Family Feud

In his Washington Post column David Ignatius takes note of some developments in the Middle East. I reflect on the developments he reports and draw a very different conclusion. Mr. Ignatius points to elements of a feud between the Saudis and the UAE:

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the two drivers of modernization in the Middle East, should be rejoicing together these days. Iran is weak, its proxies are on the run, and an American armada approaches the Persian Gulf. But instead they have stumbled into an epic feud that could polarize the region.

When the quarrel detonated in late December, it seemed like a fight over strategy for resolving the forever war in Yemen. But it has since escalated into a social media battle in which Saudis have attacked the UAE as “Israel’s Trojan horse” and denounced the Abraham Accords, joined by the UAE in 2020, as “a political military alliance dressed in the garb of religion.”

After reporting on several aspects of the “feud” he observes:

For the Trump administration, which has close ties with both countries, the Saudi-UAE wrangle illustrates the difficulty of working with two headstrong regional powers at once. The administration is said to have offered to mediate, but both sides have balked, according to several knowledgeable officials. Because of the intense personal feelings, one official told me, “This is not something you mediate.”

with this point:

“The Saudis want obedience, or at least alignment with their regional policies,” said Jonny Gannon, a former senior CIA officer with decades of experience in the Middle East. “The Emiratis don’t want to be obedient. They want optionality.”

I think that Mr. Ignatius is operating under some shaky premises. Those are highlighted by his use of this phrase: “an Arab official”. And the United Arab Emirates is not an “it”; it is a “they”—a loose confederation of seven emirates, each with different histories, rules, goals, and objectives. Here’s his conclusion:

Family feuds come and go in the Middle East, as around the world. What concerns me about this quarrel is the growing attacks on the UAE because of its opening to Israel. No country has a bigger stake in stopping the spread of Islamic extremism than Saudi Arabia. In its seeming encouragement of vitriolic Saudi attacks on the UAE as a “Devil of the Arabs” that takes orders from Israel, the kingdom is playing with fire.

I understand why Mr. Ignatius uses the phrase “an Arab official.” He is protecting a source. But the phrase quietly implies a degree of common political perspective that does not exist. “Arab” is a linguistic designation, not a strategic one. A Saudi official and an Emirati official do not represent variations within a common bloc; they represent competing sovereign regimes with distinct ambitions.

My read of the “feud” is different from Mr. Ignatius’s. Mohammed bin Salman is less “modernizing” Saudi Arabia than consolidating power and asserting Saudi primacy among the Gulf states. UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed resists that not because the UAE is drifting toward liberal democracy, but because Abu Dhabi wants autonomy in regional strategy.

“Modernization” in the Gulf should not be confused with liberalization. Civil liberties remain tightly constrained and the religious and patronage networks that have long exported conservative Islamist ideas have not evaporated simply because senior leaders now speak the language of “tolerance” and “reform.”

Nor are Israel’s interests synonymous with America’s. Trade and diplomatic rapprochement are welcome, but they are also transactional and reversible especially when domestic legitimacy, regional rivalries, and succession politics are always in play.

That is why I’m wary of treating a Saudi-UAE rupture as a solvable “family feud.” The region’s alignments can shift quickly, for reasons outsiders only partly perceive. He who sups with the devil needs a long spoon.