This morning Andrew Sullivan linked to a subscription-required article from Stratfor and quotes a snippet from it. Mr. Sullivan’s observations on the Stratfor article and the tantalizing smidgeon he quotes leave me with a lot more questions than answers. From Sullivan:
Like many other smart analysts, the pro-war Stratfor military experts have concluded that the war to control the Iraq insurgency or to erect democratic institutions in Iraq has been lost (subscription required). I think it’s time to start truly absorbing this possibility. Why lost? Because we blew the opportunity to control the terrain with insufficient troops and terrible intelligence; because all the institutions required to build democracy in Iraq have already been infiltrated by insurgents; because at key moments – they mention the fall of 2003 or spring of 2004 – we simply failed to crush the insurgency when we might have had a chance of success.
What has changed since spring of 2004? Since fall of 2003? Would the use of the level of force recently used in Fallujah back in the spring have saved the situation? Why? Greater force? Was that politically possible?
From Stratfor, quoted by Sullivan:
The issue facing the Bush administration is simple. It can continue to fight the war as it has, hoping that a miracle will bring successes in 2005 that didn’t happen in 2004. Alternatively, it can accept the reality that the guerrilla force is now self-sustaining and sufficiently large not to flicker out and face the fact that a U.S. conventional force of less than 150,000 is not likely to suppress the guerrillas.
Aren’t there other alternatives? Isn’t it possible (even likely), for example, that the Iraqi government put in place after the January 30 election will authorize the use of/use substantially more force than the U. S. has seen fit to use to date in providing security i.e. rooting out the insurgents?
More to the point, it can recognize these facts: 1. The United States cannot re-engineer Iraq because the guerrillas will infiltrate every institution it creates.
Has this changed since spring of 2004? Fall of 2003? Or has this been true since the very beginning?
2. That the United States by itself lacks the intelligence capabilities to fight an effective counterinsurgency
Do the combined nations of the world have sufficient intelligence capabilities to fight an effective counterinsurgency in Iraq?
3. That exposing U.S. forces to security responsibilities in this environment generates casualties without bringing the United States closer to the goal.
Under its obligations under the Geneva Conventions the United States was required as the occupying power to undertake security responsibilities until sovereignty was restored. Until the Iraqis are ready to undertake this themselves it’s still a pragmatic necessity. What are the authors suggesting?
4. That the strain on the U.S. force is undermining its ability to react to opportunities and threats in the rest of the region. And that, therefore, this phase of the Iraq campaign must be halted as soon as possible.
I don’t think that anyone disagrees with this. The question, of course, is how.
Sullivan concludes:
They recommend withdrawing U.S. forces to the periphery of Iraq and letting the inevitable civil war take place in the center.
How is such a civil war in the strategic interests of the United States?
Although it may read like it I didn’t intend the foregoing as a fisking—I’m really interested in the answers to these questions. I was not in favor of invading Iraq largely on prudential grounds since I envisioned something not unlike what has actually happened unless the United States forces took an approach to security substantially more aggressive than would have been supported by anything resembling a consensus of Americans. But now we’re there. Aren’t the strategic and political implications of letting Iraq fend for itself substantially more disadvantageous to America’s grand strategy than never having invaded at all? Are they really proposing that we exit Iraq with a strategic defeat?
Sullivan and (presumably) Stratfor favored the war. At least initially. Why did they support a war that they now appear to believe has always been politically impossible to win? If they were wrong, why should we believe them now.
I’m further concerned by the larger implications of all of this. Do they suggest that we shouldn’t ever engage in military action in the area regardless of the provocation since we can’t guarantee that a rump native government will remain in place, we don’t have the military intelligence to fight a successful counterinsurgency, and we can’t prevent any institutions we put into place from being infiltrated by the opposition? What are their alternatives? Should we disengage from the area completely? Do they suggest that we abrogate the Geneva Conventions? Fight wars of extermination?
Perhaps someone with access to the entire article can help me with this. But as it is I’m just left with too many questions.
UPDATE: There have been some responses to Sullivan’s post and to mine from Zenpundit, Ali of Free Iraqi, and Amba of Ambivablog.
Three comments. First, I used to have a subscription to StratFor, but the reality is that they are not like Jane’s, but like Debka, and all that that implies. I cancelled because I felt that the information wasn’t worth the money, and the analysis was often far off-base, and seemed to be conducted based on personal agendas, rather than on facts as they were.
Second, I seldom believe anyone who says that something can’t be done. In particular, the points Sullivan cites, sadly without discussing the reasoning behind the conclusions, appears to be the product of Viet Nam-inspired thinking: the US simply cannot win a guerilla war. This reasoning misses two points: we’ve won every guerilla war we’ve fought (including Viet Nam, though we then gave up and went home, leaving South Viet Nam to fall to conventional invasion from the North two years later), and that it is primarily not our job, but Iraq’s job, to win this guerilla war. We are in a support role for the Iraqi government. It would be interesting to see what their actual reasoning is, because their conclusions don’t make sense to me.
Third, I believe that the government (the US, that is) is pursuing a strategy for Iraq substantially similar to that pursued in Central America in the 1980s, to wit: an elected government will have such legitimacy that support for the insurgency will fall off dramatically and rapidly, leading to an eventual reconciliation with the former Ba’athists, and a rejection and either elimination or expulsion of the non-Iraqi terrorists. I believe that this strategy has an excellent chance of success. I also am not surprised at events as they are now, in that it is not uncommon for events to look darkest just before a final conclusion. Witness, for example, the state of the Western Front in January 1945, or the state of the Eastern Front prior to the battle of Kursk.
I do believe that there are substantial risks in Iraq, but I have yet to hear a better strategy for defeating the terrorists in the long term than democratizing the Arab nations, and have yet to hear a better place to start than Iraq.
In support of your point about guerrilla wars, Jeff, I haven’t seen much evidence that the insurgency/Ba’athists/jehadists are gaining in popularity. Said another way you’ve got to consider the trends. And although we’re not in particularly good odor right now it’s worse for the i/B/j. That’s a trend that’s favorable for us. Although not particularly pleasant.
RRRRRRgggggg.
Damn it, everybody. The increase in troop strength is coming from THE CITIZENS OF IRAQ.
Extra Troops, you say? Will 9 divisions worth be enough? How about 5 additional divisions of Iraqi National Guard?
http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/facts_troops.htm
“Iraqi Army Day Celebrates Service, Honors Sacrifice”
TAJI, Iraq, Jan. 10, 2005 — Iraq celebrated Army Day on Jan. 6, marking the 84th anniversary of the activation of the Iraqi army in 1921. Ceremonies across the country recalled the army’s past service and sacrifice and showcased current and future capabilities.
Interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, Minister of Defense Hazim Shalan, Minister of State Qasim Doud, and Gen. Babakir Zebari, the chief of staff of the Iraqi armed forces, presided over ceremonies held at Taji military base, north of Baghdad, before returning to Baghdad to conduct ceremonies at the country’s version of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.
Allawi addressed the Iraqi Armed Forces in particular and the people of Iraq more generally in his speech at Taji. “Free brothers, Iraq is facing a difficult and complicated situation especially in this period, but together we are going to build a strong and independent Iraq, a country free of oppression and depression, a country based on the power of law, honesty and truth,” Allawi said.
“It’s a difficult mission, but we will do it. You brothers, members of the army forces, will face crucial challenges, but I am confident of your ability to overcome them with your heads up. Your solid will is an advantage to defeat these challenges,” he continued. “Together we will win. Together we will defeat our enemies. Together we will build our beloved Iraq.”
Army Day ceremonies around Iraq including a reading of a proclamation issued by Zebari, which recalled the proud history of the Iraqi army, announced the activation of nine Iraqi army divisions, and explained the incorporation of the National Guard into the regular army. This move will “ensure unity of command and effort to meet the security challenges we currently face,” Zebari noted.
During the ceremony at Taji, Allawi and Shalan named Iraqi army Lt. Gen. Abdul Qader Mohammed Jassim as the land forces commander with responsibility for the Iraqi army. Jassim had been the Iraqi ground forces commander in Operation Al Fajr in Fallujah. A pass in review then showcased some of the capabilities of the Army.
Elements representing each of Iraq’s divisions and units of the Iraqi Intervention Force participated in the military parade, driving nearly 100 vehicles, including armored personnel carriers, tanks, cargo trucks and gun trucks, past the reviewing stand.
Following the events at Taji, Allawi conducted a separate ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Baghdad. The 91 cadets that made up the inaugural class of the Iraqi Military Academy, which graduated yesterday, participated in the ceremony. These cadets were then sworn in as officers in the Iraqi army. The ceremony also recognized the service of several Iraqi army units that participated in major operations since the transfer of sovereignty.
Also in attendance at the event were U.S. Ambassador to Iraq John Negroponte; U.S. Army Gen. George Casey, commanding general of Multinational Force Iraq; and U.S. Army Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus, commanding general of Multinational Security Transition Command Iraq.
Over the past six months, Iraqi forces have fought alongside coalition forces in Najaf, Samarra, Fallujah, Baghdad, north Babil, Mosul, and a host of other locations. In Fallujah alone, Iraqi forces lost eight of their members and had more than 40 wounded.
There are 18 battalions of the regular army and Intervention Force in operations now, up from one operational battalion six months ago, and nine more are scheduled to become operational over the next six weeks.
Iraq’s Muthanna Brigade, originally organized and trained by the Iraqis to provide local security in Baghdad, now has three battalions in operation, one each in Baghdad, Fallujah, and north Babil, and one more in training. In addition, the Iraqi National Guard, which will be incorporated into the regular army, is comprised of 42 operational battalions.
Despite the fact that Iraqi forces have suffered casualties in many of their operations, there remains no shortage of volunteers. In fact, basic training courses are ongoing for more than 4,000 former soldiers to fill the under- strength Iraqi regular army and Intervention Force with additional soldiers.
The army also now has more specialized units in its repertoire. Iraq’s special operations brigade now includes a counterterrorist force and a commando battalion. In addition to those elements, Iraq’s first mechanized battalion will be operational in mid-January, along with a tank company and transportation battalion, and the remaining elements of the 1st Mechanized Brigade will be trained and equipped by the summer.
Iraq is also developing naval and air capabilities. Iraq’s Coastal Defense Force is now operational, with five patrol craft, 34 smaller vessels, and a naval infantry regiment that recently completed training. Iraq’s air force has two operational squadrons equipped with nine reconnaissance aircraft. Two more squadrons will stand up in mid-January.
Having helped reestablish Iraq’s military academy, NATO Training Mission Iraq is now helping Iraqi military leaders reestablish the Iraqi armed forces officer education system with the development of a junior-leaders college, a staff college, and a war college.
In addition to the growth and development of the armed forces, security forces belonging to the Ministry of Interior are also steadily making progress. Both the regular police and special police units will be critical to security and stability leading up to election day, on election day, and in the post-election period.
At present, the Iraqi police service has more than 53,000 trained and equipped police officers, up from 26,000 six months ago. Of the 27,000 police officers trained over the past six months, 13,643 were former officers who underwent three-week transition training and 13,314 were new recruits who underwent an eight-week training course. More than 37,000 additional police are on duty and will complete training in the months ahead.
Five police academies are now operational. Together, they will soon produce nearly 4,000 new police officers each month, while additional local academies continue the transition courses for police trained before liberation. A concerted effort has recently been made to modify police training, making it more suited to preparing police officers for operations in a counterinsurgency environment.
Coupled with that change in training has been a change in the construct in which police are operating. Police stations are being hardened, communication links are being improved, more equipment and arms are being provided to police and stations, and quick reaction forces, such as SWAT teams and emergency response units, are being created.
Five provincial SWAT teams have already completed training; two more are in training, and 13 more are scheduled for training over the next six months. Iraq’s National Emergency Response Unit is now operational as well, and its elements have conducted operations in Baghdad, Fallujah, and Mosul.
Special police units, none of which were envisioned six months ago are capable of providing security in high-risk areas. Seven police commando battalions are now operational, with two more in training and additional battalions planned.
Six public order battalions are also operational, with six more planned. Iraq’s mechanized police brigade recently completed training and will begin operations this month using 50 BTR-94 wheeled, armored vehicles. Lastly, as part of Iraq’s effort to strengthen the security of its borders, Iraq’s 1st Special Border Force Battalion is operating on the Syrian border in western Anbar province, and the 2nd Battalion will be operational in mid-February.
Since July 1, Iraqi security forces have been issued more than 57 million rounds of ammunition (with another 148 million recently received and put into ammo storage areas around the country), 69,000 pistols, 46,000 AK-47 rifles, 79,000 sets of body armor, 5,600 vehicles, and 20,900 radios.
Today there is more than $1.87 billion in ongoing construction and reconstruction projects for Iraqi security forces. Projects include four multi- brigade installations, hundreds of police stations and border forts, countless headquarters and barracks, a number of training centers, and many operating bases. More than 7,500 Iraqi workers, on average, are being employed each week in these projects.
Iraqi Army Day not only marked the 84th birthday of Iraq’s yrmy, it also showcased some of the progress in reestablishing the Iraqi army since the transfer of sovereignty.
(Courtesy of Multinational Security and Transition Command Iraq.)
You think Iraq, is a tough nut to crack, and we should have poured all our efforts in the Afghan
/Pakistan border; consider what history of just the British intervention in the Hindu Kush/Khyber
Pass was like in the last century(never mind the Russian’s . Take one random account in Christina Lamb’s “Sewing Circle of Herat’; “Dr Bryden arriving slump sholdered at the garrison, the only survivor of 16,000 soldiers,retreating from Kabul in 1842″ (p. 68, 2002) The battle of Umbayla, in 1863, that Peter Bergen, references at the opening of his Bin Laden, tome. starting from the inscription at the Royal Cementary
in Peshawar. Then there’s the Battle of Maiwand, in 1880, during the Second Afghan War, most notably known as the place where Dr. Watson, was wounded by a jezail bullet; (the AK round of the 19th Century), to meet up with Sherlock Holmes, as indicated in Arthur Conan Doyle’s’Study in Scarlet ” “on the plains just west of Kandahar, the Brits suffered one of the worst defeats in Asia, losing more than
a thousand men” (227) Less than a generation later, there was the famous Malakand uprising, in which young Churchil participated.Then there’s the Third Afghan War,! in 1919, where the future Arthur ‘Bomber’Harris, first tried out his theories of the importance of airpower;this
mostly occurredin the pesky provinces of
Waziristan; Ultimately the Brits had to surrender
authority over Afghanistan, after that
intervention; where the ancestors of many a brave
muj including the tragic figure of Abdul Haq, the second great champion against Al Queda, after Massoud, participated of Similar accounts are in Robert Kaplan’s early take on the Mujahadeen, 1990’s Soldiers of God, and the collected works of Kipling, from the relatively lighthearted Kim to the almost macabre ‘Arithmetic on the Frontier’where ‘athousand pounds of educations
comes down to a ten pound jezail, and “Young English soldier” ‘s admonition, to when in Afghanistan, to commit suicide to spare the ministrations; of the natives. Considering, that
such confrontations would probably now involved
sizable fractions of the Pakistani elements, the
ISI; and the Al Queda swarms,that we currently
face in Iraq, in retrospect; Our involvement in
Iraq,doesn’t seem quite so fatalistic
The real question pertaining to Iraq is there, relative to the Shia, Kurd, Sunni ethnic/religious/tribal divide, a sufficient sense of Iraqi nationalism to overcome those divides?
If not, then it is highly unlikely any semblance of a whole Iraq will survive this transistion, no matter how many U.S. troops we had on the ground.
That said, the prospect of a disintegrating Iraq into its more natural constituent parts does not obviate against the necessity of U.S. action against Saddam in March 03. Nor does a disintegrated Iraq mean U.S. failure, by any means.