There are better approaches to resolving the problems in Ukraine than escalating the conflict there, the path the U. S. is on, and Raymond Smith proposes one in his article at National Interest. He begins by articulating something near and dear to my heart, the idea that policy should advance vital national interests:
I suggest that America’s vital national interests can also be succinctly defined: 1) prevent an attack on the homeland; 2) enhance the stability of the international system; 3) fulfill our security-alliance commitments. The first of these is presumably clear enough in principle; the second and third perhaps less so. We want to maintain the stability of the international system, because we are the most powerful state in it and its structure is advantageous to us. If we are perceived as unwilling or unable to maintain our security-alliance commitments, that will have a profoundly destabilizing effect on the international system.
That’s a good list. I would add an additional one: freedom of air traffic, sea traffic, and the flow of information. But that’s a good list.
Here’s the summary of Mr. Smith’s article:
- The U. S. does not have a vital interest in Ukraine.
- Russia does.
- Giving arms to Ukraine escalates the conflict.
- That’s against our vital interests.
He proposes a trilateral trade agreement among the U. S., Russia, and Ukraine that would allow Ukraine to serve a different role than it would as a NATO member:
Ukraine could be a bridge between the West and Russia, rather than a prize to be fought over. Ukraine must negotiate a relationship with Russia that both countries can live with. There is no reason that cannot include an economic relationship with the European Union that encourages desperately needed reform within Ukraine, while at the same time promoting trilateral economic ties beneficial to all three parties. The EU leadership can help with this. If we have no vital interests in Ukraine, European countries do have vital interests in not seeing a large-scale ground war break out on their continent. The clarity of our decision making on this issue would improve if we stopped demonizing Russia’s leader. He is not Hitler, and Ukraine is not Czechoslovakia. Putin is an authoritarian leader in a country that has known nothing but authoritarianism and disorder, and prefers the former to the latter. His brand of authoritarianism is, to date, less restrictive than the political practices in China, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to name just a few. Russia considers its interests in Ukraine vital, but its objectives have been limited, as have been the means chosen to achieve them. It will escalate if necessary to protect its interests, but it would rather negotiate.
Such an agreement would need either to partition Ukraine or provide for Russian access to the Crimean peninsula and the rights of ethnic Russians within Ukraine but it’s a start.
And it has the advantage of advancing our interests rather than running counter to them as our present policy does.
Point #2):
enhance the stability of the international system;
Seems vague to the degree of uselessness. For instance, in the current situation, I would argue that Putin’s revanchism is enough of a threat that it affects our interests. That’s not to say that we should have sided with EU on bringing Ukraine into NATO, but it at least should be a buffer.
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are the buffer states for NATO. Outside of these was expansionist, and NATO & the EU are essentially trying to establish a European Empire. (Oh, no he didn’t. Yeah, he did.)
Roughly the line between the Catholic and the Orthodox. You’d need to look at a 16th century map of Europe to see what’s happening. Basically, turning back the clock to before Peter the Great.
I would date Peter as the biggest attempt to push the borders west, northwest, south, and southwest and consolidate these gains. He also sought to increase ties with Europe, and like almost Czars, he was mostly rebuffed.
These have always been vital economic interests to Russia, and there is no way to guarantee they remain free neutral states. At the first opportunity, NATO and the EU removed their free neutral status. They now have pledged their allegiance to NATO, and they are a fiefdom of the EU.
Europe and the US can define it how they like, but they cannot change reality. The Libyan military action was not defensive. It was an Empire protecting its economic assets, and any military or economic actions against Russia will include the formerly free neutral states.
Maybe, I have just seen too much of the ugly side of life, and I am a realist’s realist. Reality has consequences, and those consequences are not the nice pictures people like to imagine. Europeans are not nice people, and they will f*ck over anybody to get what they want.
Have to largely agree. Cant figure out what vital interest we have in Ukraine.
Steve
The proposed outline of an agreement on Ukraine sounds Luke it serves our interests well enough. But that’s only one of the three parties mentioned, not to mention many others.
Does that agreement serve Ukraine’s interests, as expressed by the current government (until it gets overthrown)? It doesn’t from what I gather. (Follow some Ukrainians on Twitter – a negotiated surrender isn’t what they want.)
And would that proposed agreement address the interests of the Russian government & Putin? I really think Putin is getting exactly what he wants at the moment and I see ne reason for him to stop at this point just to help America address its own interests.
I’m not sure “enhance” the stability of the international system is a very good statement of a vital national interest, i.e. “we will go to war” according to his definition.
I agree with the underlying sentiment, but this is worded so poorly as to not be useful. “Enhance” suggests incremental improvements; we are not going to war for improvements to the international system, let alone slight improvements. Is the international system actually stable? No, I don’t think it is, and I don’t think it can be stabilized. This “system” is too dynamic. And while I am not a realist, I believe a realist will claim that any international system dominated by a single hegemon (or even two) is inherently unstable.
I would say the U.S. has an interest in preserving the current international system. (Realists will say, the U.S. has an interest in preventing the rise of other great powers, but I disagree, if the other great powers don’t threaten the system)
Russia is seeking to form a challenge to that system and Ukraine is a piece in that design. We cannot ignore it. We cannot go to war over the piece, but we do need to develop longer term strategies, not all of them need be hostile. Without that understanding, we are simply reacting to events and putting ourselves in this position of having our interests eroded and announcing that we cannot go to war over this.
Russia also violated the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances which the U.S. signed. Ukraine gave up nukes for security assurances. Eliminating the nukes furthered U.S. interests (reduced risk of attack on homeland), but the violation of the treaty is a blow to similar efforts in the future. International support for such a treaty is part of the international system, and it was damaged. While it was also one of the most tepid of security assurances given by the U.S., the world watches. At the very least, we cannot achieve the same ends with the same promises in the future.
In short, all three of the interests are implicated here. His framework, not mine.
Whenever the FP establishment talks about “stability” alarm bells should go off. For them, “stability” is the Macguffin to justify any policy. We’ve acted to bring “stability” around the world since the end of the Cold War and look how that’s turned out.
To my eye we abandoned stability as an objective in 2001. We could have returned to it. We didn’t as 2003 demonstrated. I think it was an error.
@PD Shaw
A single superpower will bring instability because they cannot be everywhere at once, and “ruling with an iron fist” has diminishing returns the further away from the center you are. There needs to be a counterbalance(s) to a single superpower.
The counterbalance could be another superpower(s). While Russia and China may not be anywhere the superpower the US is, they can still provide stability to regional powers, and this will provide overall stability.
Even though the overall system may be stable, there still may be regional conflicts. Stability is achieved by keeping these regional. During the Cold War many of these were actually proxy wars between the US and the Soviet Union, and this was another method to keep the system stabilized.
The stability is merely tamping down the simmering unrest, and when the stabilizing force is removed, there is not the peaceful reaction assumed by people conditioned through a safe comfortable life to believe that everybody yearns for freedom. It comes as a shock to learn that they usually want to settle scores with weapons not votes.
When it comes to telling your enemy what you will or will not do, your actions speak louder than words. If I fake throwing a punch at you and you flinch, I know that I can walk all over you. You can talk as tough as you want. I can put a loaded gun in your hand with the barrel pointed at me, and as long as I do not threaten you or your family, you will never pull the trigger.
If you either do not flinch or beat the crap out of me, I have learned something different, and each instance is different.
When a jet buzzes your naval ship you can: (1) Warn them about getting too close. (2) Shoot it down, but apologize profusely. (3) Shoot it down, and warn against getting too close. (4) Mobilize for war.
Against thugs, you do not bluff. They are going to call your bluff by pushing you into actions you find offensive. Pretending like you are willing to do something about Ukraine but flinching is worse than just acknowledging it is a US concern only in relation to European priorities. Personally, I would not go that far.