I’m grateful to a regular commenter for drawing our attention to an article in Quillette by Jonathan Kay. Its initially compelling argument is driven by data provided by the company Moovit who eponymous app provides realtime information on transit much as Waze does for highway traffic. It is used by enough people that I believe it is a reasonable gauge of ridership. You can see Moovit’s data for yourself here.
What the data seem to show is that there have been sharp drop-offs in public transit ridership, the point of inflection in ridership in Seattle was on March 5, and in most other U. S. cities around March 10. These drop-offs precede lockdown order and so are not a consequence of them. Here’s the basic conclusion of the piece:
I’ve spent a lot of time looking at this kind of data in recent weeks, and trying to tease out the policy ramifications. One of the trends that’s jumped out is that lockdown orders have tended to ratify public behaviour as much as prescribe or circumscribe it. Seattle residents essentially began imposing a lockdown on themselves before their government did, because the city had become one of the country’s leading early COVID-19 hotspots. Likewise, most Swedes didn’t need their government to tell them to stay home. Like everyone else, they get their news from the globalized data dump and anxiety mill known as social media. They all saw what was happening in Italy and elsewhere.
He also articulates something I’ve been saying here since early on in the crisis:
The skeptics who argue that lockdowns “don’t work†usually will support this claim by ticking off nations or regions that have succeeded in fighting off serious COVID-19 outbreaks without imposing harsh government restrictions. But when you parse the actual data, what you find is that these tend to be high-trust, high-education, high-information societies—such as in Scandinavia and East Asia—where official lockdowns haven’t been necessary precisely because a critical mass of people have effectively locked themselves down on their own.
but gets beyond the data here:
If spring-breakers in Miami were as conscientious and disciplined as, say, most office workers in Stockholm or Tokyo, the state’s governor wouldn’t have had to clear the beaches. But they’re not, so he did. Such spectacles tell us a lot about college students, but not much about lockdowns.
That has been analyzed. College students returning from spring break did not trigger an up-tick in new cases of COVID-19 as you might expect. Clearly, there’s more going on in the spread of the virus than simple proximity. That’s why I’ve kept harping on things like temperature and angle of the sun. As far as we know to date there has been no major outbreak of COVID-19 anywhere south of 23°N and that includes Brazil and the much-publicized Ecuador. Clearly, Ecuador’s health care system was already teetering on the brink and even a small increase in the number of cases requiring urgent care was enough to tip it over the edge. One might claim that you can’t trust the figures being released in Brazil or Ecuador but that cuts both ways. If the statistics from those places are phony, you ignore them rather than assuming the opposite and my claim remains true.
The author goes on to make this prudent observation:
The crowdsourced aspect of lockdowns is bad news and good news. It’s bad news because getting all of society’s actors on the same page will take many months. And so, as state-level data already show, we won’t be able to get our economies up and running on anything like the speedy timeline that most self-styled lockdown opponents are seeking. But it’s also good news, because a slower, crowdsourced form of lockdown lifting will be subject to a whole slew of negative feedback mechanisms among ordinary people and employers, such that localized outbreaks naturally lead to corrections. And so we can avoid the problem, depicted in Ferguson’s graphs, by which sudden quantum shifts in centralized policy yield behavioural spikes whose catastrophic effects set off an endless wave of epidemiological boom and bust.
but arrives at this dour conclusion:
Little of this self-imposed “lockdown-lite†is going to change in coming weeks and months, regardless of what government does, even as the masks come off and the floor dots start to fade. The changes we’ve made are sociologically sticky and, in some cases, literally hard-bolted into our public architecture.
I’m not so sure. I think that lockdown fatigue is starting to set in and, unless there is a significant surge in new cases, people are likely to relax over time.
I see no obvious straight line relationship between lockdowns and declines in COVID-19 cases. If there were, Illinois’s and Chicago’s experiences would be different than they have been. Proclaiming that they have not effective because Chicagoans aren’t compliant enough is just another way of saying that the measures as implemented are not effective. That’s one of the weaknesses of the piece. There were, in fact, precipitating events that prompted the decline in public transit ridership. The mayor of Seattle proclaimed a state of emergency on March 3 and the point of inflection in ridership took place on March 5. That can hardly have been a coincidence. I haven’t researched it but I suspect that Seattle major news outlets were deluged with reports about COVID-19 that moved people to lock themselves down.
Over the centuries cities and towns or even whole societies have found themselves in the grip of mass manias. There is a real disease that has real consequences and has resulted in real deaths.
In the United States half of all of the diagnosed cases and half of all of the deaths appear to have occurred in the New York metropolitan area. Outside the New York area the situation is different. In more than half of the states the prevalence of the disease is around 1 in a thousand and the morbidity is on the order of 1 in a 100,000.
I don’t know what the right policy is and, more importantly, I don’t even know if there is a right policy. I agree with the basic message of the linked article: the people’s behavior will tell us what the policy will be.
IMHO, much like the coverage of the Vietnam war, posting the daily body count is something we’ll need to get away from if we want to return to normal. I don’t have to tell you, but 80,000 deaths is a very large and fearful number taken out of the context of normal mortality rates. Such as an annual 130,000 by overdose and/or suicide.
When I take a step back, I realize I personally know no one who has died of Covid 19. Hope it remains that way.
Other than in the New York City metropolitan area I do not think you are the exception. You are the rule. Which in turn means that the fear driving policy is not based on firsthand experience but on reports in the mass media and on social media.
All of the deaths in China, Italy, Spain were real. People dead in the streets in Ecuador and hospitals overwhelmed in Brazil are real. This is more than just some imagined mania. What is difficult is knowing how to respond since this is a brand new virus.
Maybe you have been making the case that people were self isolating before the lockdowns, but it is one I have pointed out over and over. Even without mandatory lockdowns we were looking at negative economic effects. As I keep pointing out Sweden is predicting economic consequences about the same as we are expecting. Not because they read something by Ferguson from the UK or because they are reading the hysterical left wing press in the US, but because they understand their own country. They looked at the numbers in their country.
I guess if you are going to accept the wisdom of the crowd, then it seems the initial reaction to lockdown was largely correct. I think you are correct that people will largely ignore or undercut the lockdowns if they dont believe in them. The problem there is that the crowd is being given a lot of misinformation. Regardless, no state is going to maintain them effectively for very long.
Where our leadership should have come in is that we should have been preparing for a second wave or for long term maintenance of steady levels of illness and death with relaxation of distancing.
Steve
“steady levels of illness and death with relaxation of distancing.”
Affirmative. Steady or rising. As long as we have no treatment . But it’s tough to prepare for this chameleon disease. I’ve brought up meatpacking plants because I live near them, what I haven’t mentioned is their low death rate. As you would expect, death occurs in the few workers over 60.
Hundreds of positive tests and I think 2 deaths, and they would probably have made it if we had anything to help them.
They shut down the plants and in two days we have a meat shortage. Lives matter, but so does food.
Dave: I read the comments on Quillette (those that don’t go into their damned Quillette Circle where they are only available if you are a paid subscriber) as much if not more than the articles themselves. I would suggest if you haven’t already read those comments. Many are quite at variance with the tone of the article.
Steve: Here is a link to a 5/8/20 Reuters article about Kung Flu in Brazil:
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-brazil-amazon-idUSKBN22K1DU
I found it interesting that the mayor is complaining about COVID-19 undercounts but prefers to call any death with similar symptoms COVID-19 caused without proof. The problem with politicians becoming medical experts.
It does seem though that either there is a more humidity and temperature resistant mutant of virus going around down there or the expectation that Kung Flu is vulnerable to high levels of both is wrong, and we’re just going to have to acquire herd immunity to turn this thing into a measles or a flu rather than Black Death.
steve:
Apparently, you missed this passage from my post:
That is not incompatible with the response to the disease being the product of a mania. During the Tulip Craze of the 17th century, tulip prices were actually rising. That is a recorded fact. But the reaction to that fact is practically the definition of a mania.
It takes precisely one counter-example to disprove a hypothesis. In Chicago enough people stopped using public transport prior to the formal “stay at home” directive to achieve “critical mass”, as the author of the quoted article puts it. And yet no curve-bending whether you’re measuring new cases diagnosed or health care resource utilization. Consequently, lockdowns are not sufficient. Whether they are necessary remains to be seen.
You can hypothesize all sorts of reasons the lockdown has not been effective in Chicago. Non-compliance seems to be contradicted by Moovit’s transit use data. To claim non-compliance as the sole reason for the lockdown’s failure here you must reject the thesis of the cited article.
My own view is that, due to differences in the degree to which individuals spread the virus, the level of compliance for a lockdown as such to be effective is so high as to be impractical and the number workers deemed essential must be limited so greatly as to be intolerable.
As I point out in my post, I don’t know what needs to happen. If a lockdown cannot be effective, it should be lifted as useless. If the lockdown could be effective if properly applied, elected officials will need to bite the bullet and start enforcing it aggressively while limiting the activities and workers deemed essential.
“You can hypothesize all sorts of reasons the lockdown has not been effective in Chicago.”
As I cannot prove it has been effective, neither can you prove it has been ineffective. We do have examples of what happens when the virus gets out of control.
Steve
Occam’s Razor, while not dispositive, is enough.
I will be brutal. 150,000 dead Americans, or even 2 million, is a smaller problem than a Great Depression II that lasts a decade. Without release from lockdown across the whole country, we get Great Depression II. Actually, we may be too deep into economic collapse right now to recover any time soon. It may take a few years.
The lockdown was an severe over-reaction to a fraudulent model. The model’s author, Neil Ferguson, has a long sordid history of fraudulent, panic inducing models. He does it for fun.
PS. I am 76 years old, and my wife, sisters, and inlaws are similarly elderly.
My governor, Jared Polis, is handling Colorado well IMO and he understands the limits of trying to force people to comply with directives and the importance of economic concerns.
Last night, he held an AMA (Ask Me Anything) on Reddit and gave the following reply when asked about a state-wide order to enforce wearing masks:
https://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/ggrt2t/im_governor_jared_polis_of_colorado_former/fq42f6y
I’m not as convinced of the absolute efficacy of masks, but it’s nice that he’s a Democrat who understands the limits of what the state can do or mandate.
Sounds like a sensible answer to me. Here in Illinois we’re doing almost the opposite—imposing statewide requirements with no intention of even making good faith attempts at enforcement.
“The lockdown was an severe over-reaction to a fraudulent model.”
No conservative ever answers questions. They just blame stuff on Obama or heap praise on Obama. But seriously, nearly every other country also has lockdown in some form. You really think that they were all influenced by Ferguson. Putin? Modi?
I agree on Occam’s Razor. It would suggest that mitigation there has been effective.
Just for fun, here are the total number of deaths Ferguson predicted for the UK if they followed current practices. Of course they instituted them late. These were for 2 years. These assume an R of 2 and that they would not be in effect all of the time as he noted in his opening statement that economic costs could be high. The lowest number of deaths assumes that interventions would be triggered at a low level of ICU bbed occupation. Each following number of deaths assumes a higher trigger.
5600, 8300, 14,000, 21,000.
Link to paper here, not that any of you have the curiosity of willingness to disbelieve anything Trump has told you.
https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperial-college/medicine/sph/ide/gida-fellowships/Imperial-College-COVID19-NPI-modelling-16-03-2020.pdf
Steve