A contradiction in terms

Is the talking at cross-purposes that’s going on both in the current presidential campaign and in the blogosphere a result of disagreement on the objectives in the present conflict or simple confusion on what specific terms mean? In a recent post Daniel Drezner (who apparently does understand what the terms mean) stirred up a furor of comments that clearly suggested the the commenters did not. In his post Mr. Drezner contrasts a good grand strategy with a poor policy process and a bad (or no) grand strategy with a good policy process. The ensuing comments on Mr. Drezner’s post nearly completely reflect a misunderstanding of the terms objectives, strategy, and tactics.

Clausewitzian war consists of several components: objectives, strategy, tactics, and logistics. Jeff Medcalf of Caerdroia correctly points out that an important distinction among these components is the level at which the activity takes place i.e. who does the work. Let’s examine a simple example. You live in Chicago. You’re going to visit your wife’s mother in St. Louis. The objective—going to St. Louis—is identified by the chief civilian authority (your mother-in-law). The strategy—leaving at 9:00am Friday, taking the Kennedy to the Stevenson Expressway and Interstate 55 to St. Louis—is determined by the general staff (your wife). The tactics—get into the car, put the key in the ignition, pull out of your parking space, etc.—are executed by the field officer (you). Logistics includes making sure your auto insurance is paid up, getting the car lubed and checked out for the trip, putting gas in the car, etc.

Here’s how Wikipedia defines grand strategy:

Grand Strategy is a neologism to describe the particular form of military science that decides the movement and use of a nation state’s resources, fleets and armies at a theatre or greater scope.

The grand strategy of the Cold War was containment.

Jeff articulates the objectives on the War on Terror clearly:

The President stated a goal for the US after 9/11: destroy terrorists able to strike internationally, and the governments which support them, in order to create a stable and peaceful international environment.

In his recent article World War IV Norman Podhoretz attempts to relate the doctrine defined by President Truman in 1947 to oppose the Soviet Union in the Cold War (World War III) to the new Bush Doctrine. Wretchard of Belmont Club summarizes Podhoretz’s description of the Bush Doctrine—the present administration’s grand strategy in the War on Terror:

1. The idea that Western civilization is worth fighting for in a contest with an ideology which aims to destroy it;
2. That regimes which abet this hostile ideology will be destroyed or reformed;
3. That America has the right not merely to respond, but to pre-empt enemy action; and
4. That the Arab-Israeli issues will be judged by their contribution to the goal of creating democratic institutions in the Middle East, and not upon any grounds of historical entitlement.

Removal of the Taliban in Afghanistan was the first step in executing this grand strategy. The removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq presumeably was the second. It can certainly be argued as to whether both or either of these moves was in America’s best interests. But that either these steps did not further the grand strategy or that they were executed poorly is simply untenable. That the Taliban and Saddam Hussein’s regime abetted the “hostile ideology” is a matter of record. And the removal of the regimes took place with historic dispatch and historically light casualities.

Frankly, I sincerely wish that there had been a more vigorous discussion both of the objectives in the War on Terror and the grand strategy used to achieve the objectives. The Senate was remiss in not having such a discussion when it voted to allow Mr. Bush to go to war with Iraq. But this was as it was and Mr. Kerry assented to it at the time.

Now Mr. Kerry seeks to replace the current administration in a time of war. To earn our vote it’s reasonable for Mr. Kerry either to accept the current objectives and grand strategy or to present his own alternatives since it is in the area of objectives and grand strategy that the responsibilities of the president lie.

No amount of good policy process can replace sound objectives and grand strategy.

You can’t get to St. Louis from Chicago on I90 regardless of the process you use in planning the trip.