I found Daniel A. Connelly and Joseph B. Piroch’s post at RealClearPolicy on the narrow range of alternatives being considered in our policy with respect to Ukraine refreshing. I thought that this was a fair summary of present thinking:
The dominant narrative in political circles today views Russia’s actions as an attempt by an imperialist power to reestablish the Soviet Union. It refuses to consider Russia’s national security concerns about a West-leaning Ukraine, rejects diplomatic compromise, and presents a basket of similar policy options, all of which entail a strong and unyielding resistance to Russia. This narrative vilifies Vladimir Putin as the “ultimate bad actor†and seeks the total incapacitation of a hated enemy—a characterization that, true or not, can lead only to greater conflict. More concerning, its polarizing mindset often reduces arguments to emotional salvos that eclipse sound judgment with cries for decisive action. The result is a one-sided discourse rendering moderate proposals unacceptable before they even gain consideration.
After analyzing and tracing the historical background of the present dialectic in our foreign policy thinking they observe:
The two predominant philosophies of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Soviet era — neoconservatism and neoliberalism — embrace the themes of fatalism and total war. Despite their divergent premises and objectives, they both see international relations as an endless struggle and use a self-created moral compass to validate the persistent use of force. The first views the world as an antagonistic battleground where nations grapple for power and believes aggressive, unconstrained action in world affairs is necessary to prevail. The second sees a world in dire need of democratic governance and liberal values and judges that a forced transformation of governments and institutions is required to instill Western ideals everywhere. Both see interventionism and war as permissible, if not laudable, tools of foreign policy. Neither one, therefore, is predisposed to de-escalate a crisis, such as the one in Ukraine today.
concluding:
The United States is heading down a risky path of escalating conflict with a nuclear-armed power that does not like to be pushed into a corner. This strategy, driven by a mindset of fatalism and total war, is taking policy options off the table and constraining us to conclude that war is the only choice apart from appeasement. Our statesmen must stay on their guard and refuse to take the bait. It is certainly possible that a hardline approach to Russia is the best option for the United States, but to draw such a conclusion without considering a wider range of policy options is both impulsive and imprudent. Perhaps we need a Russian, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, to remind us that “vile means defeat the ends they seek to bring about.†If we are not careful, in combatting Russia we could destroy the values we profess to hold in highest esteem. To paraphrase philosopher Josef Pieper, now is the time for the excellent statesman to exhibit courage in policy and in deed — a courage aimed at securing the common good for all.
Under the present conditions of politics of sound bites, social media radicalism, and the extreme difficulty in distinguishing between information, information operations, and disinformation, I doubt that the foreign policy of moderation and restraint they call for will be adopted.
It’s depressing. I think the chance of nuclear war is higher than any time since perhaps the Able Archer crisis or maybe even the Cuban Missile Crisis.
So do I. And I lived through both of them. I actually wrote a paper about the Cuban Missile Crisis that they wanted to publish.
With the Ukrainian commando attacks on Russia assets in Transnistria, the war on the ground has now spread to three countries: Ukraine, Russia, and Moldova.
Ukraine has proposed to Moldova that it remove the 1,500 Russian troops from separatist Transnistria, but Moldova has decline the offer. An attack on the Russian troops in Moldova, would be a major escalation of the war.
Meanwhile, Poland and Romania are actively discussing a joint invasion of both Ukraine and Moldova in order to recover territories lost decades or centuries ago. Both countries are massing troops and positioning them for for such and invasion. Slovakia and Hungary might participate, too.
It is not clear what Russia would do if the invasion occurred. It might tacitly approve of the annexations, because they would help stabilize the rump Ukraine that will be left after the war. The Nazis have to be dumped somewhere.
I was 19 during the Cuban Missile Crisis, but this situation is much, much worse. I think we are closer to nuclear war than at any time since 1945. I also think that whether it occurs depends on the actions of the US. Polish troops occupying ancient Galicia would not do it, but American troops in the same area would.
Sanctions got us war with Japan, and Lend Lease made us a belligerent against Germany. They will get us war with Russia, too. No one seems to care.
The U.S. has done little to de-escalate tensions between Russia & Ukraine. Instead, there has been verbiage by our government leaders that have done nothing but rile one side and promise too much to the other. However, it’s downright chilling to read the comments before mine, dealing with the prospects of a nuclear war. Where are the grown-ups, the ones with sage wisdom who know how devastating such a war would be for everyone!
I am depressed there isn’t anyone in a position of power calling for moderation or restraint.
As observed, right now Ukraine is a valence issue. I haven’t observed anyone in Congress vehemently disagree with the administrations course — compare this to say the leadup to the Iraq war. As long as Congress is of one opinion on this matter — I don’t see a change from current policy.
What would moderation and restraint embrace? I think wha there are really talking about is giving Russia a big chunk or all of Ukraine. Maybe a smaller chunk and essentially doing away with sovereignty for Ukraine. What keeps getting forgot in these discussions is that all fo the countries joining NATO/EU are asking to join. No one is forcing. There is a reason they want to leave. If nothing else I am sure they see the relative prosperity of nations that leave the Russian sphere. Maybe moderate is Russia agrees to leave Ukraine, stops invading other countries and lets Ukraine have economic sovereignty.
Steve
Things to do for moderation and restraint (if we wanted to).
They are
(a) limited goals — rhetoric about Ukraine recovering Crimea, or attacking Russia inside Russia with NATO weapons must go. Also any talk of regime change.
(b) limited support — stop giving tanks, drones, artillery
(c) abandonment of the open door policy — the more US / NATO gives on this, the more it can ask for a status quo ante for Ukraine
(d) pursue a diplomatic settlement — that there are no talks ongoing incentivizes everyone to pursue maximalist goals
Moderation and restraint means this country won’t get what it wants — but we’ll maximize the chance we will avoid the things we really want to avoid.
Have an imagination. There are many many things this country wants to avoid — and they are magnitudes more important they a maximalist goals may win.
“What would moderation and restraint embrace?”
– Stop escalating. Give the extensive support we’re giving the Ukrainians a chance to work before piling more on.
– Stop with the dumb assumptions that we can escalate and do literally anything short of US military personnel pulling the trigger to kills Russians, and Russia will do nothing significant to counter or counter-escalate. I know enough about how military operations work and the capabilities that are being used to assist the Ukrainians to know that we are very likely part of the kill chain in many cases. It’s the worst-kept secret in Washington which has never been good at keeping secrets.
– Stop supporting and promoting maximalist demands that everyone knows Russia would never accede to, including regime change and the desire to see Russia not only fail in its war aims in Ukraine, but also be wrecked and humiliated to the greatest extent possible politically, economically and socially. All that does is convince Russian leadership and Russians generally that this is not just a war in Ukraine but an existential fight. It promotes the idea that even if Russia were to quit and withdrawal now, that the US and NATO would simply press the advantage toward those maximalist goals.
– Promote options for diplomacy. Right now we have essentially zero diplomatic communication with Russia. Dumb, dumb dumb.
– Maybe don’t deliberately stoke Russia’s long-standing and well-known fears. In the eyes of the Russian people, our words and actions have validated what Putin has long been saying about the intentions of the West, and validated the notion, in their minds, that the West wants to destroy Russia and that NATO is first and foremost, a hostile anti-Russian alliance.
-Maybe don’t encourage a coups or a bullet to Putin’s head without understanding that there are significant forces in Russia who think Putin has acted – essentially – as a wimp. In other words, the people likely to depose Putin are going to be worse. People who could welcome war with NATO. Regime change is inherently unstable because it’s never clear who will claim power and how it will play out. In a place like Libya, that doesn’t affect us and we can (and have) ignored the civil war and misery there. Nuclear weapons mean we can’t assume that the consequences of regime change are something we don’t have to worry much about.
– Similarly, maybe realize that Russia is not like Iraq, Iran, or Afghanistan where the consequences of us fucking up were limited to money and soldiers’ lives while the rest of America went to the mall. The potential consequence of us fucking up with Russia is the very real end of the United States. Maybe try to craft a policy that specifically seeks to avoid nuclear annihilation and perhaps acknowledges that such a policy might not be compatible with calls for regime change, national humiliation, and the maximalist demands already mentioned.
– Maybe try to be somewhat cognizant of what is actually happening in Russia, particularly among Russia’s elites and key political actors instead of listening to the usual no-nothing douchebags on Twitter that drive elite discourse and thought in this country.
Etc. Etc.
Edited to add: Curious was much more succinct and nicer.
“What keeps getting forgot in these discussions is that all fo the countries joining NATO/EU are asking to join. No one is forcing.”
No one is forgetting that. At all. And when it comes to Ukraine and Georgia it was NATO that first floated membership which – predictably! really pissed Russia off. If we really wanted to get Ukraine and Georgia (and a host of other tiny landlocked countries) into NATO we should at least have been a lot smarter about it. Floating NATO membership in the way we did is akin to telling a wife-beater that you’re thinking about fucking his ex-wife.
Contrast that with Taiwan which has as much or more of a claim to independence and formal recognition and US military protection than Ukraine. Why not dangle diplomatic recognition and a formal military alliance there and see what the Chinese do?
Anyway, the point is that NATO isn’t (or shouldn’t be) a club where anyone can walk in the door. We are on the hook for the vast majority of NATO’s defense including the potential use of nuclear weapons to protect our allies. As a citizen of the US, I don’t think it’s crazy to suggest that we should not allow countries to join NATO that would contribute nothing to the alliance while existing as a permanent strategic liability. The US does not need more protectorates.
Sounds like everyone agrees that regime change is what is needed.
In the U.S.
It would do no good. As CuriousOnlooker mentioned earlier (and I have been claiming for some time) support for Ukraine is a valence issue. What that means is that everybody supports Ukraine—the two political parties compete in how much they support it.
†the two political parties compete in how much they support it.â€
The two establishment political parties seem to support both war and arming Ukraine – more than solving the ills of our own country. However, there is a subset of people – a movement representing a more populous, nationalistic flavor – who support neither war or overindulging Ukraine with unending amounts of money and arms. I think the upcoming midterms may find a different governing temperament towards our foreign policy assignments than there is at the present.
So what I see here is everyone mostly avoiding the question. Have diplomacy? Sure. Whatever. Stop sending weapons? That is ceding to Russia. Might as well write off Ukraine. Stop letting countries join NATO or the EU? Russia has de facto re-established the USSR, Empire ro something. Those countries have no sovereignty. They understand Russia better than we do and they know it means being invaded if they dont comply with Russia wishes. So the answers here mean that moderation means Russia walks away with at least part of Ukraine or even all of Ukraine if you are even more moderate.
I dont really want Ukraine in NATO. Its not as clear to me as Andy that Ukraine had not asked before the suggestion was made. I just dont see the need to preemptively say no. What stops every superpower from invading and subjugating its neighbors? The cost is too high. As long as Ukraine values its sovereignty I think they deserve support and if we can make the cost high for Russia in other ways that is fi e with me too.
Steve
steve,
So you support the maximalist goals. The question you need to consider is what risks you are willing to take to achieve them and what resources and strategy it will take. The problem I continually see is that those who advocate for maximalist goals downplay the risks and costs of achieving such ends and can’t be bothered with the details of how to achieve them and instead keep repeating moral arguments about what ought to be.
I have no problem with maximalist demands in theory. I am an American patriot and do want to see my country remain the top dog and defend our interests. Where I part ways is that I do not see how the maximalist ends benefit the US when compared to the risks and costs.
Another big problem is the lack of any coherent idea of how to get from here to there. At a minimum, those who advocate for no-compromise maximalist ends need to demonstrate how that might be achieved without triggering nuclear armageddon. The underpants gnome strategy doesn’t cut it.
In my view, the most stupid thing to do is to put Russia in a corner where its leadership believes it has no choice but to employ nukes. Our actions and words are very much pushing them in that direction. One should consider Russia’s actual and likely reactions to our various moves and policies and not do pretend analysis that depends on them acting how we want them to act. That is part of the blunder that set the conditions for this war in the first place.