Could someone please explain to me the non-rhetorical differences between Sen. Obama’s Iraq policy and Sen. McCain’s Iraq policy? I think I’ve become confused. Citations would be helpful.
As best as I can tell Sen. Obama intends to leave a substantial force in Iraq and call it withdrawal and Sen. McCain intends to leave a substantial force in Iraq and call it victory. The sole difference I can see is that Sen. Obama sees the missions for the force as operations against Al Qaeda in Iraq (if any), training the Iraqi military, protecting U. S. assets in the country, and force protection while Sen. McCain would add to those missions providing security for the Iraqi people as required.
This is a sincere question. I’m not being snarky.
Both candidate’s statements on the desired end-state in Iraq are vague enough to deny us the ability to make any kind of cogent comparison. That is a good thing, imo, because it is unwise to commit to a course of action that may later proved untenable. I tend to think that the end-states likely will not differ all that much, and will include a force level that is sustainable over the long-term and focused more on assistance and force protection.
The main difference is how and under what conditions each would get to their respective vaporous end-state. For Obama, forces should be reduced pretty-much irrespective of conditions on the ground and, in fact, he’s previously stated that a force reduction would essentially be a catalyst for political compromise and reform. McCain essentially believes that troop reductions should be conditions-based and tied to security and political progress.
I think what Dr. George Friedman of STRATFOR wrote back in February of this year is still largely relevant today:
I think it’s safe to say that Obama’s position has probably shifted even more since that was written, despite his frequent protests that his position has been consistent all along.
The irony of the reduction in violence in Iraq is (assuming the trend continues), that the Iraq policy of either candidate is likely to be very similar whoever gets elected. Conditions on the ground, provided they continue to improve or at least stay constant into next year, will favor a reduction in force for McCain since both the security and political situation will have improved. It is also serendipitous timing for Obama’s timetable reduction. So I think there is even less of a difference between the candidates – as in what they will actually do – than there was back in February.
The key difference is in the minds of the beholders. Democrats hear what they want to in Obama’s message, and Republicans likewise in McCain’s. On paper not much tangible difference. The difference is all dog whistles.
Actually, I think that there is a real and tangible difference. I think that McCain is signaling that he will fight in Iraq and Afghanistan and wherever else is needed to preserve and expand our strategic position vis a vis al Qaeda. I think Obama is signaling that he wants to go back to (at best) the Clinton or (at worst) the Carter view of engagement in the ME area; in particular, that he favors removing our military and our bases entirely to offshore, then engaging diplomatically only, even if that means the fall of governments friendly to us. (Indeed, he seems to reserve his hostility for those who are friendly to us, and treat diplomatically with those who are hostile to us. Odd, that.)
In any case, the opportunity risk matrix is something like this:
McCain Opportunity:
Continued military gains against jihadis and hardline stance against Iran spark representative government reformation across the region (low probability), increase respect for the US (high probability), decrease odds of attacks in US (high probability) and curb future adventurism against US interests abroad (moderate probability).
McCain Risk:
Continued US reliance on military engagement sparks political backlash against US in ME, setting back possibilities of government reform (low probability, unless McCain overreaches); reduces political willingness of European and Asian governments to work with us except in their direct interest (low to moderate probability); and increases determination of China and Russia to undermine US “adventurism” with assistance to regimes we consider pariahs (high probability).
Obama Opportunity:
Decreased emphasis on military engagement and increased emphasis on diplomacy cause reduced tensions with Europe, Russia and China (high probability) leading to more tangible support for US initiatives from those governments (low probability); reduce appeal of jihadis (low probability); reduce the odds of attacks in the US (moderate probability); and reduce adventurism against US interests abroad (low probability).
Obama Risk:
Decreased emphasis on military engagement and increased emphasis on diplomacy lead to increased adventurism against US interests abroad (high probability) and in the US (low probability, unless Obama dismantles post-9/11 security changes), increased opposition from Russia and China (moderate probability), increased prestige of jihadis high probability), and fall of friendly governments (high probability) accompanied by high levels of violence (moderate to high probability).
Now, I cannot support either candidate, and will not be voting for either. But on foreign policy at least, I see McCain as far ahead in terms of the best interests of the US.
Short version:
Until his recent “refinement” that inserted some additional wiggle words, the Obama policy was to establish a short forced timeline for full removal of all combat troops, to commence immediately and be completed as rapidly as physically possible. See the Iraq War De-escalation Act of 2007 as submitted in the Senate. Said plan (according to Obama) allowed for “a limited number of U.S. troops to remain as basic force protection, to engage in counter-terrorism, and to continue the training of Iraqi security forces.” Said plan was to be enacted regardless of actual conditions in Iraq.
McCain’s plan is simply to remain in strength as long as needed, drawing down as indicated by actual conditions in Iraq, and/or until the Iraqi government tells us to get out. No timelines, no forced drawdowns by rote timetable regardless of conditions, no weasel-wording about “basic force protection.”
That about covers it.