I’ve been struggling to explain what I think about President Obama’s incipient deal with Iran and in those post I’ll try to do a better job at that. The quick summary of what I think about it is that Iran gets a great deal while the U. S. gets practically nothing if anything. I don’t think the deal is either a sign of the Apocalypse or a tremendous victory.
To understand why I think those things you’ve got to examine your assumptions. As I see it there are three practical possible assumptions:
- Iran is building a nuclear weapon.
- Iran isn’t building a nuclear weapon
- Iran is seeking “breakout capability”, the ability to build a nuclear weapon over a period of months, but can be dissuaded from doing that
There are other prospective assumptions but I don’t think they have any strategic difference from those three. For example, you might think that Iran is working on achieving “breakout capability” and can’t be dissuaded from building a nuclear weapon once they’ve accomplished that. From a strategic standpoint that’s no different from Iran building a nuclear weapon, the first assumption.
The reason i characterize these as assumptions is that we honestly don’t have any incontrovertible proof for any of them. They are all reasonable interpretations of the known facts, just more or less likely.
Now let’s look at different courses of action in the light of those assumptions.
| Assumption | Course of action | Outcome |
| Iran is building a nuclear weapon | The president’s deal | is a disaster. If you assume that Iran is building a nuclear weapon, that means they’re doing it covertly, they’ve bamboozled our intelligence apparatus, and undoubtedly will continue to do so. The deal does nothing to change that while allowing them more resources to do it with. |
| Letting the sanctions remain in place even if they decay over time | is not so bad. At least it keeps the pressure on the regime up. | |
| Letting the sanctions remain in place and taking action to bolster them. | is even better. We do have some influence in the world, including over Germany, Russia, and China. We have lots of carrots and sticks at our disposal. | |
| Iran is not building a nuclear weapon. | The president’s deal | We don’t get anything from the deal. The Iranians give up nothing and get sanctions relief. Sanctions relief for the Iranians is not a win for us because we have interests other than Iran’s nuclear development program. |
| Letting the sanctions remain in place | is not so bad. We gain a little time. We lose nothing. | |
| Letting the sanctions remain in place and taking action to bolster them | would be even better because we lose nothing and gain even more time. | |
| Iran is seeking “breakout capability” but can be dissuaded from building a bomb | The president’s deal | might contribute to the process of dissuading them. |
| Letting the sanctions remain in place even if they decay over time | might aggravate matters with the Iranians a little but probably not much. | |
| Letting the sanctions remain in place and taking action to bolster them | would actually make things worse by giving the Iranians more motivation to build a bomb. |
and that’s the calculus that leads me to my view. Do nothing. Leave the sanctions in place even if they decay over time, even if they decay pretty quickly. It minimizes downside risk.
The president’s plan looks best if you assume that the Iranians are seeking “breakout capability” but can be talked out of building a bomb. I think the evidence for that is extremely weak.
Note that I don’t include war with Iran as one of the possible courses of action. That’s consistent with the view I’ve expressed before: preventive war is immoral and illegal.
1) It is not so much that we don’t get anything as it costs us nothing. As you note, we lose nothing if sanctions fall. It is a nuclear deal, not a deal to keep Iran from engaging in war with Sunnis. If you want to impose sanctions on Iran with the idea of preventing their bad behaviors, then you should organize sanctions for that purpose.I will have to say that insisting on this for Iran is odd since it is Sunni Islam and the countries it dominates which has actually been responsible for terrorism against our country.
2) I think the chances of Iran being able to build a bomb while we have inspectors in country, with the terms of this deal, to be about zero. It looks like you don’t want to look at the details, but they matter. The deal is very comprehensive. If the Iranians were bright enough to be able to avoid discovery, they would be bright enough to already have nukes. Give any top university with a good physics, engineering and math department enough of the right material (HEU or plutonium) and money and they have a bomb in a few years.
3) “Note that I don’t include war with Iran as one of the possible courses of action. That’s consistent with the view I’ve expressed before: preventive war is immoral and illegal.”
If you were POTUS, then I wouldn’t worry about this. However, we likely get a GOP POTUS. Maybe one of the guys who talked about bombing Iran on day one. You can’t realistically come to a conclusion about the iran deal without taking this into account. It is the preferred outcome of many who oppose the deal.
Steve
And I think that the likelihood of Iran building a bomb with or without inspectors is about zero. You are assuming a version of assumption #1. If that’s the case, there’s nothing we can do to stop them.
In the final analysis you’re not convincing me. You’re just telling me that you disagree. I already know that.
Fortunately, it doesn’t really matter. The agreement is weak tea. We’d be no worse off if we just minimized downside risk. The administration is trying to maximize upside gain, willing to take the risk that they’re also maximizing downside risk. It’s a matter of preferences, of how you go about making decisions under conditions of uncertainty, not of right and wrong.
“In the final analysis you’re not convincing me. You’re just telling me that you disagree. I already know that.”
Probably, though I think I at least now know where you are coming from. For you, this is not about the nuclear deal, but getting something for us out of it. I suspect that means you want them to stop doing bad things. This is the same argument being made by the neocons and the Iraqi War advocates, so at least you are not alone.
However, your discounting war surprises me most of all. Of course you don’t want to go to war. How you can discount other people wanting to do so is unclear to me. This has clearly been the long term plan for leaders among the neocon right, i.e. those who control foreign policy on the right.
Steve
I think we can pretty much assume Iran is working on nuclear weapons.
Here’s why:
1) The Arak heavy water reactor has no peacetime application. Contrary to what President Obama said, the Iranians are insisting that Arak wil stay in operation.
2) If Iran weren’t trying to build nuclear weapons in violation of the NPT treaty, there would have been no need for the clandestine nature of the program or the underground, protected nature of sites like Fordo. They also wouldn’t be denying IAEA access to sites like Fordo and Parchin.
3) There’s a clear record of dealings between Iran and the North Koreans and with Pakistan’s notorious AQ Kahn, who ran what amounted to a nuclear supermarket. And the IAEA actually saw nuclear triggers in one of their inspections at Parchin in the past.
4) Enrichment isn’t needed for peaceful energy or medical uses Just ask Canada, Japan, the Netherlands or any number of countries whom have peaceful programs but no centrifuges for enrichment. The only reason to have that is for nuclear weapons.
5) If Iran’s program was peaceful, they would allow the IAEA to interview their scientists and would be forthcoming about their previous progress in the areas of weaponization. Without that information, there’s no way to estimate break out time, as a number of experts have said.
5) The essentially fascist nature of the Iranian regime. Based on past behavior, why take a chance?
With that in mind, there are other reasons not to support this ridiculous appeasement from America’s point of view. Iran is the major fomentor and supporter of Islamic terrorism. The regime has been responsible for the deaths of many Americans and was complicit in 9/11.
This deal, in exchange for nothing at all, gives this regime $150 billion dollars to upgrade its military and the arsenals of Hezbollah and Hamas. That’s in addition to the billions we’ve already given them for the mere privilege of talking to them. It is nothing less than material support for terrorism, which is supposedly against US law.
As for the sanctions, Thanks to President Obama, they’re history. Since the back channel negotiations Between Iran, Obama’s consigliere Iranian born Valerie Jarrett and Deputy Secretary of State William Burns starting in May of 2014, six months before John Kerry announced the so-called framework, the Obama Administration was handing out waivers for the asking and refusing to enforce major violation by countries like Russia and Turkey.
At this point, Russia, China and the EU desperately need cash and they are flocking to Iran to make deals. They won’t reimpose sanctions, and Russia’s Foreign Minister Serge Lavrov has already said as much.
Finally, this ‘deal’ is going to put the proliferation of nuclear weapons on steroids and make war more lightly. The Sunni Arab states are under no illusions about Iran. (Contrary to yet another lie told by the Obama regime, the Persian Gulf States do NOT support this appeasement)
They will want nukes of their own. And there’s no telling what Israel, faced with what she rightly considers an existential threat might do. War has been made far more likely.
The right thing to do was to tighten the sanctions unmercifully and give Khamenei a choice between nuclear weapons and an economy.
The other option was to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities utterly. Unlike Dave, I do not consider a pre-emptive strike against an imminent threat to our country to be immoral. One doesn’t let a rattler or a rabid dog wander at will in his yard simply because he hasn’t attacked you yet,
President Obama had no intention of stopping Iran’s nuclear program. He wants Iran to be our new best friend in the Middle East and to destroy to the extent he can America’s relationship with Israel and the Persian Gulf nations. It is unbelievable folly, given the nature of the Iranian regime.
In short, this deal is a colossal sellout, designed by this president to
kick the can down the road. It will cost America dearly in blood and treasure in the future, and I consider it de facto (as opposed to de jure) treason.
Thanks for laying that out but I’m not sure it makes it much clearer.
I do agree that intentions are difficult to determine and I think your assumptions are a good starting point. Although I’ve long maintained the theory that Iran lost any strategic need for nukes after we destroyed Iraq, there wasn’t anyway to tell for sure. The negotiations were, in my view, important as a test of Iranian intentions. If Iran was as hell-bent on a bomb as some believe, then that would have become apparent in the final deal or, more likely there would have been no deal at all. That Iran actually agreed to what they did is pretty strong evidence that Iran’s intentions are either no bomb or hedging. The reason is that the provisions of this agreement will make it very, very difficult for Iran to successfully build a covert bomb program despite what people may claim.
Secondly, there are assumptions that underlie the ones you mention – namely, what is our goal when it comes to Iran? There is one set of people who prioritize nuclear non-proliferation and another group of people who prioritize regime change and/or punishment (there are others, but these two groups represent the majority views). The people who prioritize a regime change/punishment end-state don’t like this agreement and would not like any similar agreement because it does to further their goals.
So, the problem I have with your table is that it appears to be based on the underlying “regime change/punishment” worldview. For example, under the “Iran is building a nuclear weapon” assumption option two and three don’t mention that sanctions would do very little to stop Iran’s nuclear progress. You write in option one that this agreement is “a disaster” if Iran intends to build a bomb yet you turn around and argue that somehow fewer restrictions on Iranian capabilities (ie. the status quo) is somehow better. I don’t see how one can cross that T unless Iran’s nuclear capabilities are secondary to other concerns.
That’s the point I made in a comment to a recent post – without this deal (or refusing to negotiate all all, as some preferred), there are two big tradeoffs:
1) Iran will continue to technically progress despite sanctions and
2) The ability to know what Iran is or isn’t doing is greatly diminished.
I don’t see many opponents of this deal willing to acknowledge these tradeoffs. Then there is the question of alternatives and opponents really don’t have anything coherent to offer.
Basically, I think that if Iran really wanted a nuclear weapon they’d already have one. The regime’s present objective is to get sanctions lifted. They’ve already accomplished that. Our wish should be regime change in Iran—it’s a thoroughly deplorable, offensive regime, determined to wreak havoc in the Middle East. Not an objective because I don’t think we should pursue it other than as we already have.
Where I differ from you I think is that I don’t think you’ve processed the implications of Iran’s not developing a nuclear weapon completely. If they’re not developing a nuclear weapon, inspections are moot. By definition they won’t produce anything because there’s nothing to produce. In order to think that sanctions matter you must as a matter of logic believe they want to develop a nuclear weapon.
Once you believe they want to develop a nuclear weapon, you are driven to the conclusion that the sanctions are inadequate because of their many limitation, i.e. known sites, non-military sites, etc.
I’ve come to the conclusion that the Iranians aren’t joking. They don’t want a nuclear weapon for reasons that Pat Lang has outlined.
Thank you, Rob. I had hoped you would join in the discussion.
Which is why I think the agreement is weak tea.
“At this point, Russia, China and the EU desperately need cash and they are flocking to Iran to make deals. They won’t reimpose sanctions, and Russia’s Foreign Minister Serge Lavrov has already said as much.”
Thank you Rob. As I keep saying, we have a good viable deal. The rest of the world knows this. The rest of the world has approved the deal. We have not due to our politics, not on the merits of the nuclear deal. We want regime change, or something, out of what was intended to be a nuclear deal. It was, in my estimation, surprising that Russia and China participated to begin with, but they clearly did so for a nuclear deal, not to try to turn Iran into Sweden. They are already beginning to bail, and Japan, China and nearly every major EU country has already sent trade delegations. Sanctions are going to fall, probably sooner, if we don’t sign this deal. Then we get nothing, maybe. No way to monitor their activity, unless they choose to honor it with the other 5 who approved it.
What comes next is worrisome. President Walker will select another group of neocon, New American Century advisors. They had Iraq in their sights before, and managed to make up reasons of us to invade Iraq. Absent this deal, the most intrusive monitoring anyone has ever accepted, it will be easy to again lie about another Muslim country having nukes. Off we go to war again.
As to Rob’s other points.
1) If they keep the reactor going they will be breaking the terms of the deal. They have their own internal political issues. Not too worried about this.
2) Exposed sites get bombed.
3) At other times the IAEA has said they found no trigger. I think there is a pretty active misinformation campaign going on. If we want to know what is really going on we need inspectors there. Approve the deal and we get to know.
4) Nope. It can used for medical purposes and for fuel. Canada doesn’t need to enrich since it can get it from us. Can Iran rely upon outside sources? Is there a history of other countries imposing sanctions and limiting imports? Yup.
5) I suspect that when Saddam had them worried they might have started looking at making nukes. However, reports since note that if they had one, it stopped long ago. This is totally unimportant if we have actual inspectors in the country. The official Iranian stand is that they will have no nukes. This is really just an effort to embarrass Iran’s leaders.
6) Yup, they are bad guys. However, if you want regime change, shouldn’t we be focused on the countries which have done us the most harm? Anyway, what is our success record on regime change efforts? Not good in my estimation. I am hard pressed to come up with positive examples. Chile? We got free markets there now. So what if he killed thousands and tortured a bunch of people in the process. Libya? That was great. Bay of Pigs? Outstanding. Iraq? They welcomed us as liberators. Iran. Oh yeah, we did that before. What could go wrong again?
Steve
” If they’re not developing a nuclear weapon, inspections are moot. By definition they won’t produce anything because there’s nothing to produce.”
Well, their intentions weren’t completely clear and many still believe Iran is hell-bent on a bomb. Secondly, this isn’t just about the present, but the future as well. Iran’s situation could change and so could their decision on whether they believe a bomb is necessary. Third, without a more robust verification regime (which this agreement will provide), we would be hard pressed to know whether Iran changed its calculus and decided to pursue a weapon. Fourth, this agreement serves as a deterrent for that since it greatly increases the chance of getting caught with a covert program.
If the Iranians are hell-bent on developing a bomb and can’t be deterred (which is what you’ve said above), inspecting known, non-military sites changes nothing. They’ll just maintain a covert program and there’s nothing we can do about it.
Assuming that they have no covert program (which means they have no nuclear weapons development program) why wasn’t a much slower, more measured program of confidence-building, possibly over a decade, leading up to an even more robust inspections regime and gradual relaxation of sanctions a better strategy?
“They’ll just maintain a covert program and there’s nothing we can do about it.”
I don’t think that is possible with a modern inspections regime.
“an even more robust inspections regime”
What could we have done that would be more robust, other than shorten the 24 day period?
Steve
Well, for one thing the regime that the Obama Administration said it wanted, “any time, anywhere”.
“If the Iranians are hell-bent on developing a bomb and can’t be deterred (which is what you’ve said above), inspecting known, non-military sites changes nothing. They’ll just maintain a covert program and there’s nothing we can do about it.”
The argument that they can just maintain a covert program and there is nothing we can do about it is an assertion without much basis in fact or history.
Secondly, the only “anytime, anywhere” inspections in modern history were in Iraq after they lost a war. While I agree it would be nice to have that kind of access in Iran, it is not possible outside of the use of force – it is something no country would willingly agree to, for reasons that should be obvious. It also isn’t that necessary. Iran tried (and failed) several times in 2002-2003 to hide its activities from a much less intrusive inspections regime (see, for instance, the Kaleye Electric Facility). Syria razed and buried their reactor after Israel bombed it, they scraped the ground, removed all the equipment, built a new building on top of the site and yet eight months later sampling detected nuclear and other material associated with a covert reactor. 24 days is not that big of a deal.