I only have one problem with the editors’ of the Washington Post’s joy over Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi’s overwhelming victory:
Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi won a mandate for her ambitious reform project after years of listless leadership in Tokyo. Her success is good news for America, and now Washington can help her succeed.
Takaichi supports a major military buildup in Japan. In addition to boosting defense spending to at least two percent of gross domestic product, she ran on expanding offensive military capabilities and lifting a ban on lethal weapon exports. The sweep of the victory, which gives her muscular majorities in parliament, might even allow Takaichi to repeal the pacifist clause written into Japan’s constitution after World War II.
Before we rejoice we might want to make up our minds. Either the United States intends to remain a global military hegemon with dependent allies or it intends to lead a coalition of capable, autonomous partners. We cannot pursue both simultaneously.
Since the end of World War II, the United States has pursued a policy of military supremacy. Strong allies were seen as an impediment to that hegemony and their autonomy was carefully contrained. For the last roughly ten years we have demanded in increasingly harsh tones that our allies spend 2% of GDP on defense. I have long thought that both policies were mistaken.
We should not demand military hegemony or that our allies spend some arbitrary amount or percent of GDP on defense. We should want strong allies with defined, dependable capabilities. Capabilities including anti-submarine warfare, air defense, sealift, munitions stockpiles, and independent logistics capacity matter far more than whether a country reaches an arbitrary spending threshold.
If Japan is to “shoulder more of the security burden for countering China”, that has certain implications. One is that we are abandoning our heretofore split-personality in policies. We don’t want to be global hegemon any more and we do need strong allies.
Another is that we cannot maintain an adverse balance of trade with China any longer. China uses that trade imbalance to strengthen its own military. A strategy that relies on allied military power while simultaneously financing the adversary’s rearmament through persistent trade imbalances is not merely incoherent but self-defeating.
We should also recognize that autonomous allies are equipped to pursue their own foreign policy interests. Takaichi’s mandate is driven as much by Japanese perceptions of China and North Korea as by American pressure.
