not.
I also think that each passing day puts the Ukrainians in a poorer position.
I’m not telling anybody (except the U. S.) what to do. I’m mostly telling the U. S. government what not to do.
This isn’t chess. When a game is heading toward defeat, step away from the board.
Resigning is very much a part of chess!