As I read Andrew Bacevich’s post at Responsible Statecraft on Israel’s war against Hamas:
Today challenges to the nation’s erstwhile indispensability premier abound: the rise of China, a stalemated conflict in Ukraine, porous borders at home, the pressing existential threat posed by climate change. Yet none poses a more urgent test than the ongoing war in Gaza. Here, more than anywhere else, events summon the United States to affirm its claim to primacy. Right now, without delay.
Doing so would mean employing U.S. power and influence to bring this wretched war to an immediate end.
As measured by actions rather than rhetorical gestures, however, the Biden administration has done just the opposite. By providing immense quantities of ordnance to one side, it ensures the war’s perpetuation and facilitates the continued slaughter of noncombatants. By vetoing UN Security Council efforts to force a ceasefire, it stands virtually alone in defiance of world opinion. While American diplomats travel hither and yon, their efforts cannot be rated as other than ineffectual.
and Jack Watling’s piece at Foreign Affairs on Russia’s war against Ukraine:
If the Ukrainian military’s 2023 offensive had gone according to plan, its forces would have punched through Russia’s so-called Surovikin Line in Zaporizhzhia Province and liberated Melitopol, severing the roads connecting Russia to Crimea. Combined with Ukrainian naval operations, that would have put Crimea under siege. This objective was ambitious but achievable. The foremost reason it failed was that the Ukrainian units assigned to lead the offensive had insufficient time to train and prepare.
In July 2022, the United Kingdom, alongside other Ukrainian partners, established Operation Interflex to train Ukrainian troops. At the time, Ukraine desperately needed more units to hold defensive positions, so Interflex set the training program at five weeks, prioritizing skills vital to defensive operations. That five-week regimen still exists, but the mission has fundamentally changed.
During World War II, the British military considered 22 weeks the minimum time necessary to prepare a soldier for infantry combat. After this initial period, soldiers would be assigned to units and take part in collective training in battalions. Even before May 2023, it was evident that Ukraine’s troops were undertrained for offensive operations and had barely had time to learn how to operate newly donated equipment. But as Russian forces strengthened their defensive positions, the offensive could not be delayed.
the question that occurred to me was is prolonging wars actually in the best interest of the United States? I don’t think so. I think that short, swift, decisive wars tend to favor our interests while long, drawn out wars have generally gone against us for the last 50 years. The White House is rather clearly pushing to continue both wars.
I think there are all sorts of flaws in both of the cited pieces. I think that Dr. Bacevich errs in thinking that the White House views the conflict in Gaza through anything other than a domestic political prism (and a 30 year old domestic political prism at that) while Mr. Watling has all sorts of misconceptions about the war in Ukraine, foremost among them that a war there with any outcome other than straight out Ukrainian victory will not result in a negotiation that would lead Ukraine to become a member of the EU and NATO eventually. Quite the opposite in fact.
I think he also misunderstands Russia’s objectives but that’s another topic.
I think it’s a question of competing interests and tradeoffs.
Continuing to support Israel comes with costs, but abandoning Israel or forcing them to end a war they think is existential also comes with costs. Both come with consequences and future risks, most of which are unforeseeable and are, therefore, difficult to evaluate.
My sense – and it’s not much more than that – is that the high cost of destruction and blood currently is the result of allowing Hamas to entrench in Gaza for so long, the consequence of two decades of can-kicking. 10/7 exposed the flaw of this strategy, which is why Israel will not kick the can again. So I have my doubts that Biden can force Israel to end the conflict, especially via the means that Bacevich elides.
Agree with Andy but would add that 10/7 also occurred because Israeli security, apparently as ordered by Netanyahu, started ignoring Hamas out of overconfidence in their beliefs about Hamas while prioritizing the West Bank settlements.
Israel does seem to be losing the PR war. In the US that is being blamed on leftists or something but it looks to me like an international phenomenon. There have been many UN votes where only the US and maybe a handful of other nations supported Israel. Looks like it may end up as only the US. As an aside I don’t think this was unforeseeable. It has always made me wonder why a small nation, surrounded by enemies and fairly dependent on the US made it a point to ally with only one political party in the US while trying to alienate the other.
Steve
Who’s “we�
In 1991 we leased space from a small business that simply dried and packaged eggs. Gulf war, contract for MRE’s, he put on three shifts and made millions.
Lots of people profit from war.
And they lobby.
This war shouldn’t have happened but lots of businesses are happy it did.