At UnHerd Philip Pilkington warns about the risks posed by inexpensive modern weaponry:
The origins of the story go back weeks, with Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen attacking commercial ships in the Red Sea in response to Israel’s war in Gaza. These attacks culminated in the decision by global shipping companies to avoid transit through the region due to the heightened risk.
As a result, the Houthis have now enacted a de facto naval blockade — without possessing a navy. In response, on 18 December, the Pentagon announced Operation Prosperity Guardian, but many allies — such as Spain, Italy and France — declined US command over their navies in the region.
and
Contemporary drone and missile technology is reshaping the global battlefield in ways that are rendering aspects of modern military technology too expensive. Politico quotes an unnamed official from the Pentagon who highlights that the US Navy is shooting down drones that cost $2,000 with missiles that cost $2 million. “The cost offset is not on our side,†the official said.
How long can this go on for? The Houthis can continue harassing ships for as long as they care to. But the US Navy is burning through expensive weapons trying to stop them (a similar problem to that faced by Israel’s Iron Dome). It is only a matter of time before one of the Houthi weapons slips through naval air defences — if another container ship is hit, can global shipping companies really justify transit through the Red Sea?
which provokes the question why are we shooting down $2,000 drones with $2 million missiles? I suspect it’s a combination of Maslow’s Hammer (“when the only tool you have is a hammer…”) and the Everest explanation (“because it is there”).
That all returns to a point I have been making for nearly twenty years, that the risk of modern technology is personal empowerment. Nowadays a single individual can make attacks that would have required a platoon (or even a brigade) 80 years ago.
If we’re going to address today’s security threats prudently, we must change our mindset. It’s not as though there are no other ways of bringing drones down. There are dozens of ways and I venture to say that most of them don’t cost $2 million a pop.
And, as Mr.. Pilkington’s piece points out, we must be prepared to change our mindset quickly.
The most effective way to combat drones is to kill the drone operator and/or destroy the originating base. For missiles, destroying GPS satellites is the best method.
Using $2 million missiles is the only option. It is not related to Maslow’s Hammer. If the US military refuses to consider any other method, it would be a case of Maslow’s Hammer.
If they can develop more precise detection and location devices, the existing gatlin guns could be used. I assume that the detection radar is tuned for a missile size object.
My guess is that ships will need to post additional watches with optical equipment (binoculars, telescope, etc.) to identify birds vs drones. This would require additional Sailors. The battle group would be in a formation to avoid friendly fire.
Since a drone can fly low, ground troops would be more susceptible to friendly fire. They may need to have snipers or some type of EMP device. I believe that most electronics are shielded, but if not, it would require retrofitting everything using any electricity. This would include vehicles, night vision goggles, laser rangefinders, etc. which I do not think are shielded.
An EMP could be used on a ship, but a sniper on a rolling ship would need a lot of training. I believe everything on a ship is shielded, and a drone EMP device may be best. This would allow a stand-off distance, but I doubt commercial ships are as shielded.
There is probably no way to protect satellites, but for now these can only be destroyed by the larger militaries. Today, this would be limited to a war with China or Russia, but soon, it may be available to anybody. In this case, we will revert to good old ground-pounders, mortars, machine guns, artillery, anti-tank Tube-launched Optical Wire-guided missiles.
Drones used in this way are still a new and developing technology with counters that are also new and developing.
Right before I retired from intel in 2016, I gave a big briefing to my organization (which deployed a lot) on the then-relatively new threat of armed suicide drones. We’d already seen the first crude versions attacking US bases in Iraq and Syria – the same bases that are getting attacked by more advanced versions today.
The war in Ukraine has seen a massive development of this technology and counters.
The principal weakness of most drones is the command and control system (data link and operators), but there aren’t yet reliable counters to the data link, and countering the operators requires putting warheads on foreheads.
That’s probably inevitable and the US is getting the pieces in place on the board.
Meanwhile, back in the real world, we could stop swatting flies. Playing by their rules.
You don’t need to shoot down inexpensive Houthi drones with expensive missiles.
You could destroy vital Iranian interests with expensive missiles. In a decisive way.
Drones would quickly disappear.
We need to decide if we are serious. Or are we politically correct. These other trade off arguments are intellectually interesting, but specious.
In order to kill the operators we need to find them and they need to hold still. Not so easy. Also, you would think we would get over the assumption that if we attack that other groups/nations will just roll over and give up. The risk of escalation would likely be a wider attack on shipping and more direct attacks on US ships. Hope someone is doing real risk assessment and not just wanting to posture.
Steve