I found this commentary on the war in Ukraine by Michael Kofman and Rob Lee at War On the Rocks informative and optimistic although not unduly so. Here’s a snippet:
The West ought to be introspective about missing important decision points, which had a profound impact on the course of the war, constraining everyone’s options later on. Decisions about future support should have been made well before this offensive even began, assuming that it was unlikely to end the war. Instead, another cycle of attritional fighting may ensue after this offensive, followed by yet another surge effort to restore Ukraine’s offensive potential. In short, the West has been unappreciative of the lead times required to reconstitute military potential or provide Ukraine with a decisive advantage.
The recent anonymous criticism by officials spilling select narratives in the press, rather than fostering an open discussion about Ukraine’s challenges and successes, reveals enduring problems in this war effort: The first, is a lack of Western understanding of how Ukrainian forces fight. The second, which is closely related, is an insufficient Western presence on the ground to enable closer coordination or even the invaluable understanding that could be offered by battlefield observers. Western capitals have sought to keep this Ukraine’s war, avoiding an in-country presence that includes contractor support or trainers. To be clear, there are Western contractors and companies operating independently in Ukraine, but this is not the same as a government sanctioned and supported effort. There is much more that could be done without becoming directly involved in fighting or deploying uniformed personnel on the ground. The hitherto cautious approach has clear limits to its efficacy. Western support thus far has been sufficient to avert a Ukrainian defeat, and arguably has imposed a strategic defeat on Russia, but not enough to ensure a Ukrainian victory. Independent of the outcome of this offensive, Western countries need to be clear-eyed about the fact that this will be a long war. Taken together, Western industrial and military potential greatly exceeds Russia’s, but without the political will, potential alone will not translate into results.
I found the observation about what I think is a general Western indifference to understanding how the Ukrainians make war particularly astute.
Meanwhile at New Statesman Lily Lynch offers a more somber assessment:
As a more sober reality sets in, it’s worth asking why Western governments and the media were such effusive boosters of Ukraine’s war effort. The writer Richard Seymour has suggested that part of it was about identity formation, wherein Ukraine is emblematic of an “idealised Europe†or even democracy itself, while Russia represents Oriental despotism and authoritarianism. The war thus embodies the supposed civilisational struggle theorised by Samuel Huntington between democracies and autocracies, promoted by the Biden administration through initiatives such as its Summit for Democracy. That annual event aims to “renew democracy at home and confront autocracies abroadâ€, underlining the continuity between liberal opposition to the putative authoritarian affinities of Donald Trump and Russia’s war in Ukraine.
But beyond the merely symbolic there was a practical rationale for the kinds of coverage we saw in the war’s early months: the conflict in Ukraine has revived a waning Atlanticism – a long-sought aim of proponents of Nato enlargement. Just a few years ago Emmanuel Macron, the French president, declared Nato “braindeadâ€; the war in Ukraine has brought it back to life. Finland and Sweden applied to join. Critics say that the governments of both countries used “shock doctrine†tactics to convince their respective populations to abandon their policy of neutrality, making the decision to apply for membership while the war was top news and the public was still afraid.
I don’t believe that the change in tone betokens an imminent change in policy.
These are tiny snippets from lengthy pieces.
I’ll just contribute this which touches on a theme I have mentioned before. As U. S. aid to Ukraine in its prosecution of war against Russia approaches $100 billion
- How much of that aid has been spent opposing Russia?
- How much of that has been siphoned off by corrupt U. S. and Ukrainian businesses and officials? 1%? 10%? 90%? It makes a difference.
- How do you know?
- How much has just been wasted?
Kofman and Lee are two of the most astute and accurate analysts of this war IMO.
Personally, I don’t think the questions you asked, which all revolve around money, are the most relevant. The more fundamental questions are about goals and what would achieve those goals. Related to that are questions of time horizons. As noted in the piece, many countries did not start to look at increasing munitions production to support Ukraine until this year. Such things take time and investment and commitment to the relevant contractors.
For your questions — this article from CSIS is well worth a look (https://www.csis.org/analysis/aid-ukraine-administration-requests-more-money-and-faces-political-battles-ahead).
The article doesn’t really answer a key question that determines the wars course. Whats the rate the fighting is depleting the war-continuing potential of both countries. And how much war making potential is still left. It seems the limiting factor in fighting capability on both sides is the number of soldiers and potential soldiers,
I don’t think there is any change to the wars course until 2025 (after Russian, American, British and potentially Ukrainian elections in 2024).
We’ve subscribed to the Ukrainian government’s goals. Those are restoration of the 2014 borders, all Russian troops including irregulars leave, NATO membership, etc. Reparations?
The only ways I see to achieve those goals are
1) the Russians themselves effect regime change and replace the present regime with a less nationalist one or
2) Russia is partitioned involuntarily
Since I, personally, don’t believe either of those will happen I don’t think the goals are achievable. That’s why I ask the questions I do. What we are doing needs to advance the Ukrainian war goals not line somebody’s pockets. IMO that requires a lot more proactive auditing than we are doing.
One of the reasons I take reports of imminent Ukrainian victory with a grain of salt.
Guess I dont read the right people so I dont see reports of imminent victory. I do see overly optimistic reports. Anyway, goals are just goals. They can change. Given the historical damage and current damage Russia has inflicted upon Ukraine it’s hard to blame them for wanting everything back. They are still willing to fight for that. It really looks like a long grind so at some point maybe they reassess.
I think your questions are of some sort of interest, would have been nice if you had asked these during our ME wars, but the very fact that Ukraine is fighting on equal terms with the much larger Russian forces and, by comparison wealthier, suggests they actually are using most of it to fight. This is very much not like Afghanistan or Iraq where US forces did most fo the fighting so the Afghan/Iraqi forces were pretty comfortable stealing our stuff since it wouldn’t hurt them a whole lot.
Steve
I opposed Desert Storm, the war in Iraq, our actions in Syria, and bombing Libya. I was quite vocal about it.
Were we financing the post-Saddam Iraqi military and government? If so I was unaware of it. I would have asked for the same scrutiny I’m asking for our Ukraine spending.
Rereading the quoted passage; I realize Kofman and Lee are asking for NATO or US “advisors†on the ground.
Does that change how one perceived what they wrote; it did for me. They say their recommendation is not “boots on the ground†but I don’t see how it wouldn’t end up being so.
They are probably splitting hairs. Perhaps they see a difference between “boots on the ground” and advisors. I’m skeptical there is one. Perhaps my thinking is colored by how our military advisors in Vietnam morphed into a deployment of a half million troops.