George Friedman follows other pundits down the rabbit hole, imagines what a North Korea that would be willing to abide by any negotiated settlement would want, and suggests that:
Pursuing a nuclear weapons program, one meant to discourage any threat to the regime and thus ensure its survival, demanded a huge amount of resources. The North Koreans have not come this far simply to walk away with nothing to show for it. If they were to agree to abandon their program, they would do so only if another means of security were in place.
This would likely require a new regional framework whereby the U.S. would enhance North Korea’s position at the expense of its allies. The framework would also have to weaken U.S. influence in the region, perhaps by relinquishing its relationship with South Korea and withdrawing its forces from the peninsula, or perhaps by keeping its Navy out of the Sea of Japan. Maybe U.S. aircraft would be prohibited from flying near Korean airspace, and maybe Washington would have to rework its treaties with Japan so that its troops there did not threaten North Korea. In short, if North Korea must abandon its military capabilities, so too must the United States, or so the thinking of Pyongyang would go. The U.S. will not alter the regional balance of power lightly. And even if it did, it would have to consider the financial burden of propping up the government in Pyongyang. The United States is unlikely to accept this.
War is the one option the U.S. has to prevent North Korea from completing its nuclear weapons program – if it has not done so already – without giving up anything (except blood) in return. But, as has been widely discussed, this option would be difficult and bloody, and if success is measured by the elimination of all nuclear facilities, there is no guarantee that it would be successful. North Korea is not particularly keen on the prospect of war, either – it knows war introduces the possibility of annihilation. But it has come to read the fear in South Korea, which would likely bear the brunt of the war, as a check on U.S. intent. This dramatically reduces the chance of war.
I’d like to see the evidence that the North Koreans actually recognize and fear the “possibility of annihilation”. Quite to the contrary I think there’s sixty years of history that tells us that they don’t.
I’m thinking here of another man-god, Hirohito. The N. K., would give their lives to save his. His father and grandfather both passed of a heart attack, those can be induced, but how the hell do you get close to him? He’s suspicious and on guard, notice his refusal to meet with his friend, Dennis Rodman.
We’ll have to watch and wait, I doubt he’ll make the first move.
Friedman is correct in that North Korea will demand compensation for giving up their huge investment in nukes and missiles. However, war is not an option. China has stated that they will defend North Korea (which is why our rhetoric has softened), and Russia would cerainly support them. China, North Korea and Russia combined have both conventional and nuclear superiority in the region, and they would win any war with Japan, South Korea and the US. Unfortunately, our Ruling Class has deluded itself into thinking China and Russia would stand aside as we devasted the North. What they don’t realize is that both South Korean and Japan, correctly estimating the odds, would not allow us to use our bases on their territory, and they even prevent our attacks themselves.
Patience seems a plausible strategy. No place manages to avoid political and social change over time, even communist dictatorships.
North Korea’s young people will listen to music from the South, and view social media sites now and then even if they are not free to post or tweet or snap anything in response. Their elders will observe that visiting Chinese seem increasingly taller and heavier and more finely dressed, that the Chinese and occasional Russians carry more gadgets about as time passes and speak of their spaceflight programs rather more than of their ICBMs. City dwellers will notice their rulers have young more often than elderly wives, that in the midst of this egalitarian state “leaders” are entitled to fast cars and special markets and hot and cold running mistresses. A heavy hand keeps rebellion down but not resentment. Aging generals ceaselessly measure their status in the social hierarchy and consider their accomplishments and likely rewards and estimate whether they would rule less well or better than the current dynast or most likely replacement.
There are strains, in other words. With political consequences that can emerge quickly, and economic costs that continually sap the regime’s strength. We’ve got Eastern Europe as an example these days — as a dozen examples.
Which is what I’ve been advising. North Korea is presently a risk not an issue. If it becomes an issue, we should be prepared to address it.