David Ignatius’s précis of President Trump’s war in Iran, the opening passage of his latest Washington Post column, is a pretty fair assessment:
For more than 45 years, U.S. presidents have wanted to destroy the radical, anti-American regime in Tehran. They always concluded that the risks of war were too great — until President Donald Trump’s all-out attack with Israel early Saturday.
Trump said Saturday that the massive airstrikes had killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Few outside Iran will mourn the demise of a man who spent his career shouting: “Death to America!” and “Death to Israel!” And by this limited definition, Trump’s decapitation strategy may have worked. But killing Khamenei, who was aging and infirm, isn’t the same thing as regime change. If there’s a plan for what’s next, I haven’t heard any U.S. or Israeli official explain it.
Mr. Ignatius correctly distinguishes leadership decapitation from regime change, but he smuggles in the assumption that regime destruction has long been settled U.S. policy rather than fluctuating strategic posture.
Even better is one sentence from the editors’ of the Washington Post’s reaction to Operation Epic Fury: “Success will likely require more than a bombing campaign.”
The editors of the Wall Street Journal, more favorably disposed to the war than I or the WaPo’s editors, observe:
In his eight-minute video in the wee hours Saturday, President Trump laid out war aims that suggest a campaign of several days or weeks. He said he wants to “raze their missile industry to the ground” and “annihilate their navy.” He will destroy what’s left of Iran’s nuclear program and “ensure that the region’s terrorist proxies can no longer destabilize the region or the world and attack our forces.”
Crucially, he called on the people of Iran to rise up and depose the theocratic regime that has terrorized and murdered them for 47 years. “When we are finished” bombing, Mr. Trump said, “take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be, probably, your only chance for generations.”
These war aims mean that Mr. Trump is enforcing the red lines he drew when the regime slaughtered its people as they protested in January. He said he’d come to their aid, and now he has. He also gave Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, ample chance to strike a deal on nuclear weapons and its missile force, but the ayatollah refused and now he is reportedly dead.
While confident that the Pentagon has contingency plans for overthrowing the Iranian regime (the Pentagon has many contingency plans), I’m less confident that it has one for doing so from the air. Let’s review some possible scenarios for the outcome.
Best case scenario
In my view the best case scenario for the outcome in Iran is a liberal democratic Iran allied with the United States. If anyone encounters a description from a credible source predicting that will happen, I would be delighted to read it. I think the prospects for that are vanishingly small. The Revolutionary Guard has a decentralized leadership. Killing and otherwise reducing identified targets would not be nearly enough.
Not much
This is, I think, the most likely scenario. The Iranian military and paramilitary forces continue to strike back. President Trump declares victory and ends the operations.
Even “not much” may have considerable costs beyond the out-of-pocket costs of the war itself including the risk of regional escalation, oil shock, proxy retaliation, maritime disruption, and terrorist campaigns abroad.
Regime implosion
The operation kills enough leaders and destroys enough that there is some sort of internal “implosion” by the IRGC and/or militias. President Trump declares victory and washes his hands of any responsibility for the outcome which is chaos and/or civil war in Iran. It could even empower hardline factions within Iran.
A return to the negotiating table
After a few rounds of attacks, both sides return to negotiations. There might even be a return to the agreement that was left on the table. Both sides could claim it as a win.
In the near term Iran is likely to be less willing (or able) to fund Hamas and Hezbollah. In that sense it could be a victory for the Israelis.
In all of these possible outcomes the key problem remains that there is no organized alternative to the present regime in Iran.
Iran gets a vote, too, and so do its allies, Russia and China. This war is already wider in area and targets than last year’s 12 Day War. It could go on for years. Somalia, our longest war, has entered its fourth decade. Iran has announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. That will disrupt oil markets for some time. But, now that Saudi Arabia has entered the war on the Israeli-American side, the destruction of the Gulf oil fields and oil infrastructure is on the agenda. What happens if Gulf oil, 40% of world supply, is cut off for a few years.
None of your scenarios is possible. What is likely is a second Great Depression and third World War.
Who is the great beneficiary of this war? Russia.
Who is the great loser? The United States.