In the millions of words spoken, in print, and on the Internet that we were treated to yesterday in recognition of the 15th anniversary of the attacks on September 11, 2001, no inconsiderable number were devoted to comparing the circumstances of today with those of September 10, 2001. Are we safer?
Many of those who are notionally responsible for that safety pointed to inputs rather than outputs as proof positive that we were safer, something I regard as strong proof of its opposite. That was particularly true of Jeh Johnson, secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. Doesn’t DHS’s $40 billion annual budget prove we’re safer?
I’d like to present an alternative approach for evaluating the question. It’s simple to state. First, identify the critical success factors of the attack. Then determine whether we’ve blocked them or mitigated the risks that they present.
There is one critical success factor in the attacks that is no longer a factor. We no longer station troops in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. However, we do continue to support the regime there, we provide them with arms, and the regime continues to be repressive. Clearly, some risk remains on that front.
Our continuing interventions in the region have increased the threats for that reason. Did invading Iraq, removing Saddam Hussein or Moammar Qaddafi, or propping up the corrupt Afghan government make us safer?
Much of the attention domestically has been devoted to federalizing airport security. TSA’s high failure rate suggests that a lot of that has been waste motion. I don’t believe the “security theater”, as it’s been called, does much to make us safer and the inevitable revelation that it has been security theater tears down whatever additional safety was provided.
I find few signs that other risks, e.g. the way we extend travel visas or our lax handling of them once extended, have been mitigated at all.
Overall does the conclusion that a lot of effort has been expended to solve the problems of elected officials but relatively little has been done to make us safer sound too cynical? That’s what I think has happened.
“There is one critical success factor in the attacks that is no longer a factor. We no longer station troops in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. However, we do continue to support the regime there, we provide them with arms, and the regime continues to be repressive. Clearly, some risk remains on that front.”
That was certainly one factor that led to the desire to attack America, but it wasn’t a success factor. Meaning, troops stationed in SA didn’t make the 9/11 method of attack more successful than another type of attack, like a car bomb. What it did was create or reinforce the intent to attack.
So, IMO, the critical success factors for the 9/11 attack were fixed and quickly. Cockpit doors were armored; more importantly the presumption that a hijacking is not a suicide mission is over – Hijack attempts in the US will not be assumed to be suicide missions. Everything else is really secondary, including the TSA.
“Critical success factor” is a term of art. As I use it it means, roughly, a factor without which something would not take place. For the attack to have taken place required, as you put it, “the intent to attack”.
I don’t believe the attacks on 9/11 would have taken place if we hadn’t had troops stationed in KSA. Now there are other grievances.
I agree with your list of factors but I don’t think they’re the entire list. However, your basic point is well-taken: some of the critical success factors had already been eliminated or their risk mitigated by 9/12/2011.
I see what you’re saying – “critical success factor” has a different definition in anti-terrorism circles that’s limited to the factors peculiar to a specific event or tactic.