Americans Are Such Rubes

At USA Today Secretary of State Marco Rubio lauds our NATO allies for their pledge to spend 5% of GDP on security:

Winston Churchill once stated, “There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.”

Although the United States has been united by treaty with its NATO allies for nearly 80 years, in the years before Donald Trump becoming president, the United States would have had to fight any major war in Europe effectively alone.

Since the end of the Cold War, Europe’s combined military capabilities had steadily degraded to the point of almost total impotence. Fortunately, President Trump’s decade-long calls for NATO allies to contribute more to shared security have recently been answered with a historic commitment among allies to spend a once-unthinkable 5% of gross domestic product on defense ? a number that reflects both fairness and strategic wisdom.

Not so fast, says Gabriel Elefteriu at Brussels Signal:

Last month’s NATO summit in The Hague gave off the disturbing impression of an alliance finally crossing the fine line between serious defence policy into the realm of make-believe. The main outcome was presented to the world as a “new 5 per cent defence spending pledge” by all allies. The previous target, dating from 2014, was 2 per cent. President Trump naturally claimed the new benchmark as a “big win”, with the White House calling it a “monumental victory” and a “dramatic” increase in defence contributions across the alliance. Yet hardly any of this is true.

Of the 5 per cent, 1.5 is to be counted as any spending intended to “protect critical infrastructure, defend networks, ensure civil preparedness and resilience, innovate, and strengthen the defence industrial base”. In other words, this part of the grand new defence commitment is really an exercise in accounting, as a variety of existing types of rolling domestic investments can simply be designated as “NATO spending”. Italy already plans to declare a €13.5 billion bridge to Sicily as a contribution towards defending Europe – which would be funny if it weren’t a logical outcome of what NATO defence policy has devolved to.

It’s the other 3.5 per cent that is supposed to provide the real (so-called “core”) defence uplift, though. But even this – leaving aside the separate 1.5 per cent nonsense just mentioned – is merely a target to be achieved by 2035, ten full years from now. Given that Russia is supposed to invade us much sooner than that – according to the usual hysterical European warnings – a 2035 target becomes superfluous as it is clearly disconnected from all official strategic calculations. Not to mention that the previous target from 2014 remains unmet 10 years on, with several NATO members not spending even 2 per cent on defence – among them, major countries like Italy (1.49 per cent), Spain (1.28) or Canada (1.37) – and most of the others hovering just above the threshold by intense cooking of the accounting books.

He goes on to document two reasons these countries won’t live up to these pledges. The first is that they lack the fiscal headroom to do it:

Of course, more money for defence could be raised, in principle – in the UK just as in any other European country – either by cutting spending on welfare, by increasing taxes, or by somehow growing the economy. The well-known problem is that neither Britain nor most of its European peers can afford any of these, let alone hope in some miraculous economic growth. They are too weighed down by regulation, taxes, Green costs, expensive energy, deindustrialisation, an aging population and a migrant onslaught to be able to splurge on rearmament at scale.

The second that they lack the political will to do it:

The third main issue standing in the way of getting even to the 3 per cent is that the the domestic situation across many European countries, especially the deeply sclerotic and mismanaged West European ones is becoming more, not less, socially and economically explosive as time goes by. This means more instability going forward, and therefore more need to divert resources and attention to domestic issues as opposed to worrying about Ukraine. Indeed, it is likely that in the coming years – if it takes that long – more politicians might come to see substantial benefits in extricating their country from the Ukraine imbroglio, as a way to save money, tap into new voting pools, and even obtain better energy prices for their debilitated industries.

He concludes:

For all these reasons, and more, it is almost clear that not only the “5 per cent” NATO target is a chimera, but also the 3.5 by 2035 and even the 3 per cent by 2030 (or later). Whether we believe our own fantasies is neither here nor there, except for the fact that it undermines the credibility of the defence capacity we do have. The problem is that the adversary likely doesn’t share in our beliefs – because, whether it is the Russians or the Chinese, they look at facts and realities as they are and make their strategic moves accordingly.

We, on the other hand, choose to live in a world of our own artificial making, increasingly disconnected from the realities and the real balance of power. What we have now is a make-believe European defence policy, in which the US pretends it still guarantees our security and we pretend to pay for it. Let’s hope we won’t be tested anytime soon.

That last witticism is from a Soviet-era wisecrack: “We pretend to work and they pretend to pay us”.

Will the Europeans reform their economies, reduce their spending on welfare, and increase their spending on defense? I’ll believe it when I see it. Here’s France’s military spending as a percent of GDP from MacroTrends:

8 comments… add one
  • steve Link

    Isn’t this like the 10th time they have promised to increase military spending?

    Steve

  • Zachriel Link

    Your graph doesn’t show zero, so it makes it look like France doesn’t spend anything on defense. The United States also substantially decreased military spending after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

    In 2014, NATO countries agreed to military spending of 2% of GDP by 2024. While some countries lag, NATO Europe is now spending 2% of GDP. The United States spends about 3½%, but that includes the Pacific theater as well as the Atlantic, which is outside of NATO purview.

    For comparison, NATO Europe spent about $500 billion in 2024, while Russia spent about $150 billion, and that’s with Russia committing substantial resources to the war in Ukraine.

  • It’s hard to see but the percentages are shown. As of 2023 France spent just over 2% of GDP on defense. The base is zero.

  • According to SIPRI France (PDF) spent around 2.1% of GDP on defense in 2024.

  • Zachriel Link

    Dave Schuler: The base is zero.

    The base of the graph is at about 1½%.

    Dave Schuler: As of 2023 France spent just over 2% of GDP on defense.

    Which is consistent with the guideline set in the Wales Summit Declaration of 2014. NATO Europe outspends Russia by 3 to 1.

  • You keep saying that as though it were a Get Out of Jail free card. It’s irrelevant if 2% is insufficient to maintain sufficient readiness which seems to be the case and they only hit the 2% mark occasionally.

  • CuriousOnlooker Link

    I think Mr Elefteriu left out the option the Canadians and Germans chose (and I suspect most NATO countries will take), borrow to fund rearmament. In a previous comment I listed the reasons why I think the incentives are there for most countries the pledges will be followed by real action.

    Of course, borrowing isn’t sustainable, and in the 1920’s a similar de-globalizing, unsettled world with governments around the world on unsustainable fiscal paths led governments to slash military spending (the Washington naval treaty); sadly disarmament wasn’t enough to avoid the great depression, etc, etc. Now, governments are doing the opposite (every major power is increasing spending on military as % of GDP); what happens when there is a fiscal crisis and subsequent contagion (as seems ineveritable)?

  • Zachriel Link

    Dave Schuler: It’s irrelevant if 2% is insufficient to maintain sufficient readiness which seems to be the case and they only hit the 2% mark occasionally.

    That was the agreement, to be at 2% by 2024. However, the strategic situation has changed.

    Dave Schuler: You keep saying that as though it were a Get Out of Jail free card.

    Not at all. That defense spending should increase in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing war is broadly supported in Europe. France has already announced substantial increases going forward.

    Most important is preventing the collapse of Ukraine, for which the United States has shown itself to be an unreliable and mercurial partner. Responding to the threat will take more than mere money, but will also require a change in military doctrines.

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