I’d originally planned to post this at OTB but there wasn’t quite enough “here” here for that so, rather than just throw it away, I thought I’d post it here. Let’s consider the casualties our forces have taken in Afghanistan:
| Year | Fatalities | Average monthly “boots on the ground” | Fatalities per 100K |
| 2001 | 12 | ||
| 2002 | 49 | 5,200 | 942 |
| 2003 | 48 | 10,400 | 462 |
| 2004 | 52 | 15,200 | 342 |
| 2005 | 99 | 19,100 | 518 |
| 2006 | 98 | 20,400 | 480 |
| 2007 | 117 | 23,700 | 494 |
| 2008 | 155 | 30,100 | 515 |
| 2009 | 317 | 50,700 | 625 |
| 2010 | 499 | 94,000 | 531 |
| 2011 | 418 | 109,000 | 383 |
| 2012 | 49 |
Source for fatalities: iCasualties.org
Source for “boots on the ground” Troop Levels in the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, July 2, 2009 and Troop Levels in the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, March 29, 2011
As you can see the fatalities varied with troop level from 2003 through 2008, increased relative to troop level in 2009 and 2010, probably reflecting increased operational tempo, and decreased in 2011. I don’t know whether there was a decrease in operational tempo during 2011 or not.
My interpretation of this, as suggested above, is that both total deployment and operational tempo are relevant to fatalities. It may be that total deployment including all ISF forces is relevant, too. I just don’t know.
I can see how one might look at this table and conclude that OEF is succeeding. I don’t interpret it that way but I can see how one could.
Union casualties in a single day at Antietam were greater than in a decade of Afghanistan against a population (current US vs. US 1860’s) more than ten times as large.
Well, I can’t. Success in terms of the use of military force is ultimately measured by political objectives. If casualties are a/the political objective then we can “win” by reducing them to zero by pulling completely out of Afghanistan.
Casualties are relevant to this discussion. We aren’t fighting for survival and political support for whatever we do in Afghanistan is contingent on not exceeding some tolerable level of casualties. That sounds cold but I think it’s the truth. How acceptable Americans find casualties depends on the objectives.
I think we probably agree. I would say that of course causalities are relevant, but they aren’t a measure of success or failure. Too many casualties can bring about failure (this is war we’re talking about, after all), but one can’t and shouldn’t look at casualty statistics (especially statistics so general as the chart above), see some downward trend, and leap to the conclusion that the trend implies success. It absolutely does not.
Generally speaking, I think that what we’ve seen over the last few years is that 2-4 fatalities per week are politically acceptable in perpetuity while more than that aren’t. In that light casualties are, indeed, a measure of success when success requires protracted or even permanent commitment.
Note that according to DoD figures 75 fatalities per 100K is the expected rate at home during peacetime.
More than casualties, however tragic, or even the incredible logistics problems, the thing that bothers me is Kabul’s corruption and unreliability.
We just are not fit for empire. The American people won’t tolerate the kinds of actions that are required. It’s not that the situation is insoluble in the abstract, it’s that it’s insoluble given what the American people can tolerate.
I think you are confusing achieving strategic ends with the political acceptability of means. The number of casualties doesn’t tell us anything about how we are doing with respect to achieving our strategic ends.
I will agree with Michael. We just arent built for occupation, and we dont know how to nation build.
Steve
Also important is the nature of the fatalities (and other casualties.) There have been a significant number of casualties & fatalities in Afghanistan because of Afghan troops that are nominally our allies have been assasinating our troops. Michael Yon had a post up a day or two ago (I believe) that gave some hint that the numbers may have even been scrubbed, and that things are worse than they appear. If we’re losing almost as many troops to our “allies” turning on us, as opposed to enemy action, then the situation becomes less tenable politically. (Justifiably so.)
Mr. Schuler,
I stumbled upon your site a few weeks ago and have been playing catch-up since then. I want to thank you for what you do here and hope you keep up the good work.
I served in Afghanistan from ’03-’04 as an infantryman and would be interested in your input concerning a project I’ve been working on. Would it be possible to contact you via email?